INDIA VISIT REINFORCED NEPAL'S RULING COALITION --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000814 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KDEM CH IN NP SUBJECT: INDIA VISIT REINFORCED NEPAL'S RULING COALITION -- SLIGHTLY REF: A. NEW DELHI 1801 ¶B. KATHMANDU 792 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 (b /d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal's August 18-22 visit to New Delhi, widely viewed as more symbolic than substantive, somewhat cemented his position as the leader of the Nepalese government but does not guarantee he will be able to remain in power. The visit did, however, illustrate the Government of Nepal's (GON) dependence on Indian political and economic support, which will continue to dominate Nepalese affairs. Long-term gains for Nepal's peace process -- and Indo-Nepal relations during this period -- are likely to be minimal. ¶2. (SBU) PM Nepal, accompanied by a large delegation -- including Tourism Minister Sharat Singh Bhandari, Commerce Minister Rajendra Mahato, Finance Minister Surendra Pande, Energy Minister Prakash Sharan Mahat, Industry Minister Mahendra Prasad Yadav, Constituent Assembly members, senior GON officials, a number of businessmen, and media representatives -- met with several Indian officials and political leaders (Ref A). Foreign Minister Sujata Koirala cancelled at the last minute (Ref B). End summary. Symbolic Support -------------- ¶3. (C) Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal's five-day visit to India beginning August 18 -- his first official foreign visit as Prime Minister -- garnered symbolic support but little of substance. Alok Sinha, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu, told Charge on August 27 the Government of India (GOI) supported PM Nepal's visit as a symbolic gesture to bolster the GON and pressure the Maoists to return to the government; however, he emphasized that the visit involved nothing significant. He explained the GOI's strategy is to support M.K. Nepal's government both to increase coalition stability and exert external pressure on the Maoists that could magnify the split between those who favor the democratic process to gain power (e.g., Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda) and those who favor "revolt" as the means to gain power. Sinha said the GOI's primary interest in Nepal is enlisting Nepali support in efforts to enhance security in the Terai region. ¶4. (C) Bhekh Bahadur Thapa, a former Ambassador to India and the United States, stressed to Emboff on August 28 that the PM's visit was empty of substance by design. Thapa advised PM Nepal before the visit to prove himself a person India could stand behind as head of a stable government. Thapa told Emboff the visit was deliberately low-key so as not to disturb the domestic political balance. The Ambassador said major Indo-Nepal decisions could be made later, perhaps when the Maoists return to the fold. ¶5. (SBU) Akhilesh Upadhyay, the editor of The Kathmandu Post and an Embassy contact, corroborated the view of a symbolically-heavy but results-deficient visit. Upadhyay, who accompanied the PM to New Delhi, observed in his newspaper on August 25 the PM's visit was purely political because M.K. Nepal wanted to be seen as a more pliant PM than Pushpa Kamal Dahal had been. The editor noted the GOI's perceived hostility to the Nepalese Maoists and said the longer the GOI retained this hostility, the longer the UML-led government could remain in power. Referring to the proposed trade treaty that dominated media coverage at the end of the visit, Upadhyay quoted an unnamed Indian official who said that was a last-minute negotiation conducted at the behest of the Nepalese delegation to "bag as many accords as possible." Trade Almost an Afterthought -------------- ¶6. (C) The delegation made incrementally useful but -- as with the political discussions -- mostly rhetorical economic KATHMANDU 00000814 002 OF 002 and trade gains. India pledged NRs. 32 billion (USD 412 million) in aid for various development projects, including road and rail infrastructure and border and customs facilities (Septel). The GOI also agreed to assist human resource development, including police and civil service training and exchange programs, and health and education projects. The Nepalese media widely praised the assistance package, with one newspaper trumpeting, "(PM) Nepal Brings Home the Bacon." The glowing coverage ignored the fact that none of the projects -- nor India's promise to fund them -- is new; some of the projects were first proposed a decade ago. Even an agreement for a new trade pact merely repeats existing arrangements. Arun Chaudhary, the president of the Nepal-India Chamber of Commerce and a member of the PM's delegation to India, told Emboff on August 28 that it was "a nice trip," implying a vacation-like atmosphere in lieu of any real achievements. Bhekh Thapa separately told Emboff that the lack of trade progress was not a bad thing, reiterating the true purpose for both India and Nepal was a token show of support. Other businessmen who accompanied the PM on the trip were less restrained and openly expressed to us disappointment at the lack of concrete achievements. Immediately Beneficial but Ultimately Irrelevant -------------- --- ¶7. (C) Some observers assess that the PM's visit would have short-term benefits to the GON but ultimately would be meaningless to the stability of M.K. Nepal's government and the wider peace process. Rhoderick Chalmers, Country Representative for the International Crisis Group (ICG),was sharply critical of Indian policy toward Nepal during a meeting at the Australian Ambassador's residence on August ¶27. Chalmers accused the GOI of being knee-jerk anti-Maoists without any long-term strategy for advancing Nepal's peace process. Chalmers said the Indians were trying to prop up PM Nepal by announcing such a large economic aid package, but this "clumsy diplomacy" would not work. He reported that contacts between the GOI and the Maoists continue but not at a high level, and no policy movement for either side has resulted from these discussions. The ICG representative was also highly critical of the Prime Minister. Chalmers characterized M.K. Nepal as ineffectual, corrupt, and more interested in the trappings of power than in governing the country. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Indian influence, perceived or otherwise, has as prominent a role in Nepalese domestic politics as any of the political parties. The PM's visit was a ritual to restore the tradition of the first foreign visit of the Nepalese Prime Minister being to India -- perhaps an attempt to reassure the GOI that whatever influence China had with the Maoist-led government (Puspha Dahal's first foreign visit as PM was to Beijing),India is the more important neighbor. Many of post's interlocutors have posited that M.K. Nepal's government may fall after local holidays in September or October, and the PM's solicitation of Indian support seems to have had little effect on this opinion. PM Nepal may have gained a bit of extra time, but unless he can manage to build consensus among the political parties -- particularly with the Maoists -- his coalition's grip on power will remain tenuous. MOON