Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KATHMANDU950
2009-10-16 06:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: UN SUPPORTS JOINT HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM NP 
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PP RUEHCI
DE RUEHKT #0950/01 2890619
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P 160619Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0906
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7156
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 7493
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2829
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 5534
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6640
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3286
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 4798
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2434
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3687
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000950 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: UN SUPPORTS JOINT HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY

REF: A. KATHMANDU 898

B. KATHMANDU 887

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 (
b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000950 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: UN SUPPORTS JOINT HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY REF: A. KATHMANDU 898 ¶B. KATHMANDU 887 Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 ( b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Post agreed to develop a joint human rights framework, identifying emblematic human rights cases and pressing both the Nepal Army and the Maoists to take specific actions to punish the perpetrators. While this strategy would not address all outstanding human rights violations, positive movement on emblematic cases would send a powerful signal to Nepalis that the culture of impunity is beginning to end. End Summary. Joint Strategy, Parallel Pressure -------------- ¶2. (C) In a October 13 meeting, the Representative of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, New Zealand-national Richard Bennett, and Charge agreed that the international community should develop a joint human rights strategy to address impunity in Nepal. Bennett concurred with Charge's suggestion that the UN and like-minded countries apply parallel pressure on both the Maoists and the Nepal Army, using this balanced approach as leverage against both institutions (ref A). Working Level Dialogue -------------- ¶3. (C) OHCHR and Post agreed to establish a working-level dialogue to develop a common list of emblematic human rights cases, with specific and doable requested actions. Bennett agreed that the list of cases should be defined and that it was unrealistic to expect either the Maoists or Nepal Army to investigate and prosecute all allegations of past human rights violations. The list should include specific individual cases, group violation cases, and systematic reforms. Charge noted that developing a common list is likely to be more effective than presenting the Maoists and Nepal Army with various "competing" lists containing overlapping and conflicting cases. OHCHR and the U.S. Government will also consult with the EU, which is pursuing its own human rights impunity strategy, and other like-minded countries such as Japan and Australia. Emblematic Case -------------- ¶4. (C) Bennett highlighted the Maina Sunuwar murder as the type of emblematic case that should be on the list. A local district court recently ordered the Nepal Army to hand over the investigation file relating to Sunuwar's murder to the Nepal Police, as well as suspend the Nepal Army officer implicated in the case (ref B). (Note: According to Bennett, OHCHR has seen the Sunuwar military investigation file -- although they were not allowed to keep or copy it -- and the interview notes are very damaging to the Army officer's case. End Note.) The court decision establishes some concrete benchmarks to present to the Nepal Army. Obstacles Ahead -------------- ¶6. (C) Bennett observed that the Nepal Army and the Maoists tend to react differently when presented with evidence of past abuses. The Nepal Army will often deny that the abuses took place or present highly legalistic defenses of Army actions. The Maoists, on the other hand, usually acknowledge that the human rights violations took place, but refuse to cooperate with Nepal Police on prosecuting the cases -- nor punish their own "cadres" for the violations. Realistic Expectations -------------- ¶7. (C) Bennett separately noted that he did not believe the proposed Nepal Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) would lead to criminal prosecutions. (Note: the Nepal Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction is concluding its public consultations on the TRC and will soon present a revised KATHMANDU 00000950 002 OF 002 legislative proposal to the parliament. End Note.) Based on a review of other experiences from around the world, Bennett suggested that the most that could be expected from the Nepal TRC is a chance for victims and victims' families to air grievances and perhaps therefore contribute to national reconciliation. Comment: Long-Term Strategy -------------- ¶8. (C) Post is optimistic that we will be able to work with OHCHR and the EU on a common human rights framework, with a list of specific human rights cases and defined actions. We are much less optimistic that the Maoists and Nepal Army will take action on these cases. Ending the culture of impunity will be a long struggle in Nepal, requiring the type of political courage and vision that few of the country's leaders have shown signs of possessing. MOON

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