NEPAL: UNMIN HEAD SHARES DOUBTS ABOUT PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000877

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM IN NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: UNMIN HEAD SHARES DOUBTS ABOUT PEACE
PROCESS

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 (
b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Unless the Maoists are "drawn into the
political process," progress on constitution drafting and
military integration and rehabilitation will be very
difficult, according to UNMIN head Karin Landgren. Landgren
told visiting Defense DAS Scher that solutions to the
technical aspects of military integration and rehabilition
can be found, but that the key parties must first reach
political agreement on this sensitive issue. The latest
violations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement underscore
the importance of moving quickly on integration and the
dismissal of the 4,008 disqualified combatants. UNMIN is
using the deadline of its next UNSC report in mid-October to
press for progress on the peace process. End Summary.


2. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher,
accompanied by Charge, met on September 16 with Karin
Landgren, the Representative of the Secretary-General and
head of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN),UNMIN
Chief Advisor Gordon Hughes, and UNMIN Political Officer
Kathy Jones, at UNMIN's Kathmandu offices. Landgren provided
a detailed overview of the political and security situation.

Dialogue, Unity Government Needed
--------------

3. (C) In Landgren's view, the Maoists must be "drawn into
the political process." If not, neither the constitution
drafting nor integration will move forward. The exclusion of
the Maoists from government only "gives fuel to the Maoist
hardliners." Meeting the Maoist demands surrounding
"civilian supremacy" over the military is critical to moving
the process forward. (Note: Maoist PM Dahal resigned in
protest in May when the President overturned his decision to
fire the Nepal Chief of Army Staff (CoAS). Since then, the
Maoists have demanded a debate in parliament on whether the
civilian Prime Minister was "supreme" over the Army. End
Note.) Landgren argued that the Maoists are "in a box" and
need a "face-saving" way out. While they would like the
President to admit he was wrong when he overturned the PM's
decision, they will settle for a guarantee that the President
will not, in the future, trump the decisions of the Prime
Minister related to the military. Landgren opined that a
constitutional amendment restricting the President's powers
was a possible solution. On the other side, the Nepal Army
and some parties view the President as the ultimate check on
Maoist designs to take over the military, should they return
to power, and are reluctant to cede his authority.


4. (C) UNMIN supports the creation of a "high-level"
mechanism to promote systematic political dialogue among the
key leaders, focused on core peace process issues. The
Maoists have conditioned their participation on resolution of
the "civilian supremacy" issue, but UNMIN is encouraging them
to participate without precondition. While Landgren
acknowledged that some view the high-level mechanism as
"G.P.'s baby" (referring to Nepali Congress leader G.P.
Koirala),UNMIN does not see any alternative at this point.


5. (C) The recent "harsh" rhetoric from the Prime Minister
about the Maoists -- suggesting, for example, the Maoists
would go the way of the LTTE in Sri Lanka -- does not "build
confidence," Landgren said. A solution would be easier if
the Maoists were "treated with a degree of respect." The
Maoists also need to stop the street violence, which could
"spin out of control." If they continue the protests, the
Maoists risk "painting themselves into a corner." (Comment:
Landgren failed to mention the recent and sustained militant
language promulgated by the top Maoist leadership. End
Comment.)

Constitution Differences
--------------

6. (C) UNMIN hopes that the parties will move quickly on
drafting the constitution, but Landgren noted that there has
been little progress on the key constitutional issues,

KATHMANDU 00000877 002 OF 003


particularly federalism and executive power. Asked by Charge
whether she envisions a solution to the federalism debate,
Landgren admitted she did not. Federalism is the "single
most difficult issue," Landgren said, with stark differences
between the parties.

Military Integration and Rehabilitation
--------------

7. (C) Landgren said that UNMIN continues to press the
Government of Nepal to develop a comprehensive action plan on
the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants. The
resumption of the work of the Special Committee on
Integration and Rehabilitation, following key concessions
from the Maoists and the composition and chair of the
committee, is encouraging. Former CoAS Katawal was an
"impediment" to integration, Landgren claimed, and his
retirement is positive. Advisor Hughes reported that the
Nepal Army's view toward integration is "changing," with a
growing acceptance that some Maoist combatants will join the
army. Landgren is encouraging the parties to begin to
discuss the overall number of Maoists to be integrated into
the Nepal Army. While UNMIN has no formal position on the
number, it is unrealistic to expect that no Maoist soldiers
will be integrated. Like the constitution, Landgren doubted
that agreement on military integration and rehabilitation
would be possible without a broader political agreement.


8. (C) UNMIN itself is not pushing a particular model of
integration, and has never received a formal request for
assistance. (The Nepalis do not want to be seen to be
accepting international assistance in this highly sensitive
area.) The work of the Technical Committee, advising the
Special Committee, has been helpful, including the recent
recommendations on a code of conduct and supervision plan.
On the technical issues of integration, Landgren and Advisor
Hughes were optimistic that solutions could be found. Hughes
outlined some of the key principles that should guide the
process: (1) giving the Maoist combatants a free choice to
join the security forces, enter society as a civilian, or
join party politics; (2) agreeing on a transparent and
logical number for integration; (3) carefully setting up
criteria for rank allocation; and (4) applying flexible
standards for admission, including some type of "bridging"
training.


9. (C) Landgren also noted that the Nepal Army's attempt to
recruit new soldiers, "in violation of the peace agreements,"
appears to be on hold, which she views as a very positive
development. The import of lethal weapons to the Nepal Army
or police would also violate the peace accords, undermine
confidence, and be "provocative." Recent suggestions from
the Indian Ambassador presenting a different interpretation
of the peace agreements -- which would permit the import of
lethal weapons -- are "unhelpful."

Cantonments
--------------

10. (C) Stressing the importance of moving quickly on
integration and rehabilitation, Landgren noted that the
cantonments housing the Maoist combatants were always meant
to be temporary. While the UN Secretary General's latest
report urged the parties to consider alternatives to the
current camps, Landgren does not see any other possibilities.
Despite UNMIN's narrow mandate -- only monitoring the
management of arms -- and unarmed presence, the parties
continue to have some degree of trust in UNMIN. While the
longer the Maoist combatants remain the camps the more
dangerous for the process, Landgren pointed out that there
have been no major violations of the cease-fire and no shots
fired. In this sense, the "very light" UNMIN monitoring role
might be a model for other UN operations. Advisor Hughes
credited the Maoists' and Nepal Army's "chain of command" for
keeping their troops under control.

Dismissal of the Disqualified
--------------

11. (C) UNMIN continues to press aggressively for the

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discharge of the 4,008 disqualified Maoist combatants, which
Landgren called a "running sore" and "irritant."
Particularly important is movement on the approximately 3,000
who are identified as "child soldiers," even though many are
now older than 18. Maoist leader Dahal promised the UN
Secretary General in December 2008 that he would release the
disqualified and publicly committed to do so again July 6.
Landgren is somewhat encouraged that there is a dialogue
between the Maoists and Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction
on this issue. The key UN agencies, UNDP and UNICEF, are
prepared to support whatever political agreement is reached
on the timing, training, and process for discharging the
disqualified Maoist combatants.

India's Strong Role
--------------

12. (C) Landgren stressed the critical role that India plays
in Nepal. The perception in Nepal is that India does not
want the Maoists to return to power. During Landgren's
recent trip to New Delhi, she met with the MEA Joint
Secretary who said that India is "comfortable" with the
current coalition government. UNMIN heard reports that India
would like the current regime to govern for another eight
months or so, or at least until the end of the year. Some
have alleged that India wants to create fissures among the
Maoists; Landgren questioned how this could serve the
interests of peace. Landgren hoped that the new Indian
Foreign Secretary, Nabindra Rao, who recently visited Nepal,
would have a more "realistic assessment" of the political
situation, especially given her recent service as India's
Ambassador to China.

Terai Could Derail Process
--------------

13. (C) While not part of UNMIN's mandate, Landgren said that
the continuing instability in the southern Terai belt
bordering India could derail the peace process. The Home
Minister's new special security plan has been handled
"insensitively," Landgren claimed, and is viewed with the
Madhesi parties as "anti-Madhes." UNMIN has not seen the
written details of the security strategy, despite many
requests.

Next UN Report
--------------

14. (C) UNMIN tries to leverage the quarterly reports to the
UNSC to press for progress on the peace process. The next
report is due in New York in mid-October, and will be debated
by the UNSC on November 6.

Comment
--------------

15. (C) UNMIN is widely considered to be "biased" in favor of
the Maoists, and it needs to work to build credibility with
the Nepal Army and non-Maoist political parties. That said,
UNMIN's presence, however flawed and limited, remains useful,
deterring (at least the more egregious) violations of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
MOON