Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KATHMANDU999
2009-11-03 13:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: ESCALATING MAOIST PROTESTS THREATEN AIRPORT

Tags:  PGOV PTER KDEM NP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000999 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: ESCALATING MAOIST PROTESTS THREATEN AIRPORT

REF: KATHMANDU 980

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 (
b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000999 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/INSB E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019 TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: ESCALATING MAOIST PROTESTS THREATEN AIRPORT REF: KATHMANDU 980 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 ( b/d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: On November 1, the Maoists launched a protest program against the coalition government that is to build up to a blockade of the Kathmandu Valley and international airport on November 10. Meanwhile, Maoist leader Prachanda invited foreign ambassadors and representatives of international organizations to a November 3 tea during which he asserted repeatedly that the protests would be peaceful. Many observers fear the possibility that demonstrations could unintentionally erupt into violence, but the security services assert confidence in their ability to manage the protests. At least one diplomatic mission has decided to close on November 10. Post will carefully assess the situation over the coming days. End summary. Escalating Protests -------------- ¶2. (U) On November 1, the Maoists launched a two-week protest program designed to force the coalition political parties to agree to a debate in the Constituent Assembly (CA) on civilian supremacy over the Nepal Army and to allow the formation of a new government under Maoist leadership. The protests began with nationwide torch rallies and, on November 2, the picketing of Village Development Committee (VDC) and municipality offices across the country. Several Chief District Officers reported to post that these were mostly peaceful; the one exception was in the eastern district of Dhankuta, where Maoists took over a municipal office. The Maoists claimed 50,000 people turned out for the rallies, and they hope to draw up to 60,000, including those they are bringing in from rural districts. (Note: Police estimates put turnout on the first day of the rallies at approximately 12,000. End note.) The piece de resistance of the protests is to be a complete blockade of the Kathmandu Valley, including the airport, on November 10, followed by protests at central government offices at Singha Durbar on November 12-13. (Note: The last blockade that forced the closure of the capital, including the U.S. Embassy, occurred on June 1 -- before the introduction of the Home Minister's special security plan meant to put an end to widespread civil disruptions. End note.) The complete schedule is as follows: - November 1: Nationwide torch rally &#x
000A;- November 2: Mass gatherings, picketing VDCs and municipalities - November 4-5: Picketing district administration offices - November 9: Declaration of autonomous regions - November 10: Kathmandu Valley blockade (including airport) - November 12-13: Picketing government offices at Singha Durbar Potential for Violence -------------- ¶3. (C) Political leaders contacted on November 3 differed on whether the protests will remain peaceful or -- possibly against the wishes of the Maoist leadership -- turn violent. Gagan Thapa, a CA member from the Nepali Congress, told Emboff the Maoists want to use the protests as a bargaining tool and not become violent. Bishnu Rimal, a CA member from the United Marxist-Leninist (UML) and president of the General Federation Nepalese Trade Unions, said he did not expect the Maoists to create havoc as they have done in the past, but they would successfully carry out blockades. Other post contacts expect the protests to turn violent, particularly on November 10, the day the Maoists plan to blockade the Kathmandu Valley and international airport. Anil Jha, General Secretary of the Sadbhavana Party, told post the Maoist leaders are in "great tension." He said the Maoists want to show they can bring the government to a standstill, but the government would try to curb the Maoists' actions to prove they are capable of maintaining order. Clashes might take place between the police and Maoists, particularly in sensitive areas like Singha Durbar, the location of the Prime Minister's Office and numerous KATHMANDU 00000999 002 OF 003 ministries. Abhishek Shah, a CA member from the Madhesi People's Rights Forum, agreed Singha Durbar could be a trouble spot and added clashes could occur on the streets if the Maoists burn vehicles. Maoist Leadership Intentions -------------- ¶4. (C) On November 3, the Maoists took the unprecedented step of inviting Charge, foreign ambassadors and representatives of international organizations to an afternoon tea at a Kathmandu hotel to explain the protest campaign and counter "rumors and propaganda" regarding Maoist intentions. Maoist leader Prachanda opened the meeting with representatives of 12 countries and the United Nations with a 15 minute explanation of the "ups and downs, dips and turns" in the political process that led to the mass demonstrations. He asserted repeatedly that the Maoists were committed to the peace process and that the protests would be peaceful. The Maoist leader stated that he hoped that the major parties could reach a political consensus that would obviate the need for protests, and that he planned another meeting with the Nepali Congress and UML party leaders that evening to continue negotiations. If, however, it was not possible to reach consensus on Maoist demands for a parliamentary debate on the "civilian supremacy" issue, the Maoist protests would continue unabated. ¶5. (C) After his presentation, Prachanda opened the floor to questions. The ambassadors asked the Maoists to reconsider the protest program and strongly encouraged the Maoists to resolve their differences with other parties through peaceful, democratic means. The British Ambassador asked twice whether the Maoists had calculated the economic cost to Nepal of the protests, but received no substantive response. Charge and several ambassadors expressed concern about the safety of foreign citizens. Several questions addressed the impact of the proposed airport closure. Prachanda defended plans to close the airport, advising foreigners to "take note and plan accordingly." After repeated follow-up questions, however, he promised to consult with other high-level Maoist party officials regarding the need to provide access in the event of an emergency. Police Expect Shutdown -------------- ¶6. (C) According to a senior police source, the police fully expect the Maoists to proceed with the shutdown of the Kathmandu Valley and the airport on November 10. The police estimate the Maoists will deploy 5,000 - 10,000 "hardcore," trained cadres to lead the protests. Many cadres are scheduled to arrive in Kathmandu from other parts of the country on November 7-8 and are likely to stay in the 38 Maoist safehouses in Kathmandu. Based on the activity at these safehouses, which are under surveillance, the police will have a good idea of the size of the Maoist operations. The Maoists have also told the transport unions -- many of which they control -- not to travel on November 10, which by itself will effectively shut down activity in the valley. Despite Maoist plans, the police do not expect major violence to erupt. The Nepal Police believe they will be able to handle the protests, with the support of the Armed Police Force as necessary. Army Awaiting Orders -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ministry of Defense has not instructed the Nepal Army to prepare to deploy for the protests, according to Nepal Army leaders. The leaders supported the belief the protests are a political bargaining tool, and any mobilization of the Nepal Army would also be meant to send a political message. Field level commanders expressed concern that the Maoist leadership could not control protestors along the main roads from India to Kathmandu, and the protestors could easily stop food and supplies from reaching the capital. International Community Reaction -------------- ¶8. (C) On November 3, Charge attended a meeting of P-5 KATHMANDU 00000999 003 OF 003 ambassadors and a United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) representative and discussed their preparations for the protests. The French Embassy plans to close on November 10 and will issue a travel warning discouraging travel to and from Kathmandu on November 9 and 10. The British Embassy plans to remain open on November 10; none of the other P-5 missions announced closure. UNMIN is concerned about the potential for "major confrontations and flashpoints" in many locations that could be uncontrollable. UNMIN officials who talked to Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai expressed concern about Maoists instituting new authorities in rural areas. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported staff traveled to Dhankuta district, where Maoists expelled municipal workers and then appointed their own to various posts, to serve as a barrier between the Maoists and other parties and to facilitate talks among the parties. Press Coverage -------------- ¶9. (C) The Maoist protests have garnered wide press coverage in the Nepali and English language press, and post's media contacts say the Maoists have carefully planned the protests, including preparation of a document that lays out who will be taking part in which protests and where, with their phone numbers. Maoist CA members reportedly will join the protest at Singha Durbar. An Indian wire service reports the Maoists have asked all international airlines to stop flights to and from Kathmandu on November 10, saying it would be a token sacrifice for democracy. According to post contacts, the Maoists sent an announcement of the airport blockade to the Civil Aviation Authority. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Both the Maoists and the ruling coalition have become more vocal with their rhetoric, increasing the probability of violence during the Maoists' protests. Although the police assure post they will be able to handle the protests, an accidental overreaction and use of force could cause the situation to deteriorate. The wildcard is internal Maoist dynamics. The party no longer appears to have a single, coherent strategy as rabble-rousers currently led by Baburam Bhattarai -- who coordinated this protest program -- struggle for control with more moderate leaders led by party chairman Prachanda. The Maoist leadership's control over cadres in the districts is unclear; some sources report Maoist organizational preparations have been extensive, while others claim organizational influence is tenuous. MOON

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