Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KATHMANDU535
2009-06-19 08:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: A/S BLAKE URGES PROGRESS ON PEACE PROCESS

Tags:  PREL PTER KDEM UN UK NP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000535 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER KDEM UN UK NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: A/S BLAKE URGES PROGRESS ON PEACE PROCESS
AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION

REF: A. KATHMANDU 522

B. KATHMANDU 471

Classified By: Ambassador Nancy J. Powell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000535 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2019 TAGS: PREL PTER KDEM UN UK NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: A/S BLAKE URGES PROGRESS ON PEACE PROCESS AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION REF: A. KATHMANDU 522 ¶B. KATHMANDU 471 Classified By: Ambassador Nancy J. Powell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a June 12 lunch meeting with representatives from three of the four major parties and at an evening reception with a broad group of Nepali leaders, visiting Assistant Secretary Robert Blake encouraged parties and institutions to work together to complete the peace process, including drafting the new constitution. He urged the governing coalition to move quickly to name the rest of the cabinet so the work on the peace process could begin. The Assistant Secretary found a wide range of views among the parties and others; some expected the new government would not last. In a morning meeting on June 13, the former UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) deputy special representative, the UNMIN representative, and the British Charge d'Affaires highlighted their concerns about Nepal's current situation and UNMIN's future role. Everyone Wants Peace -------------- ¶2. (C) In a lunch meeting on June 12 with representatives of the three of the four largest parties, visiting Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia Robert Blake encouraged all of the parties to work together to complete the peace process. Former Minister of Tourism and Civil Aviation Minister Hisila Yami (Maoist) and newly appointed Minister without Portfolio Minendra Rijal (Nepali Congress or NC) frequently expressed diametrically opposed views on how Nepal's peace process had gotten into its current logjam, but they agreed some way forward had to be found. Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF) chairman and former Foreign Minister Upendra Yadav shared that view. Similarly, at an evening reception, Assistant Secretary Blake took the opportunity to discuss with a broad group of leaders, including Constituent Assembly (CA) Chairman Subash Nemwang, Deputy Prime Minister Bijay Gachhadar (MPRF),Minister without Portfolio Prakash Mahat (NC) and several senior civil servants, among others, the prospects for peace. (Note: On June 17, Rijal was named Minister for Constituent Assembly Affairs and Mahat was named Energy Minister. Ref A.) Drafting a Federal Constitution -------------- ¶3. (C) Yami described the familiar challenges Nepal faces in drafting a
new constitution: disagreements about the type of executive (presidential vs. prime ministerial) and differences about how to draw the map of the new federal Nepal and to allocate powers between the center and the states. Yadav noted that the MPRF wanted a presidential system -- like the one in the United States -- and strong states (what he called "autonomous states") as in the U.S. system, not the weaker ones that existed in India. Rijal argued for the Westminster system, at least for now, in order to avoid the risk of an overly strong executive, and to force the government to seek the support of the Parliament. Yadav was convinced that the Maoists and the NC would team up to prevent the Madhesis from having a unified Madhes state. However, after some back and forth, Rijal said he, for one, was prepared to support a Madhes state if, as Yadav maintained, the MPRF supported a bicameral parliament with one chamber for the states (like the U.S. Senate) and one chamber based on population (like the U.S. House of Representatives). According to Rijal, the bigger issue was the Maoists' commitment to multiparty democracy, human rights and private property. Forming a Government -------------- KATHMANDU 00000535 002 OF 003 ¶4. (C) At the lunch and the reception, the Assistant Secretary emphasized the importance of the coalition completing the cabinet quickly. Yami, who can be outspoken in other fora, was mild in her criticism of the way in which the Maoists' former coalition partner, the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (UML),had teamed up with the NC to elect M.K. Nepal as the new Prime Minister a few weeks earlier. Yadav was more blunt. He accused the NC and UML of conspiring to split his party by tapping his party rival, Bijay Gachhadar, to become Deputy Prime Minister (Ref B). Yadav said he had no faith in a government which was headed by a man (Nepal) who was defeated in both the CA races he contested. The Defense Minister (Bijaya Bhandari, UML) and the Foreign Minister (Sujata Koirala, NC) were other ministers whom the voters had rejected. He predicted that the government would not last long. Yami, too, had doubts. Rijal conceded that it was proving difficult to name the cabinet. He claimed that the NC and UML, however, were close to a deal on allocating portfolios among themselves. UN Views on Peace Process, Government -------------- ¶5. (C) At a morning meeting on June 13, former UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) Deputy Special Representative Tamrat Samuel stated to Assistant Secretary Blake that the challenge was to find a way to get the peace process moving forward again. Samuel, who is presently Director for Asia and the Pacific in the UN Department of Political Affairs, said one idea is to form a high-level political committee. However, the Maoists had already told the UN they saw no point in participating as long as they were outside the government. The Maoists, he added, were bent on bringing down the new coalition. UNMIN Representative Karin Landgren noted that UNMIN had drafted a guardedly optimistic interim report to the UN Security Council in April and then the situation had gone "haywire." The new coalition needed to decide what it was going to do about the crucial Special Committee on Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of Maoist Combatants. For starters, who would convene it? Landgren said the Maoists wanted 3-7,000 of the combatants integrated into the Nepal Army, but arrangements would have to be made for the rest and for the disqualified. Some politicians were talking about giving them cash, which was a bad idea. Future of UNMIN -------------- ¶6. (C) Samuel and Landgren indicated that PM Nepal as well as the other major party leaders believed it was too soon for UNMIN to leave when its mandate expired in July. Samuel thought the Security Council members felt the same way. British Charge d'Affaires Sophia Willitts-King interjected that before the Maoist-led government fell, London had been keen to see UNMIN leave in July. In part, this was due to budgetary pressure in the UK, but it also reflected concern about the lack of movement in the peace process. It was important that the Nepalis not take UN support for granted. After the fall of the government, London had started to reconsider its position. The British delegation in New York was likely to question strongly why UNMIN was being extended, but then vote in favor -- after taking a tough line that this extension would be the last. Samuel agreed that it was difficult to persuade the Nepalis to take any threats to withdraw seriously. The Nepalis figured that the UN might bluster, but in the end it would not walk away. Blake remarked that he had detected little sense of urgency among Nepali leaders. U.S. Public Stance on UNMIN -------------- ¶7. (U) At a June 13 press conference, in response to a question about the U.S. position on extension of the UNMIN mandate, A/S Blake stated that the U.S. is following UNMIN's work closely and considers those activities to be very important. However, Nepal "should not think that there will KATHMANDU 00000535 003 OF 003 be unlimited patience on the part of the international community" to continue supporting UNMIN's operations into the future. UNMIN, he said, is quite expensive for the U.S. and other donors to fund. He stressed that Nepalis need to show they are "truly committed to achieving progress" in the peace process. Progress would provide the basis for further support. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Finding consensus to form the government, integrate the Maoist combatants and draft the new constitution would be extremely difficult for any Prime Minister in the current circumstances in Nepal. M.K. faces those challenges without the benefit of a popular mandate. He also does not have much time. POWELL

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