GHAZI SALAH EDDIN TELLS SPECIAL ENVOY SEPARATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001006 SIPDIS NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM SU SUBJECT: GHAZI SALAH EDDIN TELLS SPECIAL ENVOY SEPARATION WOULD BE A GOOD CHOICE FOR NORTH REF: KHARTOUM 917 Classified By: CDA Robert E. Whitehead, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an August 20 meeting with SE Gration, Presidential Adviser and National Congress Party (NCP) intellectual light Dr. Ghazi Salaheddin said he was pondering the option of allowing the South to separate, with or without a referendum. Ghazi stated that there was a political current within the NCP in favor of letting the South go its own way. He confirmed that the NCP is content with the NCP-SPLM Points of Agreement on Outstanding Issues related to the implementation of the CPA, which Dr. Ghazi initialed on August 19 with Malik Agar Eyre of the SPLM, and he noted, "the loss was on the SPLM's side," for not accepting previously agreed language on the 2011 referendum. Ghazi predicted that, were the South to become a failed state after the 2011 Referendum, any internecine bloodshed within Southern borders would be of limited concern to the North. However, he warned, Southern separation would trigger a wave of secessionist tendencies across Africa. Ghazi pledged the NCP's commitment to continue building trust with the Southern Sudanese, commenting that the North needs to "declare its intentions," so as to appear less threatening. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) On August 20, 2009, Special Envoy Scott Gration met with Dr. Ghazi Salah Eddin Presidential Adviser in charge of the regime's Darfur portfolio and the head of the NCP's delegation to SE Gration's trilateral (NCP/SPLM/USG) negotiation mechanism. Dr. Ghazi told Gration that the NCP wished to show the South options, and "demonstrate that peace dividends are greater than what they could get in war." He continued, "as long as politicians are tethered to their constituencies, it is difficult to lead people into change." ¶3. (C) SE Gration suggested to Ghazi that fear and mistrust held back the South from participating in rational peace-building dialogue with the North. Dr. Ghazi replied, "The only remedy to fear is persuasion...I don't see any alternative to engagement." He noted the serious obstacle presented by Darfur, and explained, "SPLM members in Parliament don't act as if they have ownership of the country. The responsibility has been on (the NCP),and it has drained our resources for dealing with national problems such as Darfur." Dr. Ghazi characterized the SPLM as unwilling to engage in political discussion, and said, "We need to talk, and reassure them. We need to 'declare our intentions,' as they say in the Navy." ¶4. (C) Ghazi remarked that the South would be unwise to consider separation, because the current situation was working to their advantage. "They have everything they could want right now; they have autonomy, and a good share of the National Government. They couldn't hope for anything more under independence." He speculated that the South's resistance to unity was motivated by fear, and observed that "there is a growing number of Northerners in the NCP who increasingly favor separation. We sometimes find ourselves defending a losing case when we espouse unity." He noted that perhaps there were alternative means of reaching a decision to separate or unite, within the terms of the Naivasha Protocol. "People wonder if a referendum is really the best way to maintain good governance and stability." He warned that secession through a referendum could have disastrous repercussions throughout the Continent, noting, "Africa has done better with border issues than Europe. So far, colonial borders have been inviolate. Southern separation would trigger secessionist tendencies all over Africa." ¶5. (C) Ghazi characterized the SPLM as "a tribal confederation, not a party." He predicted that if its Northern ties were cut by secession, the SPLM would revert to very divisive, tribalist politics in the South. However, he assured SE Gration that he expected the two parties would reach an agreement on the referendum. He said that there was no future if this problem continued. ¶6. (C) SE Gration agreed with Dr. Ghazi that separation was likely, and warned that if it wasn't handled well the NCP could soon find troubles lurking beneath its Southern border. Ghazi responded, "this is actually your problem, not ours." He explained: "Northern elites are looking North, East, and West for alliances...we are closer culturally to the KHARTOUM 00001006 002 OF 002 Christians of Ethiopia and Eritrea, than we are to even the Muslims of Southern Sudan." He predicted that, if separated, Southern Sudan would go into limbo for some time, during which Northerners would have limited concern with the travails of the South. He concluded that press stories about conflict and bloodshed in the South would resonate very little with the average citizen of a separated Northern Sudan. ¶7. (C) Comment. Ghazi appeared sincere in his comment that the South will ultimately be allowed to choose its path, but he made it clear that North is ready to wash its hands of all things Southern should separation be the choice. Our view is that this would be easier said than done, and that turmoil in the South would inevitably splash over borders old and new. Ghazi's claim that there is growing sentiment in NCP and Northern circles that the North would be better off without the South is intriguing, but it does not reflect what we have heard in our conversations here in Khartoum. This message was cleared by S/USSES. WHITEHEAD