DARFUR HUMANITARIAN MECHANISM AND PROSPECTS FOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000102 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - GARBLED TEXT DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: DARFUR HUMANITARIAN MECHANISM AND PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS REF: A) KHARTOUM 92 B) 08 KHARTOUM 1764 KHARTOUM 00000102 001.4 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On January 24, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue's (CHD) Theo Murphy told CDA Fernandez that Abdul Wahid Al-Nur's acceptance of CHD's proposed humanitarian monitoring mechanism was a "breakthrough." Murphy also reported that JEM has accepted CHD's initiative "in principle," and that the Government of Sudan (GoS) continues to deflect CHD's requests for meetings and has not provided a response on the proposed mechanism. Murphy also provided his evaluation of Darfur's rebel movements and the prospects for successful negotiations. Kenny Gluck, a Senior Advisor to the United Nations-African Union Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST,) also provided his analysis of the same topics in a separate meeting with poloffs during the week of January 18. END SUMMARY. CHD'S HUMANITARIAN MONITORING MECHANISM - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) Murphy opened the meeting by stating that the CHD continues to plan for its "humanitarian equivalent of the ceasefire commission." (Note: As described reftel A, CHD has been pushing the idea of a commission with rebel, GOS, and UNAMID representation in El-Fasher that would focus on investigating NGO and UN vehicle hijackings and other humanitarian violations in Darfur. End Note) Murphy then related that he and CHD Humanitarian Advisor Dennis McNamara had to cancel their field visits to Darfur, planned for the week of January 25, because of the upsurge of violence there (reftel B.) Murphy said that the commission will be based in El-Fasher, housed in the UN compound, and be under the supervision of UN'S Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Murphy also reported that UN-AU Chief Mediator Djbril Bassole has been supportive of CHD's humanitarian proposal, and that "the minute he wants to take it over, we'll hand it over to him." ¶3. (SBU) Murphy said the mechanism "will address humanitarian concerns, but will still be nominally political." Murphy added that he hopes the commission will provide the building block for a more sustained dialogue between the GOS and the rebel movements. He said ;that the commission will focus on bringing "clarity and accountability" to the issue of carjackings. The first major project for the commission will be to map areas of rebel control, and all rebels will be held accountable for carjackings in their areas of control. ¶4. (SBU) Murphy reported that in January CHD made a "breakthrough" as leader Abdul Wahid Al-Nur agreed to participate in CHD's proposed mechanism. Murphy also stated that the JEM has agreed "in principle" to the humanitarian mechanism, as long as UNAMID and the international community can guarantee the well-being of their representatives in the commission in El-Fasher. Murphy reported that this is a particularly sensitive issue for JEM, as the GOS previously detained JEM's former representatives to the AU's Ceasefire Commission. SLA/Unity, according to Murphy, should not be difficult to convince and will follow JEM and SLA/AW if both groups participate in CHD's proposed mechanism. ¶5. (SBU) In contrast to the rebels, the GOS has not responded enthusiastically to CHD's proposal. The GOS's Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) has not replied to CHD's requests for meetilgs, and CHD has little room to initiate meetings with other government entities as this is a humanitarian endeavor. CDA Fernandez remarked that even if CHD is able to make progress with the HAC, it will be necessary for CHD to receive permission for the plan from the Sudanese military as well as intelligence agencies. Despite CHD's difficulty in working with the Sudanese Government, Murphy stated that he is "fairly optimistic" that CHD will be able to pull the commission together. He said that the commission could be up and running in as soon as three months. Conversely, if nothing happens in six months, then CHD will "probably let this idea go and move on to something else." Murphi emphasized, however, that there is a need for this commission as UNAMID's contacts with the rebels are so weak, that their own ceasefire commission planning will be plagued by their poor reputation with the rebels. "The rebels view UNAMID as disrespectful, incompetent, and 'in bed with the GoS' so I do not believe that UNAMID can pull off any ceasefire mechanism right now," stated Murphy. Murphy reported that there has not been any coordination between CHD and UNAMID with respect to each others' respective proposals. Murphy, however, believes that each mechanism can fulfill a specific need, and "we should not just consider each others' ideas to be threat because they sound similar." JMST'S ASSESSMENT OF CHD'S WORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) JMST Senior Advisor Kenny Gluck separately shared his assessment of CHD's proposal with poloff during the week of January KHARTOUM 00000102 002.4 OF 003 ¶18. (Note: Of all JMST members, Gluck has the most experience in Darfur. Before his work with the Chief Mediator, Gluck worked for Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)in Darfur. He traveled with CHD Theo Murphy and Dennis McNamara during their November 2008 meetings with JEM and SLA/AW. End note. ) Recalling his experience at MSF, Gluck stated that he believes it is necessary to separate humanitarian and political issues. According to Gluck, CHD continues to blur the line between these two endeavors. Nonetheless, if CHD focuses solely on humanitarian issues (such as car jackings, child soldiers, or the treatment of wounded) this might build trust between the GOS and the rebels and provide a foundation for more substantive talks. ¶7. (SBU) Gluck stated that he suspects that the GOS will be reluctant to participate in CHD's proposed commission, as it gives the rebels more credibility, and may encourage greater rebel unity and coordination. Poloffs responded that such a commission could actually benefit the government as the rebels often sustain their movements through attacks on the humanitarian convoys. Gluck agreed, but noted that Arab militias are also responsible for aQ large percentage of the carjackings in Darfur and that any commission will expose the GOS's tenuous grip over their proxy forces. Gluck stated that CHD's major strengths are establishing a commission quickly, maintaining relaTionships with most rebel leaders, and having already performed the necessary groundwork for such an operation. ASSESSMENT OF REBELS - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (SBU) According to Murphy, Abdul Wahid Al-Nur of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA/AW) is content to delay negotiations "as the hold-out strategy has worked for Abdul Wahid so far." Murphy also told CDA Fernandez that "Abdul Wahid recognizes that a deal with JEM will not bring peace to Darfur, and any agreement will be a 'DPA-style deal' that will 'neutralize' JEM." According to Murphy, there is significant coordination between Abdul Wahid and some prominent SLA/Unity field commanders including Abubaker Kado, who "is ready to defect to Abdul Wahid's movement any day now." Murphy also characterized SLA/AW's December-January meetings in Switzerland as a positive development that has the potential to help broaden the movement's leadership and decision making. He noted that the Swiss view their initiative with SLA/AW as a way to become more active in sub-Saharan Africa, and that "they really appear to believe that Abdul Wahid is fighting for the cause." ¶9. (SBU) Murphy also asserted that although he views SLA/Unity as one of the strongest movements militarily, it appears as though Unity may soon disintegrate as Suliman Jamous and Sharif Harir become more publicly critical of SLA/Unity leader Abdalla Yehia. "Harir and Jamous are politicians, and they know what they are doing when they publicly criticize Yehia," stated Murphy. According to Murphy, SLA/Unity's Yehia became the movement's leader because he was "the lowest common-denominator that everyone else could agree to." Murphy believes that UN-AU Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole is taking the correct approach by focusang on JEM and SLA/AW and not pandering to SLA/Unity. He added: "it is the common belief that SLA/Unity will accept any initiative that comes to them if one of the major rebel groups has already agreed to it." ¶10. (SBU) JMST's Kenny Gluck gave a similar analysis of SLM Unity, saying that the movement is more of a "collection of commanders" than a unified rebel movement. SLM/Unity has the strongest military force on the ground in Darfur, asserted Gluck, but several of its prominent commanders such as Ali Karbino and Abubaker Kado are "loose canons." Gluck also said he believes JEM's military strength may be overly-exaggerated, and that JEM is playing a game of "smoke and mirrors" to give the illusion that it is the dominant military force in the region. JEM is not very popular in Darfur and compensates through its strong organization, media outreach, and interaction with the international community, said Gluck. DANGER FOR BASSOLE "TO TAKE THE EASY ROUTE" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (SBU) There is danger, stated Gluck, in working solely with rebel leaders who are cooperative, accessible, and present a unified and relatively coherent position. JEM fits all of these categories, but represents an extreme political position and constitutes a minor portion of Darfur's ethnic diversity. According to Gluck, although it is incredibly frustrating to work with the illogical and stubborn Abdul Wahid Al-Nur, it is still necessary to focus on him and seek others who can represent the Fur. Gluck was particularly interested in the reported meeting between Abdul Wahid Al-Nur and other SLA/AW leaders in Switzerland during early January. Gluck said that it was unfortunate that the JMST did not participate in the meeting because "this meeting may have resulted in new leaders and decision making processes." Gluck reported that he believes that Chief Mediator Bassole may be able to encourage a "light" agreement between the KHARTOUM 00000102 003.4 OF 003 rebels and the GOS" within the next month. COMMENT - - - - - ¶12. (SBU) In order for CHD to gain leverage with the GOS, it may be necessary for UNAMID, an agency of the UN, and/or the international community to intervene on their behalf. CHD has been speaking about their humanitarian mechanism for months, and during their last visit to Sudan proposed that it could be up and running by January. Despite the fact that CHD has no full-time representatives in Sudan, it maintains some of the best rebel and field commander contacts of any international organization here. If CHD's humanitarian mechanism does not end up going anywhere, the question remains how its experience, knowledge, and relationships in the region can be capitalized upon. Gluck iS right tocautaon against taking the "easy path." Cutting a deal with another Zaghawa movement Representing only a portion of Darfur's population will not bring peace and stability to the region. FERNANDEZ