DARFUR MEDIATION: WE NEED A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BEFORE AN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000114

DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR MEDIATION: WE NEED A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BEFORE AN
ICC INDICTMENT


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On January 28, George Zechariah, the primary
staff assistant to AU-UN Chief Darfur Mediator Djibril Bassole, told
poloffs that the Mediation needs to secure a framework agreement
between the rebels and Government of Sudan (GoS) before the issuance
of an ICC indictment against President Bashir. Zechariah stated
that the Chief Mediator hopes he can secure this agreement between
at least one of Darfur's three major rebel movements (most likely
JEM or, less likely, SLA/Unity) in the next two weeks. According to
Zechariah, this would provide a foundation for the peace process and
supposedly put pressure on uncooperative actors such as Abdul Wahid
Al-Nur. END SUMMARY.

BASSOLE'S STRATEGY AND PRESSURE OF ICC
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2. (SBU) According to Zechariah, the Chief Mediator continues to
pursue a strategy of "focusing on the largest and most powerful
Darfur groups." Zechariah stated that the Chief Mediator is
focusing his efforts on securing rebel and GOS acceptance of both a
framework agreement and traveling to Doha for initial talks. "If we
can get this [i.e. the framework agreement and a GoS-rebel meeting
in Doha] before the ICC moves, that would be really big for the
process," stated Zechariah. According to Zechariah, Bassole fears
that an indictment of President Bashir will kill any momentum in the
peace process. "If an ICC indictment is issued against Bashir, we
do not know if the Government will continue to engage with the
international community or if the rebels will use the decision to
stage a big attack," stated Zechariah. The JMST believes there are
signs that the GoS may take a more aggressive and militant stance
following an ICC indictment, such as the arrest and ongoing
detention of Hassan Al-Turabi and some recent anti-Western rhetoric
by the regime. (Note: The comment about heightened regime rhetoric
is somewhat overstated; what rhetoric there has been is related to
the ICC. End note.)

JEM
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2. (SBU) Zechariah stated that the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM) of Khalil Ibrahim continues to proactively engage with the
Mediation, and that last week's meetings with JEM leadership in
London were positive. Zechariah stated that although JEM previously
acknowledged the need to include other rebel movements in
negotiations, JEM has "become more confident" following their
January 6-14 visit to Washington and now "has started to talk again
about entering into talks with the GOS alone." Zechariah believes
that JEM continues to gain strength and "is likely attracting more
followers at this point than it is losing" (Note: JEM launched a
major offensive in Darfur on January 15, still ongoing, which
initially target DPA signatory Minni Minnawi's strongholds. End
note).

SLA/AW
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3. (SBU) Zechariah reported that Abdul Wahid Al-Nur of the Sudan
Liberation Movement continues to be uncooperative, stubborn, and
difficult to contact. It is very unlikely, reported Zechariah, that
Al-Nur would travel to Doha or sign any framework agreement in the
near future. Al-Nur refused to meet Chief Mediator Bassole in Paris
last week, although Bassole did meet with one of his
representatives. "Even if JEM and SLA/Unity are ready to move
forward and sign a framework agreement, we will leave the door open
for Abdul Wahid," stated Zechariah. He also speculated that if the
Mediation is able to adequately address the concerns of IDPs, that
this will put pressure on Al-Nur to cooperate with the Mediation.

SLA/Unity
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4. (SBU) Zechariah stated that their talks with SLA/Unity are
positive and that "there is the belief that if other movements agree
to attend negotiations, SLA/Unity will follow and come as well."
(Note: CHD's Theo Murphy repeated this same theory to poloffs the
week of January 25. End Note.) Zechariah questioned whether
SLA/Unity is still one movement, or whether it has fragmented among
the lines of Unity's top leadership (i.e. Suliman Jamous, Sharif
Harir, Abdallah Yehia, and a number of prominent and unruly field
commanders.) Poloffs shared their recent conversation with Abdallah
Yehia on January 17, where the SLA/Unity leader called his
movement's rumored division "part of the Government's and JEM's
propaganda war." Poloff also stated that Yehia's perception of the
Chief Mediator significantly improved since Bassole's meeting with
SLA/Unity in the field in December, but that Yehia still does not
understand the role of Qatar. (Note: Yehia told poloff that Qatar
still has not directly invited SLA/Unity to any meetings in Doha and
that he personally was confused about Qatar's role. Poloff
explained to Yehia that Chief Mediator Bassole is in charge of the

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peace process, but that the Qataris have been helpful in providing a
venue and support to the Mediation. Poloff encouraged Yehia to be
proactive and to speak directly to both the Mediation and the
Qataris about his concerns, and to consider sending a representative
to Doha as JEM and other movements have already done. End note.)

WHAT TO DO WITH MINNI?
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5. (SBU) When asked about the status of the Sudan Liberation
Movement of Minni Minnawi and how it will fit into future
negotiations, Zechariah responded, "you tell me." Although SLM/MM
member of Parliament Ali Traio and General Secretary Ali Dausa were
meeting with JMST officials on January 28, Zechariah stated that the
Mediation does not know how to include SLM/MM in the process.
Zechariah also stated that JEM is not keen on including SLM/MM in
negotiations, as "JEM leaders tell the Mediation that Minni is no
longer a relevant force" (after JEM's recent sneak attack against
SLM/MM). Poloffs responded that even if Minnawi has been
significantly weakened and is still (at least officially) a
government official, that he needs to be consulted, included in the
process and given special recognition for being the first to sign a
peace agreement in Darfur.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE MEDIATION
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6. (SBU) Zechariah ended the meeting stating that he appreciates
U.S. support for Chief Mediator Bassole and that the Mediation would
appreciate USG support in three particular areas. First, the USG
can "continue to be helpful in encouraging Sudan's neighbors,
particularly Egypt and Libya, to support Qatar's efforts and not
undermine the process." Second, Zechariah stated that the USG
should remind JEM that it is not the only movement in Darfur and
that other movements must be respected and included in the process.
Third, Zechariah stated "there is probably not much the U.S. or
anyone else can do about this, but from our perspective the later
that an ICC indictment comes out, the better for the Mediation."

COMMENT
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7. (SBU) When compared to past UN and AU mediators, Bassole has been
more active, developed better relationships with the rebel
leadership, and expressed a clearer strategy. The question remains
whether this strategy of focusing on the problematic and aggressive
JEM (especially as it is a minority Zaghawa movement with Chadian
backing, little popular support in Darfur, historic ties to the
Sudanese regime, and has an Islamist and regime change agenda) will
encourage other movements to join the process. While the USG should
support Bassole in his work and maintain a dialogue with JEM, it is
important to remind JEM that they are not the only movement, that
their leader remains on specially designated U.S. sanctions lists,
and that the U.S. is extremely concerned about JEM's past and
current role in the recent upsurge of violence in Darfur and their
presence in areas controlled by SLM/MM. The recent violence in both
South and North Darfur was entirely instigated by JEM, and we should
be telling JEM that this is unacceptable at every opportunity, as
well as making that clear in our public statements.


8. (SBU) Comment continued: The ICC continues to hang over Sudan
and dominate political discourse. While justice is integral to a
final solution in Darfur, it is unfortunate that the delay in an
announcement from the ICC (a warrant was originally expected in
October and has been delayed repeatedly) has created a situation of
political limbo for all of Sudan and has effectively halted progress
on all fronts (not just Darfur, but also CPA) as the NCP's opponents
wait to see what the result will be before engaging in negotiations.
The NCP regime itself is also relatively paralyzed at the moment,
waiting to see how the dynamic may change after the ICC and focusing
on little else besides defending President Bashir from the ICC.
While the Chief Mediator should focus on pushing forward his
framework agreement, he should also secure the commitment of all
parties to engage in the peace process regardless of any
announcement of an ICC decision on President Bashir.

FERNANDEZ