SUDANESE RESPOND TO BADR AIRLINES DEMARCHES

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 000107 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR A A/S CARTER AND AF/SPG, NEA/IPA, ISN/CATR ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019 TAGS: ASEC ETTC KPKO MASS PARM PGOV PREL UN AU SU SUBJECT: SUDANESE RESPOND TO BADR AIRLINES DEMARCHES REF: A. STATE 5567 ¶B. KHARTOUM 82 ¶C. KHARTOUM 52 Classified By: CDAAlberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S/NF) Sudanese Foreign Minister Deng Alor on January 27 provided a written response to the Badr Airlines demarche (Refs A and B). Alor said that NISS Chief Salah Ghosh had provided him with the document the previous day. The document, which is transcribed in its entirety at the end of this cable, denies that the Badr Airlines flights were transporting military equipment and claims that the flights mentioned in the US demarche were carrying farm equipment and other equipment for "non-military manufacturing." The document further states that Sudan respects the decisions issued by the UN Security council, including resolution 1747 that Iran shall not sell or transfer any arms. ¶2. (C) Moving to other subjects, Alor said he will accompany President Bashir to the AU summit in Addis this weekend, as will Minister of Justice Abdel Bassat Sabdarat. However, he said that Presidential Assistant Mustafa Othman Ismail will not accompany the delegation. Sabdarat is expected to engage with representatives of other African countries on the ICC issue, according to Alor. Alor said he is looking forward to meeting with A A/S Carter in Addis Ababa. ¶3. (C) Alor said he took advantage of his meeting with Ghosh to discuss the ICC and Darfur. He said Ghosh is irritated with the SPLM's "ambiguous" position on the ICC, with FVP Kiir first supporting President Bashir publicly, and other members of the SPLM later saying that the NCP must engage with the ICC. Alor said he told Ghosh that Kiir had been "misquoted" and never intended to indicate support for Bashir. ¶4. (C) Alor predicted that the NCP may soon reach some sort of empty, meaningless agreement with the JEM rebel group in order to demonstrate progress toward peace in Darfur and to gain time, but would not implement the agreement and would attempt to weaken JEM by tying them into a process. Ghosh reportedly told Alor that the NCP "will never accept" a vice presidential position to be set aside for a Darfurian, nor the creation one region for Darfur. Alor speculated that this is because the NCP is worried that FVP Kiir and the Darfurian VP would align themselves within the presidency to the detriment of the NCP, in addition to the possibility that all regions within Sudan would have a pretext for demandIng a vice presidential position of their own. Alor thought the NCP's opposition to the one region proposal came down to preventing a move toward secession. Alor noted that there are strong links between JEM and PCP leader Hassan al Turabi, which may be why the recently incarcerated Turabi has been moved to the more isolated prison in Port Sudan ahead of the ICC verdict and amidst on-going attacks in Darfur by JEM. For it's part, Alor said the SPLM had warned JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim that the SPLM cannot pursue a partnership with JEM until the party drops its Islamist agenda. ¶5. (C) Comment: Alor made it clear that the response to the Badr Airlines demarche was that of Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudanese Intelligence apparatus, not his own of belief or that of the SPLM. The SPLM is right to be highly suspicious of JEM and its political intentions, not to mention JEM's relationship with Turabi. The fact that JEM has not been able to reassure the SPLM - a partner if the Government of National Unity and a logical alliance for JEM in negotiations with the NCP - regarding its intentions should give us pause when considering how to engage with JEM. While JEM is certainly the most high profile rebel group in Darfur at the moment, and the best-supplied thanks to President Deby of Chad, it is the least representative rebel group in Darfur, with a narrow ethnic base and highly intolerant and ideological leadership. It pursues its own agenda at all costs - most recently by attacking DPA signatory Minni Minawi - the result of which was to weaken Minawi and paradoxically served to strengthen the hand of the GOS in Darfur, with JEM now abandoning territory it gained in South Darfur and running for the border to protect President Deby. End comment. ¶6. (S/NF) Following is the text of the GOS reply to the US demarche on Badr Airlines: In the name of Allah the Merciful and Compassionate Secret and Private With regard to the demarche from the American government that was delivered via the American Charge d, Affaires in Khartoum to the Foreign Minister dated 17 January 2009, please be informed of the following: ¶1. The government of the Republic of Sudan respects the decisions issued by the Security Council among them resolution 1747 which states in paragraph 5: Iran shall not supply, Sell or transfer directly or indirectly from itsQ territory or by its nationals or using its flagged vessels or aircraft, any arms or related materials, whether or not originating in the territory of Iran. ¶2. In the past there was cooperation between some Sudanese colpanies and establishments and Iran in a number of !reas such as the manufacturing of weapons and military material. However, this cooperation stopped completely following the issuance of the rederenced Security Council resolution. ¶3. Coo0eration now is limited to the import or export by some Sudanese establishments and companies and some Iranian companies, of non-military goods such as tractors, airplane maintenance supplies, and equ)pment for vehicle and road repair. Acknowledging that, some of these good end up at the GIAD Company which belongs to the Military Production Directorate. ¶4. After consulting concerned authorities, we are convinced that the Badr Airlines flights, to which you referred in your demarche, were limited to carrying farm equipment and equipment for non-military manufacturing, and that this was not a matter of arms importation or equipment for the manufacture thereof. ¶5. We affirm the desire for good relations between Sudan and the United Statas of America, and what you referred to as cooperation in the context of suppor4 to UNAMID is an indication of that. We hope that it develops to encompass other areas. FERNANDEZ