NEPAL: PM OUTLINES PEACE PROCESS STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000829

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PM OUTLINES PEACE PROCESS STRATEGY

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 (
b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal told
Charge on September 4 his primary concerns are how to resolve
whether former Maoist combatants can integrate into the Nepal
Army, achieve unity among the political parties and the
international community, and advance the peace process. The
PM said the United States could help by sending a strong
message to the Maoists to cooperate, bringing the
international community together, and providing monetary
assistance and expertise. Charge agreed that political
consensus is crucial, and the Government of Nepal (GON) and
the political parties must focus on integration and other
issues for the peace process to progress. Post has doubts
this could happen under M.K. Nepal's leadership. End summary.

Mean Maoists
--------------

2. (C) The PM, frustrated the peace process has taken so
long, told Charge on September 4 he has advised the Maoist
leadership that the sooner the issue of former People's
Liberation Army (PLA) combatants is resolved, the better for
all. He noted the Nepal Army needs the opportunity to train
and should not remain confined to barracks, nor should Maoist
cantonments remain open for much longer. He said closing the
cantonments will not happen overnight because the combatants
have been brainwashed and will need time to rehabilitate.
The PM said he would listen to the Maoists' proposal at the
second meeting of the reconvened Army Integration Special
Committee (AISC) scheduled for September 5. (Comment: The
AISC met on September 1 for the first time since the Maoists
left the government in May. The group discussed completing
integration and rehabilitation within six months. The
meeting occurred only because the Maoists agreed to attend,
and -- despite the overly optimistic deadline -- was the
first positive news on integration in several months. End
comment.)


3. (C) PM Nepal described three areas of concern regarding
the Maoists: PLA combatants leaving cantonments whenever they
want; misbehavior by the Young Communist League (YCL); and an
old mindset that -- unless the Maoists change -- will make it
difficult for them to manage their own people, especially the
"militants" within the party who are resistant to democracy.
M.K. Nepal stated allowing the Maoists into the government
had been a mistake. He added that former combatants should
not be allowed to participate in the next national election
to ensure its peacefulness. Charge asserted that bringing
the Maoists into the government was the right thing to do,
and their involvement in the political process is keeping
them from returning to war.

How To Progress?
--------------

4. (C) The PM declared two things are essential for peace
process progress: unity among the political parties and
unity among the international community. He requested the
international community not give conflicting advice, naming a
recent International Crisis Group report and UNMIN's apparent
bias toward the Maoists as examples of unhelpful actions. He
said UNMIN "closes its eyes" against PLA breaches but is
quick to criticize every mistake by the GON and NA.

How To Integrate?
--------------

5. (C) How could the PLA, a political force, assimilate into
a professional national army whose own numbers should be
decreased, the PM wondered. He said the best option would be
no integration at all, but he realized that was unfeasible.
Former combatants should receive vocational training and
education to embark on their own careers. The GON could also
provide lump sum payments to individual combatants. The GON
could form a border security force and industrial security
force -- including two years of training -- for those who
want to be part of the security services. PM Nepal said the
Nepal Army should be the last option and limited to a
symbolic, token few: women, Madhesis, and other ethnic

KATHMANDU 00000829 002 OF 002


minorities. He said those integrated into the NA should be
required to sever all ties to the Maoist party. Responding
to Charge's skepticism as to whether the Maoists would accept
these terms, the PM figured individual combatants would, but
the collective organization would reject them. The GON would
have to figure out how to privately communicate to the former
combatants that there would be no other beneficial options
for them.

How Can the U.S. Help?
--------------

6. (C) The most important role for the United States, PM
Nepal offered, is to send a strong message to the Maoists
that they will have no international support if they do not
change their ways. The PM also requested U.S. funding
assistance, but conceded Charge's point that the UN
Development Program had already committed to provide such
funding. Charge also asked whether the past practice of
foreign embassies in Kathmandu to issue joint statements
regarding major events and issues, including peace process
development, had been useful. The Prime Minister replied
affirmatively. M.K. Nepal added, as an aside, that he has
asked the Indian Prime Minister to "do his part." Finally,
PM Nepal said, the peace process could use international
experts who do not offer contradictory or unworkable ideas.

Comment
--------------

7. (C) M.K. Nepal's open expressions of frustration with the
Maoists and his unwillingness to consider integration of
former Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army make it unlikely
that a political consensus will develop or that there will be
significant progress in the peace process under his
leadership. Embassy contacts assess that the PM is a weak
leader who is having difficulty maintaining unity within his
coalition. Many have also speculated that his tenuous hold
on leadership could end after the upcoming Nepalese holiday
season.
MOON