GOSS VP MACHAR GIVEN MISSION IMPOSSIBLE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001240 SIPDIS NSC FOR MGAVIN, ETIM DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV SU SUBJECT: GOSS VP MACHAR GIVEN MISSION IMPOSSIBLE? REF: KHARTOUM 1232 Classified By: CDA ROBERT E. WHITEHEAD FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. ¶1. (C) Summary: Over two days of meetings, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) told the United States Special Envoy (SE) to Sudan General Scott Gration that it was interested in negotiating a broad "package deal" with its Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) partner the National Congress Party (NCP). The package would include: a) introduction of the Southern Sudan Referendum law with both a pass/fail and voter turnout quorum of 50 percent plus 1; b) introduction of a Popular Consultations law for Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan; c) introduction of an Abyei Referendum law; d) agreement on 2010 budget; and d) revision of the following laws to conform with the CPA: National Security; Criminal Procedure; Criminal; Public Order; and Trade Union. While the SPLM was clear on its demands, it was far less coherent on what it would be willing to give in exchange. End Summary. -------------- Big vs Small Package Deal -------------- ¶2. (C) SE Gration met with SPLM leadership, including Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) President Salva Kiir, from October 30 to November 1. During the meetings, SE Gration stressed the need for the SPLM to clearly delineate what an immediate "package deal" with the NCP should contain, and what issues it would subsequently resolve. Gration suggested that the parties might pair their top priorities - Southern Sudan Referendum and Census/Elections - and attempt to negotiate a deal on those two key issues. The SPLM countered that it must finalize all outstanding issues at once. It argued that were the NCP to secure its top priority of elections, it would not be able to be trusted to enter into negotiations on the other outstanding issues. ¶3. (C) Perhaps more importantly, the SPLM also acknowledged that due to internal party issues as well as competition from other Southern political parties, it could not be perceived as only concerned with the Southern Sudan referendum at the expense of other important constituents, such as Northern opposition allies, the SPLM northern sector, and the peoples of Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Abyei. A senior SPLM member relayed to the SE's party that Blue Nile Governor Malik Agar told him, "If you (Southern Sector SPLM) are going to sell us out, at least do so at a higher price." -------------- Elections and Referendum -------------- ¶4. (C) Gration concurred that the sooner all outstanding issues were resolved, the better. However he cautioned that if the SPLM wanted to try and secure a "maximalist" package, it would also need to be prepared to offer "maximalist" compromises. Turning to specifics, Gration probed as to whether we could find an acceptable number for the referendum quorum that was between the two proposals currently on the table of 50 percent plus 1 and 66 percent; and/or institute safeguards into the law that would allow for a lower turnout if the exercise were disrupted by violence. Although senior SPLM members had previously conveyed that they could live with the NCP's proposed turnout, SPLM members who opposed the NCP position appeared to have carried the point for now. The SPLM told the SE that a referendum quorum of 50 percent plus 1 was a "red line." ¶5. (C) On elections, key SPLM members were willing to show greater flexibility, to include abstaining from running a presidential candidate against Bashir as the "ultimate trump card." However, it became rapidly clear that this was not a consensus view among all members of the SPLM. In a follow-up meeting between the SE and GoSS Vice President Riek Machar in Khartoum, Machar was adamant that such a decision would have to be taken by the SPLM National Liberation Council. Machar maintained that SPLM abstention from the presidential elections would lead to "chaos and possibly war," adding that it would undermine the work that the SPLM has done with northern opposition parties and split the SPLM. Machar concluded that "even Kiir did not have the authority to trade that one away on his own." KHARTOUM 00001240 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Gration pressed Machar for what the SPLM would be willing to give the NCP in exchange for receiving its maximalist package. "The SPLM is very good at telling me what it wants; but is not so adept at prioritizing concerns, or at saying what it is willing to give." Machar replied that the NCP should not expect to be incentivized for meeting its CPA obligations -- "that's its job." He thought, however, that the SPLM would possibly be able to "help" the NCP by engaging in post 2011 discussions and supporting it on some of the Darfur-related issues. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The SPLM continues to be pulled in different directions based on the interests of its diverse constituents. Machar and the SPLM northern sector persist in pushing for a nationalist agenda that includes tertiary issues such as the trade union law in the "negotiating package." Others such as Foreign Minister Deng Alor and Blue Nile Governor Malik Aggar are keen to make sure that the "package" protects their interests in Abyei and Blue Nile respectively. Machar is known to harbor ambitions to bear the SPLM standard as candidate for the national presidency. The SPLM will need to prioritize these issues before negotiations with the NCP. Still others are focused only on the Southern Sudan referendum. ¶8. (U) This cable has been cleared by the SE's party. WHITEHEAD