GHAZI ADDRESSES CHAD-SUDAN DETENTE, DARFUR PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001273 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S, AF/C, AF/E NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL UN AU SU CH SUBJECT: GHAZI ADDRESSES CHAD-SUDAN DETENTE, DARFUR PEACE PROCESS, OUTSTANDING CPA ISSUES REF: A. A) N'DJAMENA 522 ¶B. B) KHARTOUM 1271 Classified By: CDA Robert E. Whitehead, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On November 11, CDA Whitehead met with Presidential Advisor Dr. Ghazi Salaheddin to discuss the sequencing of the Chad-Sudan Dtente Process (ref a),the lag in the Darfur peace process, and the ongoing bilateral discussions between the SPLM and the NCP to resolve outstanding Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) issues. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Ghazi said that he had spoken with Chadian Foreign Minister Faki the prior day, and affirmed the sequencing of Chad-Sudan confidence building measures as reported ref a. Ghazi noted that ongoing GOS cantonment of Chadian rebels was a "delicate" matter, given the need to re-locate the rebels to a habitable place without disturbing the local populace. He was happy to report, however, that following his most recent meeting with President Bashir and Minister of Defense Abdelrahman Hussein, the GOS has identified a suitable area in which to re-position the Chadian rebels in Darfur. (Note: Ghazi did not specify where. End Note.) He continued that the next step in the dtente process was the dispatch of a technical military inspection team to Chad to verify that there are no longer JEM bases there, to be followed by a high-level GOC delegation to Khartoum led by Minister Faki. ¶3. (C) CDA asked for the GOS perspective on the revival of the Dakar Accord Contact Group, to which Ghazi responded that the GOS agreed in principle but that he preferred the bilateral path based on the 2006 Tripoli Accord. "Of all the six agreements we've signed (regarding Chad),this has the potential to be the most effective," he asserted. That said, he thought that the revival of the Dakar Accord could bolster implementation of the Tripoli accord. "The Dakar Accord without the Tripoli accord will not work. The Tripoli Accord can work by itself, but will be better with Dakar," he concluded. ¶4. (C) With regard to the Doha peace process, Ghazi noted that had received a message from Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole inviting him to planned talks in Doha on November 18. Bassole told Ghazi that the upcoming talks may be attended by JEM's Khalil Ibrahim and intransigent SLA Chairman Abdul Wahid, which Ghazi admitted would be "a major step forward." Otherwise, he lamented, it appears that Bassole and the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) have "no clear plan" on how to move the peace process forward. Ghazi, who is traveling to Paris November 12 to discuss Chadian issues with the GOF, will also meet Bassole there. ¶5. (C) CDA raised the prospect of a S/USSES-sponsored rebel unification conference in Jebel Marra to take place later this month. Ghazi said that SE Gration had raised the notion with him in Moscow, but that the GOS has not yet been officially informed of such an undertaking. He expressed surprise that the conference might bring together several hundred participants; he had expected a more discreet event consisting of a dozen or so individuals. If the conference is to proceed, Ghazi noted, he would have to convince the GOS military and intelligence apparatus about the benefits of such a conference, adding that "we ourselves need to be convinced." He remarked that "such a meeting could send a positive signal, but it could send a wrong signal as well." Charge urged Ghazi to contact SE Gration directly to discuss this issue. ¶6. (C) With regard to the ongoing bilateral talks between the NCP and the SPLM to resolve outstanding issues of the CPA, Ghazi noted that the NCP continues to seek a "package deal." On popular consultations in the Two Areas, Ghazi noted the NCP has yielded to the SPLM's insistence that such consultations be legislated, but remains wary that the SPLM may still seek to turn this initiative into a referendum on self determination, as in Abyei. Rather, the NCP sees popular consultations as a way to "take the pulse" of the residents on issues of wealth sharing, power sharing, and other such arrangements, he said. He also confirmed there has been some narrowing of differences over four disputed provisions in the Security Act. ¶7. (C) Ghazi reported that on Abyei, a considerable gap in positions remains over the definition of an Abyei resident. The SPLM continues to favor Ngok Dinka with no mention of Misseriya, with other residents' qualification to vote in the referendum determined by proven status there since 1/1/1956. (Note: This date is not stipulated in the Abyei protocol. In KHARTOUM 00001273 002 OF 002 a midnight meeting with NCP negotiators on November 10, they also suggested to CDA scheduling the Abyei Referendum after the dust had settled from the Referendum in South Sudan, perhaps not a bad idea but certainly a violation of the timeline contained in the CPA. End note.) The NCP still favors the Abyei Referendum Commission (ARC) as the final arbiter of who is qualified to vote. (Note. Given the NCP's preference for an eight person ARC with co-chairs, this would be a recipe for future impasse. End note.) On the Referendum, Ghazi confided that while they have not yet tabled the proposal, the NCP is prepared to accept a lower turnout requirement of 60 percent with a 50 1 vote, along with a re-run if turnout if insufficient in the initial go. On the census, the NCP is willing to return to an earlier option whereby an undetermined number of MPs are appointed to parliament, without this becoming a permanent arrangement, he said. ¶8. (C) Comment: From where we sit, it appears the NCP has yielded a good deal of ground on a number of the issues, and has been open in sharing its positions and concerns with us. We have had more limited contact with the SPLM, which has been more reticent about revealing its evolving positions and shown limited willingness to engage the NCP in flexible give and take. Both sides report that the atmosphere surrounding the talks is good, and wish to keep it that way. The final round of negotiation is slated to start at 10:00 a.m. today, November 11, after which the SPLM delegation will return to Juba. Barring more flexibility on both sides, but particularly by the SPLM, we do not expect a final package deal to emerge today. It remains to be seen if this will result in continued SPLM boycott of the National Assembly and the Council of Ministers in Khartoum. WHITEHEAD