Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KHARTOUM1239
2009-11-04 06:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY GRATION MEETS MUTRIFF SIDDIQ

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS SU 
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FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4686
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0148
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001239 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS SU
SUBJECT: U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY GRATION MEETS MUTRIFF SIDDIQ

Classified By: CDA Robert E. Whitehead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001239 SIPDIS NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS SU SUBJECT: U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY GRATION MEETS MUTRIFF SIDDIQ Classified By: CDA Robert E. Whitehead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. In a November 2 meeting with U.S. Special Envoy (SE) to Sudan General Scott Gration, Mutriff Siddiq, Government of Sudan (GoS) Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, welcomed the new U.S. Sudan policy as a step forward. Siddiq said that the issues in Darfur were difficult but surmountable. Siddiq was less optimistic about the situation in the south and he questioned the resolve of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to negotiate and implement outstanding issues in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Siddiq was emphatic that referendum terms and post-referendum issues must be negotiated as a package. It appears that post-referendum arrangements are a deal-breaker for the GoS, and a referendum in the south will have no chance of proceeding peacefully until at least some of these issues are addressed. End Summary. -------------- New USG Sudan Policy "a Step Forward" -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Siddiq said the new Sudan policy is "not up to our ambitions," but that it is "a step forward." He said that the U.S. goals in the plan are shared by the GoS, and in this sense, the U.S. plan is what he would have written himself. Siddiq said that the GoS is committed to moving forward and if the GoS is supported by the United States in this process, they will welcome it. -------------- Situation in Darfur Surmountable -------------- ¶3. (C) Siddiq said that the situation in Darfur is not benefiting the GoS. He said that the Sudan Armed Forces and police are suffering significant casualties trying to maintain stability in Darfur. He also said that most of the carjackings in Darfur are committed by members of the Arab tribes. This lawlessness is hurting the GoS, but outsiders continue to view the Arab tribes as allies of the GoS. He added, though, that the problems in Darfur are "surmountable," while issues in the south are going in an unpromising direction. -------------- Why Riek Machar? -------------- ¶4. (C) Siddiq asked why, if the SPLM is interested in negotiating a solution to outstanding CPA implementation issues, they continue to send Riek Machar, Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan, as their negotiator? Siddiq noted that twice Machar has reached agreement with his negotiating partner GoS Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, and twice the SPLM has rejected the resulting agreement. Siddiq suggested that the SPLM send anyone else, even a radical SPLM member such as Pagan Amum, as long as that person has a mandate to reach a binding agreement. -------------- -- Referendum and Post-referendum Issues a Package -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Siddiq reassured SE Gration that the Southern referendum will be held in January 2011, but was emphatic that referendum terms and post-referendum issues must be negotiated as a package. Siddiq said that post-referendum issues must be addressed prior to agreement on referendum procedures because the SPLM could promise to negotiate these post-referendum issues, and then simply refuse, or make unreasonable demands. He said that it is crucial that referendum participants know the consequences of secession when they make their decision. ¶6. (C) Comment: Siddiq's stance that post-referendum arrangements be negotiated concurrently with the terms of the referendum repeats a unified message coming from the GoS. Binding the referendum procedures and the post-referendum issues into a package deal will definitely make their negotiation more complicated. On the other hand, post-referendum arrangements may be the highest priority of the GoS, just as the referendum is the highest priority of the SPLM, and the GoS will be reluctant to lose their KHARTOUM 00001239 002 OF 002 negotiating leverage on the latter by reaching an early agreement on the former. It seems likely that a referendum in the south will have a limited chance of proceeding peacefully until at least some of these issues are addressed including wealth sharing, soft borders, and citizenship. End Comment. WHITEHEAD

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