NEPAL: DEFENSE MINISTER ON PEACE PROCESS, U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000883 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: DEFENSE MINISTER ON PEACE PROCESS, U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 ( b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Defense Minister Bidya Bhandari told visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher that Nepal was "at a very important juncture in the peace process." She supports limited integration of Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army based on the peace agreements so long as the combatants are fully qualified and are willing to give up political activities. Bhandari appreciated U.S. training assistance and requested that military assistance resume as soon as possible. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Scher encouraged progress on the peace process, including integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants and accountability for human rights abuses. He affirmed U.S. support for Nepal would continue. End Summary. Peace Process -------------- ¶2. (C) During their September 16 meeting, Defense Minister Bhandari told Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Scher that "the peace process can only be brought to a logical conclusion through dialogue, and the Ministry of Defense is very much committed to such a dialogue." The government was negotiating in good faith with the Maoists to resolve the integration and rehabilitation issue as soon as possible. She said the government supported a limited integration of Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army, but insisted on "standard norms for filling positions, as any bureaucracy would". These requirements cannot be compromised. Maoist combatants would have to decide whether to "go ahead with their ideology" or "become apolitical and join the military." If a Maoist decided to "remain political," Bhandari said the government was willing to provide former combatants with pensions and retraining programs to ease their transition back into society. She cited that India refused to integrate elements of the Indian National Army into its forces after independence. Bhandari suggested the Maoists were not serious about integration, and their true intention was to gain "supremacy over the military." ¶3. (C) The government was concerned about potential ramifications of integration on the country's national security, Bhandari claimed. Nepal faced "many threats from various armed groups, some even challenging the country's sovereignty." Unless the peace process takes into account the threat from these groups, larger problems might appear around the bend, she added. She did not identify the discuss specific threats. HUMAN RIGHTS -------------- ¶4. (C) Human rights incidents were being carefully scrutinized by the ministry, Bhandari reported. She added the government was also looking at incidents by "other fighters," not only the Nepal Army. DASD Scher said the U.S. supports investigating human rights incidents and that national leaders were ultimately responsible for determining how far back to investigate possible incidents. He added improving and maintaining current human rights practices was the most important priority. U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶5. (C) Bhandari thanked DASD Scher for past U.S. training and equipment support, stating that Nepal's effectiveness as a contributor of United Nations peacekeeping troops was directly related to U.S. assistance. She said the Nepal military is finding it difficult to operate since the United States stopped providing lethal equipment to Nepal. (Note: Equipment assistance was halted in 2005. End Note.) She asked the United States to resume the delivery of equipment to the Nepal Army as soon as possible. DASD Scher said the U.S. could possibly provide additional, non-lethal assistance for Nepal's peacekeeping operations and disaster response KATHMANDU 00000883 002.3 OF 002 efforts. ¶6. (C) DASD Scher encouraged the Defense Minister to make progress on the peace process, and acknowledged that integration and rehabilitation of former Maoist combatants was a key component. He agreed that standards were a necessary aspect of integration, and said that standards had both a technical and political component. He suggested Nepal develop a process for developing consensual standards. ¶7. (C) Comment: Peace agreements include undefined references to "standard norms," but Bhandari's reference to recruitment standards means that the Nepal Army will require new recruits to meet levels of educational and training that most Maoists cannot satisfy. This approach would limit the number of Maoist combatants that could be integrated and perhaps force them to enter as individuals rather than combat units. Still, the Ministry seems to have implicitly acknowledged that integration will occur. The request for renewed assistance is a message heard regularly from all levels of the military establishment. End Comment. MOON