FRENCH DIPLOMAT CALLS FOR RETURN TO NAIVASHA-STYLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001278 NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINS CH FR SU SUBJECT: FRENCH DIPLOMAT CALLS FOR RETURN TO NAIVASHA-STYLE TALKS Classified By: CDA Robert E. Whitehead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In an October 21 meeting with Polchief and Poloff, French Deputy Chief of Mission Denis Douveneaux praised Chadian President Idris Deby as a "peacemaker," and placed the blame squarely on Libya for arming and funding insurgents in the Darfur region. He expressed doubts that unity would be possible between North and South Sudan, and said that, if the Southerners chose to secede in the upcoming referendum, both North and South would rapidly spiral into failure. He recommended instead that all parties return to the negotiating table to arrive at a confederation agreement, saying that it would be far safer to abandon the CPA entirely, than it would be to allow Sudan to split. End summary. -------------- Chad Not to Blame for Darfur Troubles -------------- ¶2. (C) In an October 21 meeting with Polchief and Poloff, Douveneaux praised Deby as a peacemaker, saying that he had made good-faith efforts to defuse the Darfur conflict before being rebuffed by the Government of Sudan (GoS). Nonetheless, he noted that Chad-French relations have cooled in recent years, due to a 2007 scandal involving a French NGO that was convicted of kidnapping a number of Chadian "orphans" from Darfur, many of whom were not orphans at all. Douveneaux described the NGO members as well-intentioned, but misguided, and said that the matter was an embarrassment to the French. According to Douveneaux, France views President Deby as an "exotic" figure, and does not take him seriously in politics. He remained optimistic that Chad-Sudan relations were on the road to improvement, despite the fact that "there is absolutely no trust between Bashir and Deby." -------------- Referendum Will Bring Problems -------------- ¶3. (C) Douveneaux took a dim view of North-South relations, saying that Sudan would probably split after the referendum, with disastrous results. The North, stripped of its oil wealth, would spiral into chaos, and face the secession of other geographical regions, such as Darfur and the East. He believes the Government of Sudan would attempt to retain its sovereignty by enlisting the financial backing of rogue states such as Iran and Eritrea, potentially becoming a hotbed for religious and political extremism. As for the South, they would attempt to sever ties with the North, which would include redirecting their oil experts through a proposed pipeline to Nairobi, rather than through Port Sudan. Lacking critical infrastructure, the South would rely heavily on donor states for financial backing. "In essence," Douveneaux said, "you will see two failed states, two more Somalias, in an already fragile area, and we cannot allow this to happen." -------------- Negotiate a Confederation -------------- ¶4. (C) The only realistic alternative, according to Douveneaux, is to forego the referendum, and return all stakeholders from the negotiations that took place in Naivasha, Kenya from 2003 to 2005 to the negotiating table. Douveneaux believes that North and South must find a way to function as a confederation, and steer clear of the referendum, which would lead to secession. This, however, would violate the terms of the CPA. Douveneaux explained that he was willing to accept such a violation, or even abandonment of the CPA, if such recourse could stave off the cataclysmic separation he predicts. "The Western world could even handle a resurgence of civil war in Sudan," he said, "but if the states split they will inevitably fail, and destabilize the entire region." He added that Egypt would suffer the immediate brunt of a North-South split. ¶5. (C) Douveneaux also urged the United States to give careful thought to post-referendum plans. He named wealth sharing, currency, banking, and Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) as areas that must be well-planned ahead of time, to smooth the transition to separation. ¶6. (C) Comment: We cannot say if Douveneaux's comments reflect his personal view or the thinking of some segment of the Paris policy apparatus, but they are considerably more frank than usual. We think it highly unlikely that Southern Sudanese could be cajoled, convinced or bullied into returning to Naivasha talks that would put the self-determination referendum on the table. Northern Sudanese would leap at the chance. End comment. WHITEHEAD