NEPAL: TERRORIST BENCHMARKS PASSED TO PRACHANDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001174 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: TERRORIST BENCHMARKS PASSED TO PRACHANDA Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., Randy W. Berry. Reasons 1.4 (b /d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a December 29 meeting with Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal "Prachanda," Charge presented the Embassy's benchmarks for removing the Maoists from the two U.S. terrorist lists. Prachanda said the Maoists were considering moving from street protests to debate within Parliament. He expressed concern that the other political parties did not want to see progress on the peace process or constitution drafting because they were outnumbered in the Constituent Assembly and out-organized by the Maoists. Prachanda claimed India also opposed progress on the constitution and peace process. In a separate meeting held immediately after the one-on-one with Prachanda, the British Ambassador and French Charge joined and inquired about the Maoist's opinions on UNMIN expansion, which Prachanda requested be extended for six months. End Summary. Terrorist Benchmarks Accepted -------------- ¶2. (C) Charge told Prachanda the United States wanted to engage further with the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, but that their continued placement on the U.S. terrorist designation lists was an impediment. Charge noted that the requirements for being taken off the list had been presented numerous times by A/S Blake and Boucher and Ambassador Powell. Since the Maoists had yet to take significant action, the Embassy was presenting a written list of the benchmarks (in both Nepali and English) and wanted to arrange for regular meetings to discuss progress on the action items. Prachanda said he appreciated the clarification and recommended the party's foreign affairs chief, and regular Embassy contact, Krishna Bahadur Mahara work directly with the Embassy. (Note: Post is arranging a meeting with Mahara to follow up.) Shifting Debate into Parliament, Want International Help -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Prachanda said that the Maoists were in the midst of a politburo meeting and were rethinking their overall strategy. The first several phases of protest against the government had been successful, he claimed, but had focused on "street protests." Prachanda said they were trying to "change the direction of the party" and "shift the debate to inside Parliament," which would bring "more effective exposure of our demands." (Note: The Maoists unilaterally ended their obstruction of Parliament on December 23.) He intimated that the politburo would make a decision in next several days. ¶4. (C) The Maoist leader complained that anti-Maoist, hard-line factions in the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninists (UML) and the Nepali Congress (NC) had taken a more active role in their parties and were not looking for consensus. These parties were stalling on both the peace process and constitution drafting because they realize the Maoists have an upper hand in both. Prachanda said India had historically played a role in pushing the parties forward at times like this, but India has become "cold," and regretted bringing the Maoists into mainstream. Prachanda claimed India also opposes drafting a constitution while the Maoists are in a position of political power. ¶5. (C) Prachanda asked the international community to push all sides, including India, to stay engaged in the peace process and constitution. Without help from "the West," consensus would be impossible. Extremists and hardliners within his party would gain the upper hand. Prachanda admitted his party "has shortcomings," but said the Maoist party members wanted a constitution completed. Constitution Deadline Likely to be Extended -------------- ¶6. (C) The Maoist leader reported the party has been active in drafting the new constitution. Even if the Constituent Assembly cannot finish by the May 28 deadline, it could amend KATHMANDU 00001174 002 OF 002 the Interim Constitution to extend the process by six months if they have a rough draft document to present to the people. The public would support an additional six months for "finalizing the document," and taking public input, he claimed. Asking for UNMIN Six Month Extension -------------- ¶7. (C) U.K. Ambassador Andrew Hall informed Prachanda that the British were tired of UNMIN being renewed in perpetuity, and asked whether the Maoists would support the government's recent request for a four month extension, instead of the usual six months. Prachanda strongly disagreed with a four month extension, and said the country needed UNMIN's presence for at least six more months. UNMIN "must be kept until the stagnated debate on the integration and rehabilitation of the 19,000 Maoist combatants can be resolved." Hall suggested the indefinite withdrawal date would be a difficult sell in London. Without UNMIN's presence, the atmosphere surrounding negotiations would become poisoned, Prachanda said, noting that the next six months is "especially crucial." If the constitution drafting process crumbles in the final days - mid-May - then UNMIN's presence will be absolutely essential to keep the peace. This is not the time for UNMIN to pack up. ¶8. (C) Ambassador Hall suggested Prachanda work with the Prime Minister to develop a timetable for UNMIN's departure. If the Maoists could agree with the government on a timetable, it would go a long way towards satisfying the UNSC that a six month extension would be the last extension. Prachanda agreed in principle, and noted that once a decision on integration and rehabilitation was made, the process could be largely completed within five months. He later admitted that the actual integration and rehabilitation process would likely take longer than five months, but that "just getting started is enough to create a conducive atmosphere, at which point UNMIN can leave." Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) By presenting the Maoists with a written list of benchmarks, we now have a shared reference point on terrorist delisting. The document will help disseminate information among Maoist leadership, something it appears had not been happening before. We are encouraged with Mahara's designation as a point of contact. He is someone Post has worked with before, and we have had positive and constructive interactions with him. We are also encouraged with the possibility that the Maoists might end their shutdowns and violent demonstrations, and begin negotiating in Parliament. However, time will tell whether the Maoists will carry through on this plan. Prachanda clearly feels that India is the largest impediment to their current agenda, and is frustrated by its perceived (or actual) resistance to greater Maoist involvement in the political process. BERRY