INITIAL REACTION TO SUDAN STRATEGY ROLL OUT MUTED

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001188 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 4) SIPDIS DEPT FOR S/USSES, AF, AF/C, AF/E NSC FOR MGAVIN DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2011 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SU SUBJECT: INITIAL REACTION TO SUDAN STRATEGY ROLL OUT MUTED AND CAUTIOUS REF: KHARTOUM 1184 Classified By: CDA Robert E. Whitehead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Our initial soundings about Sudanese reaction to the New Sudan Strategy roll out indicates that most informed observers are adopting a muted and cautious posture as they digest how the strategy will impact the bilateral relationship. Media reaction today largely echoed the mixed but quiet reaction of October 20 (reftel),and only a handful of opinion leaders have publicly spoken out on the issue. Embassy officers continue to meet with a broad range of contacts, including opposition politicians, officials from the Foreign Ministry and prominent political strategists from the National Congress Party (NCP). A senior NCP contact told us that a number of study groups will meet to discuss the strategy as a prelude to a large, high-level meeting late next week that will offer an analysis of the new strategy and offer recommendations to senior policymakers. End summary. ¶2. (C) Following the October 19 roll out of the Sudan strategy, Embassy Khartoum and Consulate Juba officers provided a range of contacts with copies of the unclassified rollout strategy, the White House statement, and the transcript of the rollout event in Washington. We have requested feedback and begun meeting with select individuals to elicit their views. Initial soundings have revealed an overall positive, if cautious, reaction. Publicly, Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salahuddin regretted the strategy's use of the term genocide but expressed hope that the strategy would allow the US Administration to speak more clearly to Sudan with a single voice. Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Mutrif Siddiq told reporters that it was difficult to say if bilateral relations between Khartoum and Washington will improve soon, since "everything in is the hands of the Americans." The harshest critic to date has been Mohamed El Mukhtar, an expert in the Presidency who was closely involved in the Naivasha peace negotiations and now staffs the trilateral process. He told poloff the new policy was "a joke" and another attempt by the US to bring pressure to bear, a tactic that "will not work, and has not worked, so why do you keep trying?" ¶3. (SBU) MFA Americas Department Director Ambassador Nasreldin Wali told the DCM that he found the new strategy "very positive." Wali,who until recently was the DCM at Sudan's Embassy in Washington, said that he had already provided his analysis of the U.S. policy statement to the MFA Front Office. Among the points he made in his report was that the new strategy focused on "engagement" with Sudan rather than "isolating" his country. In his view, the strategy put greater stress on incentives than on pressures. It was the first time, he added, that the U.S. had provided a detailed set of policy objectives on Sudan. Wali said that he hoped this would prompt European countries to articulate similar strategic goals for Sudan. He noted that the strategy was carefully worded, balanced and reflected what he saw as a compromise between divergent U.S. policy positions. He implied that the strategy's discussion of what he termed "the so-called genocide" in Darfur reflected this. He added that *Secretary Clinton's press conference presentation of the strategy was intended to address American public opinion on Sudan as well as being directed to an international audience. He commended Special Envoy Gration for the work he had done prior to the strategy rollout, singling out the envoy's support for the Doha process on Darfur and his setting up of a trilateral process to advance implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Wali said that Gration's efforts were evident in the areas of emphasis found in the new policy statement. He cautioned, however, that Khartoum did not require any "U.S. pressure" to move forward on the policy's three priority areas: ending the conflict in Darfur, implementing the CPA and combating terrorism. Sudan, Wali concluded, was already fully-engaged in all three areas and would continue to work with the U.S. on each. ¶4. (C) Charge met with US educated Dr. Sayed El Hassan El Khatib, Director of the Center for Strategic Studies and one of the NCP's most respected theoreticians. Khatib said that he was still studying the document, but at first blush saw it as the first significant change in the USG's approach to Sudan over the past decade. He said that most Sudanese political strategists he had spoken with shared the view that there was something afoot here. Not surprisingly, his (NCP) colleagues took exception to the genocide terminology and statements concerning the International Criminal Court, and some believed that the continued focus on Darfur, the North-South Peace Agreement and terrorism were nothing new. The commitment to seek engagement, however, and the more neutral tone of the roll-out document reflected fresh thinking. Khatib said that efforts were already underway to organize a series of meetings wherein those informed on Sudanese-American relations could exchange views on what the new strategy portends. Khatib expected this to culminate in a large, high-level meeting before the end of next week that would produce a written analysis of the new strategy and provide advice to policymakers on how to proceed. He offered to brief the Charge on the results of this process as soon as it had run its course. Khatib concluded by saying that he was relieved that the roll-out had not provoked the public vitriol that accompanied the release of earlier US policy statements, some from President Bashir himself. ¶5. (SBU) Comment. We will continue to track the reaction of Sudanese policymakers throughout the country as they try to decide, in Khatib's words, "whether the glass is half empty or half full." We are pleased with the reception to the roll out thus far, although we are under no illusion that more hard-line elements will not join Mukhtar in descrying the Sudan strategy as more of the same. WHITEHEAD