Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KATHMANDU538
2009-06-22 08:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:
INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY CONCERNED ABOUT POTENTIAL
how-toO 220840Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0357 INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY CIA WASHDC PRIORITY NSC WASHDC PRIORITY DIA WASHDC PRIORITY CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000538
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/INSB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR UN IN NP
SUBJECT: INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY CONCERNED ABOUT POTENTIAL
CONFRONTATION IN NEPAL
Classified By: AMBASSADOR NANCY J. POWELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000538
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/INSB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR UN IN NP
SUBJECT: INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY CONCERNED ABOUT POTENTIAL
CONFRONTATION IN NEPAL
Classified By: AMBASSADOR NANCY J. POWELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D)
1. (C) Summary. In a June 21 meeting with Ambassador,
Indian Foreign Secretary Menon expressed growing concern
about the potential for confrontation between the military
and the Maoists and about the lack of political leadership
from the other parties. Menon said that COAS Katawal,s
confrontational attitude was matched by that of Maoist
hardliner Kiran. He believed that Kiran's challenge to
former PM Dahal within the party would result in escalating
disruptions and a greater potential for violence even if the
hardliners did not prevail. The Foreign Secretary elaborated
his concern that there appears to be almost no attention to
key governance and peace process issues by the other
politicians. Without providing details, Menon appeared to be
concerned about recurring reports of Koirala favoring a
"Bangladesh" solution in which the military would take over
and install a civilian leader. Menon indicated Delhi
understands that UNMIN needs to be extended beyond its
current mandate which ends on July 23. He suggested it might
be useful to use the extension resolution to urge changes in
the way combatant stipends are disbursed and to establish
firm deadlines for Nepali action, with UN support, to remove
and rehabilitate the 4000 non-combatants and begin the
process of integration/rehabilitation of the 19,000
combatants.
2. (C) Ambassador met Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar
Menon June 21 to discuss the current political situation in
Nepal. Menon began the meeting by noting that his concern
for Nepal had grown considerably since he had last met the
Ambassador in Delhi in May and following his meetings on June
20 with Nepali political leaders and COAS Katawal. Menon had
just completed the meeting with Katawal, whom he described as
"spoiling for a fight". He said Katawal had been more
bombastic than usual and seemed to have concluded that he
alone is Nepal's savior and needed to remain in office
beyond his scheduled September retirement. Menon said he had
delivered a diplomatic, but clear signal to Katawal that an
extension would not be welcomed by Delhi. He noted that he
had not raised the issue with PM Nepal with whom he had met
on June 20. When asked if the new Foreign Minister was more
flexible on integration of Maoist combatants into the Nepal
army, Menon said it was generally recognized in Delhi that a
few thousand would have to be accommodated as individuals,
not in units.
3. (C) Menon said that COAS Katawal's confrontational
attitude was matched by that of Maoist hardliner Kiran.
According to Indian analysts, Kiran has made headway within
the Maoist camp and has already achieved a major part of his
agenda in getting the Maoists out of government and into the
streets. Menon agreed that while the Maoist protests to date
had been measured and did not appear to be generating public
support, he believed that Kiran,s challenge to former PM
Dahal within the party would result in escalating disruptions
and a greater potential for violence even if the hardliners
did not prevail.
4. (C) The Foreign Secretary elaborated his concern that in
the face of Katawal and Kiran's growing belligerency, there
appears to be almost no attention to key governance and peace
process issues by the other politicians. He described them
as acting in their own selfish interest with an eye on future
positions rather than to national interests. He noted that
PM Nepal had said all the right things in their June 20
meeting, but had not shown any leadership since assuming
office and seemed to be unable to break the focus on
individual horse trading of positions rather than developing
a program for peace and development in Nepal. Menon
expressed concern about the motives and actions of former PM
and Nepal Congress leader Koirala. Without providing
details, Menon appeared to be concerned about recurring
reports of Koirala favoring a "Bangladesh" solution in
which the military would take over and install a civilian
leader.
5. (C) Menon indicated New Delhi understands that UNMIN
needs to be extended beyond its current mandate which ends
on July 23, but expressed concern that the video tape of
Prachanda bragging to cantonment cadres that UNMIN had been
hoodwinked on verification of combatants and on funding calls
into question its current operating procedures. He suggested
it might be useful to use the extension resolution to urge
changes in the way combatant stipends are disbursed and to
establish firm deadlines for Nepali action, with UN support,
to remove and rehabilitate the 4000 non-combatants and begin
the process of integration/rehabilitation of the 19,000
combatants.
6. (C) Next steps. Post is developing set of talking points
to be used by the Ambassador in her farewell calls on
political leaders, and COAS Katawal, and in three scheduled
media interviews. In addition, Ambassador will consult with
the British Ambassador, who has taken the lead in convening
the local P-5, concerning UNMIN mandate extension and Indian
conditionality proposals.
POWELL
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/INSB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR UN IN NP
SUBJECT: INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY CONCERNED ABOUT POTENTIAL
CONFRONTATION IN NEPAL
Classified By: AMBASSADOR NANCY J. POWELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D)
1. (C) Summary. In a June 21 meeting with Ambassador,
Indian Foreign Secretary Menon expressed growing concern
about the potential for confrontation between the military
and the Maoists and about the lack of political leadership
from the other parties. Menon said that COAS Katawal,s
confrontational attitude was matched by that of Maoist
hardliner Kiran. He believed that Kiran's challenge to
former PM Dahal within the party would result in escalating
disruptions and a greater potential for violence even if the
hardliners did not prevail. The Foreign Secretary elaborated
his concern that there appears to be almost no attention to
key governance and peace process issues by the other
politicians. Without providing details, Menon appeared to be
concerned about recurring reports of Koirala favoring a
"Bangladesh" solution in which the military would take over
and install a civilian leader. Menon indicated Delhi
understands that UNMIN needs to be extended beyond its
current mandate which ends on July 23. He suggested it might
be useful to use the extension resolution to urge changes in
the way combatant stipends are disbursed and to establish
firm deadlines for Nepali action, with UN support, to remove
and rehabilitate the 4000 non-combatants and begin the
process of integration/rehabilitation of the 19,000
combatants.
2. (C) Ambassador met Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar
Menon June 21 to discuss the current political situation in
Nepal. Menon began the meeting by noting that his concern
for Nepal had grown considerably since he had last met the
Ambassador in Delhi in May and following his meetings on June
20 with Nepali political leaders and COAS Katawal. Menon had
just completed the meeting with Katawal, whom he described as
"spoiling for a fight". He said Katawal had been more
bombastic than usual and seemed to have concluded that he
alone is Nepal's savior and needed to remain in office
beyond his scheduled September retirement. Menon said he had
delivered a diplomatic, but clear signal to Katawal that an
extension would not be welcomed by Delhi. He noted that he
had not raised the issue with PM Nepal with whom he had met
on June 20. When asked if the new Foreign Minister was more
flexible on integration of Maoist combatants into the Nepal
army, Menon said it was generally recognized in Delhi that a
few thousand would have to be accommodated as individuals,
not in units.
3. (C) Menon said that COAS Katawal's confrontational
attitude was matched by that of Maoist hardliner Kiran.
According to Indian analysts, Kiran has made headway within
the Maoist camp and has already achieved a major part of his
agenda in getting the Maoists out of government and into the
streets. Menon agreed that while the Maoist protests to date
had been measured and did not appear to be generating public
support, he believed that Kiran,s challenge to former PM
Dahal within the party would result in escalating disruptions
and a greater potential for violence even if the hardliners
did not prevail.
4. (C) The Foreign Secretary elaborated his concern that in
the face of Katawal and Kiran's growing belligerency, there
appears to be almost no attention to key governance and peace
process issues by the other politicians. He described them
as acting in their own selfish interest with an eye on future
positions rather than to national interests. He noted that
PM Nepal had said all the right things in their June 20
meeting, but had not shown any leadership since assuming
office and seemed to be unable to break the focus on
individual horse trading of positions rather than developing
a program for peace and development in Nepal. Menon
expressed concern about the motives and actions of former PM
and Nepal Congress leader Koirala. Without providing
details, Menon appeared to be concerned about recurring
reports of Koirala favoring a "Bangladesh" solution in
which the military would take over and install a civilian
leader.
5. (C) Menon indicated New Delhi understands that UNMIN
needs to be extended beyond its current mandate which ends
on July 23, but expressed concern that the video tape of
Prachanda bragging to cantonment cadres that UNMIN had been
hoodwinked on verification of combatants and on funding calls
into question its current operating procedures. He suggested
it might be useful to use the extension resolution to urge
changes in the way combatant stipends are disbursed and to
establish firm deadlines for Nepali action, with UN support,
to remove and rehabilitate the 4000 non-combatants and begin
the process of integration/rehabilitation of the 19,000
combatants.
6. (C) Next steps. Post is developing set of talking points
to be used by the Ambassador in her farewell calls on
political leaders, and COAS Katawal, and in three scheduled
media interviews. In addition, Ambassador will consult with
the British Ambassador, who has taken the lead in convening
the local P-5, concerning UNMIN mandate extension and Indian
conditionality proposals.
POWELL