NEPAL: ESCALATING MAOIST PROTESTS THREATEN AIRPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000999

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: ESCALATING MAOIST PROTESTS THREATEN AIRPORT

REF: KATHMANDU 980

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 (
b/d).


1. (SBU) Summary: On November 1, the Maoists launched a
protest program against the coalition government that is to
build up to a blockade of the Kathmandu Valley and
international airport on November 10. Meanwhile, Maoist
leader Prachanda invited foreign ambassadors and
representatives of international organizations to a November
3 tea during which he asserted repeatedly that the protests
would be peaceful. Many observers fear the possibility that
demonstrations could unintentionally erupt into violence, but
the security services assert confidence in their ability to
manage the protests. At least one diplomatic mission has
decided to close on November 10. Post will carefully assess
the situation over the coming days. End summary.

Escalating Protests
--------------

2. (U) On November 1, the Maoists launched a two-week
protest program designed to force the coalition political
parties to agree to a debate in the Constituent Assembly (CA)
on civilian supremacy over the Nepal Army and to allow the
formation of a new government under Maoist leadership. The
protests began with nationwide torch rallies and, on November
2, the picketing of Village Development Committee (VDC) and
municipality offices across the country. Several Chief
District Officers reported to post that these were mostly
peaceful; the one exception was in the eastern district of
Dhankuta, where Maoists took over a municipal office. The
Maoists claimed 50,000 people turned out for the rallies, and
they hope to draw up to 60,000, including those they are
bringing in from rural districts. (Note: Police estimates
put turnout on the first day of the rallies at approximately
12,000. End note.) The piece de resistance of the protests
is to be a complete blockade of the Kathmandu Valley,
including the airport, on November 10, followed by protests
at central government offices at Singha Durbar on November
12-13. (Note: The last blockade that forced the closure of
the capital, including the U.S. Embassy, occurred on June 1
-- before the introduction of the Home Minister's special
security plan meant to put an end to widespread civil
disruptions. End note.) The complete schedule is as follows:

- November 1: Nationwide torch rally
- November 2: Mass gatherings, picketing VDCs and
municipalities
- November 4-5: Picketing district administration offices
- November 9: Declaration of autonomous regions
- November 10: Kathmandu Valley blockade (including airport)
- November 12-13: Picketing government offices at Singha
Durbar

Potential for Violence
--------------

3. (C) Political leaders contacted on November 3 differed on
whether the protests will remain peaceful or -- possibly
against the wishes of the Maoist leadership -- turn violent.
Gagan Thapa, a CA member from the Nepali Congress, told
Emboff the Maoists want to use the protests as a bargaining
tool and not become violent. Bishnu Rimal, a CA member from
the United Marxist-Leninist (UML) and president of the
General Federation Nepalese Trade Unions, said he did not
expect the Maoists to create havoc as they have done in the
past, but they would successfully carry out blockades. Other
post contacts expect the protests to turn violent,
particularly on November 10, the day the Maoists plan to
blockade the Kathmandu Valley and international airport.
Anil Jha, General Secretary of the Sadbhavana Party, told
post the Maoist leaders are in "great tension." He said the
Maoists want to show they can bring the government to a
standstill, but the government would try to curb the Maoists'
actions to prove they are capable of maintaining order.
Clashes might take place between the police and Maoists,
particularly in sensitive areas like Singha Durbar, the
location of the Prime Minister's Office and numerous

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ministries. Abhishek Shah, a CA member from the Madhesi
People's Rights Forum, agreed Singha Durbar could be a
trouble spot and added clashes could occur on the streets if
the Maoists burn vehicles.

Maoist Leadership Intentions
--------------

4. (C) On November 3, the Maoists took the unprecedented
step of inviting Charge, foreign ambassadors and
representatives of international organizations to an
afternoon tea at a Kathmandu hotel to explain the protest
campaign and counter "rumors and propaganda" regarding Maoist
intentions. Maoist leader Prachanda opened the meeting with
representatives of 12 countries and the United Nations with a
15 minute explanation of the "ups and downs, dips and turns"
in the political process that led to the mass demonstrations.
He asserted repeatedly that the Maoists were committed to
the peace process and that the protests would be peaceful.
The Maoist leader stated that he hoped that the major parties
could reach a political consensus that would obviate the need
for protests, and that he planned another meeting with the
Nepali Congress and UML party leaders that evening to
continue negotiations. If, however, it was not possible to
reach consensus on Maoist demands for a parliamentary debate
on the "civilian supremacy" issue, the Maoist protests would
continue unabated.


5. (C) After his presentation, Prachanda opened the floor to
questions. The ambassadors asked the Maoists to reconsider
the protest program and strongly encouraged the Maoists to
resolve their differences with other parties through
peaceful, democratic means. The British Ambassador asked
twice whether the Maoists had calculated the economic cost to
Nepal of the protests, but received no substantive response.
Charge and several ambassadors expressed concern about the
safety of foreign citizens. Several questions addressed the
impact of the proposed airport closure. Prachanda defended
plans to close the airport, advising foreigners to "take note
and plan accordingly." After repeated follow-up questions,
however, he promised to consult with other high-level Maoist
party officials regarding the need to provide access in the
event of an emergency.

Police Expect Shutdown
--------------

6. (C) According to a senior police source, the police fully
expect the Maoists to proceed with the shutdown of the
Kathmandu Valley and the airport on November 10. The police
estimate the Maoists will deploy 5,000 - 10,000 "hardcore,"
trained cadres to lead the protests. Many cadres are
scheduled to arrive in Kathmandu from other parts of the
country on November 7-8 and are likely to stay in the 38
Maoist safehouses in Kathmandu. Based on the activity at
these safehouses, which are under surveillance, the police
will have a good idea of the size of the Maoist operations.
The Maoists have also told the transport unions -- many of
which they control -- not to travel on November 10, which by
itself will effectively shut down activity in the valley.
Despite Maoist plans, the police do not expect major violence
to erupt. The Nepal Police believe they will be able to
handle the protests, with the support of the Armed Police
Force as necessary.

Army Awaiting Orders
--------------

7. (C) The Ministry of Defense has not instructed the Nepal
Army to prepare to deploy for the protests, according to
Nepal Army leaders. The leaders supported the belief the
protests are a political bargaining tool, and any
mobilization of the Nepal Army would also be meant to send a
political message. Field level commanders expressed concern
that the Maoist leadership could not control protestors along
the main roads from India to Kathmandu, and the protestors
could easily stop food and supplies from reaching the capital.

International Community Reaction
--------------

8. (C) On November 3, Charge attended a meeting of P-5

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ambassadors and a United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)
representative and discussed their preparations for the
protests. The French Embassy plans to close on November 10
and will issue a travel warning discouraging travel to and
from Kathmandu on November 9 and 10. The British Embassy
plans to remain open on November 10; none of the other P-5
missions announced closure. UNMIN is concerned about the
potential for "major confrontations and flashpoints" in many
locations that could be uncontrollable. UNMIN officials who
talked to Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai expressed concern
about Maoists instituting new authorities in rural areas.
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
reported staff traveled to Dhankuta district, where Maoists
expelled municipal workers and then appointed their own to
various posts, to serve as a barrier between the Maoists and
other parties and to facilitate talks among the parties.

Press Coverage
--------------

9. (C) The Maoist protests have garnered wide press coverage
in the Nepali and English language press, and post's media
contacts say the Maoists have carefully planned the protests,
including preparation of a document that lays out who will be
taking part in which protests and where, with their phone
numbers. Maoist CA members reportedly will join the protest
at Singha Durbar. An Indian wire service reports the Maoists
have asked all international airlines to stop flights to and
from Kathmandu on November 10, saying it would be a token
sacrifice for democracy. According to post contacts, the
Maoists sent an announcement of the airport blockade to the
Civil Aviation Authority.

Comment
--------------

10. (C) Both the Maoists and the ruling coalition have
become more vocal with their rhetoric, increasing the
probability of violence during the Maoists' protests.
Although the police assure post they will be able to handle
the protests, an accidental overreaction and use of force
could cause the situation to deteriorate. The wildcard is
internal Maoist dynamics. The party no longer appears to
have a single, coherent strategy as rabble-rousers currently
led by Baburam Bhattarai -- who coordinated this protest
program -- struggle for control with more moderate leaders
led by party chairman Prachanda. The Maoist leadership's
control over cadres in the districts is unclear; some sources
report Maoist organizational preparations have been
extensive, while others claim organizational influence is
tenuous.
MOON