MINNAWI SEEKS GREATER ENGAGEMENT WITH QATAR AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000012 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2019 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: MINNAWI SEEKS GREATER ENGAGEMENT WITH QATAR AND JOINT MEDIATION SUPPORT TEAM REF: A. KHARTOUM 1848 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1572 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a January 4 meeting with CDA Fernandez, Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minnawi expressed a desire for greater involvement of SLM-MM in the Darfur peace process. He lamented that he has yet to be contacted by Qatari officials about proposed peace talks in Doha, but noted that his movement was nonetheless drafting proposals to guide its involvement in those talks as an independent party. Minnawi also asserted the need for greater engagement with the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST),including a direct line of communication with Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole not encumbered by UNAMID. Minnawi reported no progress on the September 19 El Fasher Agreement on accelerated DPA implementation, and noted that he had rejected an alternative proposal from Ali Osman Taha and Nafie Ali Nafie emanating from the Sudan People's Initiative (SPI). Minnawi also expressed an eagerness to introduce himself and his movement to the incoming US administration. End Summary. ¶2. (U) On January 4, CDA Fernandez met with Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minnawi at his residence in Khartoum. Minnawi recounted his recent visit to Asmara for consultations with President Isaias Afwerke (ref A). Minnawi said that Afwerke proclaimed he is no longer encouraging Darfur rebel movements and decried their fragmentation and lack of political vision. Afwerke now believes that Sudan's problems cannot be solved piece meal but require a more holistic approach. He was similarly unhappy with the SPLM, noting that "instead of solving the problem, they've become part of it," according to Minnawi. Minnawi also stated that during his visit to Asmara, the SLM-MM signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with President Afwerke's People's Front for Democracy and Justice party, to include cooperation on capacity building activities, "but this was just propaganda". With regard to his trip to Cairo to meet with the Arab League, Minnawi stated that it had been postponed as a result of the crisis in Gaza. He noted that his priorities for that meeting were to ensure that Arab assistance funds for Darfur come directly to the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) and not to Bashir's NCP, and to obtain a better understanding of next steps in the peace process. ¶3. (C) Minnawi stated that there has been zero progress on the September 19 El Fasher agreement he brokered with Ali Osman Taha to accelerate implementation of the DPA (ref B). He said that this agreement appears to be forgotten as Taha and Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie recently proposed to him a re-shuffling of the DPA Implementation High Commission to include numerous Darfur Arabs, including Musa Hilal. "I rejected this on the basis that they are all NCP members or NCP supporters," said Minnawi. "And as Arabs having rejected the DPA, how will they implement it?" Minnawi stated that Taha told him privately that the proposal was made to placate Darfur's Arab community, and that he should not worry because the triumvirate of Taha, Nafie and Minnawi would wield the real power in this arrangement; Minnawi said he rejected the proposal nonetheless. ¶4. (C) With regard to the peace process, Minnawi stated that up to now Qatar remains an "unknown initiative" and that despite many assurances, he has yet to be contacted by Qatari officials. He concurred with CDA Fernandez that the Qataris are discovering that bringing peace to Darfur is a much greater challenge than they anticipated. He stated that SLM-MM is currently drafting proposals to guide its potential role in proposed peace talks, and is seeking assurances from Qatar that they are capable of the exercise. "We need to understand whether their role will be that of a mediator, a facilitator, or simply a host," he said. He also asserted that unless the DPA was implemented, SLM-MM would unquestionably attend any future talks not as part of the GOS but rather as an independent entity. Minnawi promised to pass on SLM-MM's proposal for talks in Qatar when it was completed, and noted that SLM-MM is also drawing up demands for the NCP for any future negotiation, most notably a demand to know what the NCP is prepared to offer to Khalil Ibrahim and Abdulwahid Nur. He acknowledged that there "must be a role" for both of them, but cautioned that Abdulwahid was not a reliable partner for peace and Khalil "even less so." He KHARTOUM 00000012 002 OF 002 had recently tried to speak with Abdulwahid but the Paris-based leader had refused to take the call. ¶5. (C) In addition to greater communication with Qatar, Minnawi also expressed a desire for increased contact with the JMST and Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole, noting that he currently has no "direct line" to him and must go through UNAMID, a process that is both cumbersome and unreliable. He recalled that during a prior conversation with Bassole, the mediator told him he could play an instrumental role in liaising with rebel commanders in the course of the establishment of a ceasefire monitoring mechanism. CDA Fernandez told Minnawi that the US had put forth a proposal to support the commission, but that it has yet to be fully accepted by UNAMID. ¶6. (C) Minnawi reiterated his apology to CDA for declining to travel to Washington this month due to both the impending issuance of an ICC arrest warrant and potential JEM activity. But he remained eager to introduce himself and SLM-MM to officials from the new administration and "present his case." CDA concurred, but noted that it was too early for such discussions. Minnawi closed by launching a scathing critique of Sudanese society and politicians' current outpouring of grief and anger due to the Israeli offensive in Gaza: "Gaza looks like New York City to a Darfuri. In Darfur, you live under a tree and get slaughtered, we have suffered so much more. These people are such hypocrites on Gaza." ¶7. (C) Comment: That Minnawi is readying himself for the prospect of eventual talks in Doha by drafting proposals and guidelines is laudable, and his desire for increased engagement with the Qataris and the JMST is also a positive. Post will continue to encourage Minnawi to take proactive actions, and recommends that this message be reinforced with additional messages to the Qatari mediation team and the JMST about the need to engage Minnawi in the peace process. Encouraging Abdulwahid Nur to mend fences with Minni (or at least speak to him),if possible, should also be explored. Presuming the 2006 DPA will no longer exist if a new agreement emerges from eventual peace talks in Doha or elsewhere, Minnawi should be allowed to represent his movement at formal talks separately from the GNU, and the JMST and the Qataris should be encouraged to engage with Minnawi directly (something the GOS regime so far has attempted to prevent.) End comment. FERNANDEZ