SUDANESE BREAKTHROUGH ON RELATIONS WITH CHAD?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001146 SIPDIS DEPT FOR S/USSES, AF, AF/C, AF/E NSC FOR MGAVIN DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2011 TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL SU SUBJECT: SUDANESE BREAKTHROUGH ON RELATIONS WITH CHAD? REF: NDJAMENA 438 Classified By: CDA Robert E. Whitehead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. GOS presidential adviser and lead negotiator on Darfur, Dr. Ghazi Sallah Eddin, told Charge Whitehead that his October 10-11 trip to Ndjamena will potentially have a huge impact on normalizing RELATIONS between Chad and Sudan as well as forging a durable peace in Darfur. He described a tentative agreement to implement the Joint Protocol signed in Khartoum in 2006, including provisions to form a joint monitoring force. Ghazi anticipates that a Chadian delegation will come to Khartoum within 7-10 days to discuss and finalize details of implementation. He said that he hopes to travel to France before month's end to seek French approval. He also noted ways that the United States can help the initiative to move forward. End summary. ¶2. (C) Charge met with Dr. Ghazi on October 13 to discuss the latter's recent trip to Ndjamena. Ghazi opened by repeating his conviction that there can be no stable peace in Darfur absent a prior agreement between Sudan and Chad to cease support for the other country's rebels and to normalize bilateral relations. He cited meetings with Chadian Foreign Minister Musa Faki in Tripoli and in New York, during which he stressed that both sides needed "to turn the page" if they were to move beyond mistrust. He assured Faki that Sudan no longer had regime-change in Ndjamena on its agenda and was willing to take the initiative toward normalization of relations. Ghazi accepted Faki's offer to visit Ndjamena and left for a scheduled one day visit there on October 10. ¶3. (C) Ghazi said that he went immediately from the airport to a long meeting with President Deby that bQn acrimoniously, with Deby stating a long list of grievances and accusing President Bashir of "trying to stab me (Deby) in the back" following their last meeting in Saudi Arabia. Ghazi told Deby that there was blame aplenty, but that it was necessary to let bygones be bygones. They argued briefly over whether the Chadian opposition was a POLITICAL force or, as Deby termed them, "mercenaries" before agreeing to call them hostile forces. Deby instructed a team of his advisors to schedule a follow-on meeting with Ghazi. �A; ¶4. (C) In talks that stretched into the evening, both sides found some common ground and agreed to extend the visit into the following day. The next morning they agreed to implement the 2006 Joint Protocol that included a high-level commission staffed by each side's military chief of staff (and other senior figures) and provided for identified control points on their common border. Ghazi said that Sudan had expressed interest in the border towns of Um Jaras and Kariyari, Zaghawa strongholds under the influence of Khalil Ibrahim. He said that the Chadians denied the presence of Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) forces there, a claim of which the Government of Sudan (GOS) is unsure. He in turn told the Chadians that Sudan has moved Chadian rebel forces on its territory to Ain Sirro, 200 kilometers from the border. The Chadians expressed their concern, noting that this had been the springboard from which Deby launched his 1980 invasion that brought down the former government of Chad. ¶5. (C) Ghazi explained that the actual verification mechanism would consist of joint units similar to the joint integrated units of North and South Sudan (which he hoped worked better in this instance) deployed on both sides of the border but commanded on each side by a senior officer of the host country. The GOS had offered to finance these units. Ghazi said that the talks borke-off at this point to allow both groups to seek executive approval. He returned to Khartoum and went immediately to a meeting with Bashir, Minister of Defense Hussayn, the Military Chief of Staff, the commander of Military Intelligence and other senior security officials to discuss the details. He said that there was general agreement to proceed with the initiative in Khartoum, but that he understood that this had not yet been fully discussed with Deby in Ndjamena. ¶6. (C) Assuming Deby's approval, he concluded, he expected a Chadian delegation to arrive in Khartoum in seven to ten days to iron out the details. He said that an agreement would lead to eventual disarmament of rebel forces, and have a huge impact on eliminating the regional impact of the crisis in KHARTOUM 00001146 002 OF 002 Darfur. He said that the Chadians had been very receptive to his proposals, and that he had since spoken with the French Ambassador in Khartoum to seek the approval of Paris. He said that he was prepared to accept the (third) French invitation to visit Paris before the end of the month and hoped the French would send a clear message to Chad that France supports the initiative. Ghazi said that the United States could help advance the process by making a positive statement encouraging both parties to implement the Joint Protocol as soon as it was officially unveiled. He said that the efforts of the U.S. Ambassador in Ndjamena to encourage Chadian approval, or an approach in Washington to the Chadian Ambassador, might also be helpful if there were delays. Ghazi concluded that Special Envoy Gration had mentioned to him the desirability of a GOS ceasefire before the upcoming talks in Doha. Sudan thought this doable, although it could not declare a ceasefire without rebel approval, and was willing to make a unilateral commitment to taking no further offensive actions on the ground in Darfur. ¶7. (C) Comment. If Ghazi is accurate in his read that the Chadians are receptive to proceeding with implementation of the 2006 Joint Protocol, this would represent an important step toward resolving the animus between Ndjamena and Khartoum. After recent GOS attacks against rebel positions in North Darfur, a renunciation of offensive action would also be a helpful internal step. We caution that past GOS declarations of unilateral "ceasefires" have not panned out, and Ghazi did not explicitly state that Chadian rebels on Sudanese soil and pro-GOS militia forces, such as those controlled by Minni Minnawi, would be bound by the GOS renunciation. WHITEHEAD