Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KATHMANDU1163
2009-12-24 07:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: PRIME MINISTER'S BRIEFING FOR P-5

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM NP 
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PP RUEHCI
DE RUEHKT #1163/01 3580735
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 240735Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1203
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7252
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 7591
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2937
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 5632
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3405
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 4891
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2496
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3776
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001163 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PRIME MINISTER'S BRIEFING FOR P-5
REPRESENTATIVES

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Randy W. Berry. Reasons 1.4 (b/
d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001163

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PRIME MINISTER'S BRIEFING FOR P-5
REPRESENTATIVES

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Randy W. Berry. Reasons 1.4 (b/
d).


1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister M.K. Nepal, flanked by his
two Deputy Prime Ministers, told P-5 Ambassadors and Charges
that the country was currently facing &new challenges8 to
the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. On
the heels of a three-day Maoist bandh,, or general strike,
he expressed GON frustration that the Maoists have failed to
renounce violence and had resorted to undemocratic actions to
further their political agenda. While complaining that
UNMIN has become &too biased, too partial,8 he indicated
that Cabinet would likely request a limited extension of
mandate (as little as four months, to coincide with the
planned completion of the new constitution on May 28, 2010)
to focus only on arms monitoring. The PM also laid out six
reasonable &key issues8 that the GON would like to see the
Maoists address, and vowed that the Government was prepared
to engage with the Maoists ) even bringing them into
Government ) but not as its leader. The PM spelled out the
need for action on the integration/rehabilitation of Maoist
combatants, saying that a new constitution cannot be
promulgated while the &Maoist Army8 remains intact and in
cantonments ) and acknowledged that he and Maoist leader
Dahal had agreed that between 4,000-6,000 combatants would be
integrated into the Nepal Army - eventually. End Summary.


2. (C) Prime Minister M.K. Nepal summoned P-5 Ambassadors
and Charges to a peace process briefing on December 23. The
Prime Minister was joined by First Deputy Prime Minister
Bijay Gachchhadar (Madheshi Janakdar Forum),Second Deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sujata Koirala (Nepali
Congress),Minister for Federal Affairs Minendra Rizal
(Nepali Congress),Chief Cabinet Secretary Madhav Ghimire,
Foreign Secretary Madan Bhattarai, and the Prime Minister,s
advisor, Rajan Bhattarai. Charge Berry, along with the
British, French, and Russian Ambassadors attended, as did the
Chinese Charge.

Concern Over &New Challenges8
--------------

3. (C) Speaking from prepared notes, the PM reiterated the
GON,s support for full implementation of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement, but noted that progress was being hampered
by &new challenges,8 mainly in the form of increasing
Maoist intransigence. The PM complained that despite
attempts to engage the Maoists, they continued to use and
espouse violence as a means of advancing their party agenda.
He noted with special concern the situation in the
cantonments, where Maoists combatants still reside. Maoist

leadership had not been helpful in bringing the combatants
under the control of the Special Committee, as required. He
stressed that a solution on the reintegration/rehabilitation
must be completed before the new constitution could be
promulgated (now slated for May 28, 2010). Instead of
working on such issues, the PM said, the Maoists continued to
provide only &endless protests, abductions, killings,
extortion, and land seizures.8 He lightly chided &some
members of the diplomatic community8 (read: EU Member
states, to varying degrees) of failing to hold the Maoists
accountable for such actions. The GON wants the Maoists to
engage in a constructive and productive manner. He had done
his utmost, the PM said, to ensure that they have the
opportunity to rejoin government ) but that he would not
consent to them leading a new, unity government.

Six Items
--------------

4. (C) The PM said that the GON remained willing to engage,
and was asking the Maoists to address six issues/items to
bring them back into the process, including:

--A categorical renunciation of the use or threat of violence;
--A clear acceptance/participation in a peaceful, multiparty
democratic system;
--To complete the task of &combatant management,8 i.e.
reach a deal on rehabilitation/reintegration;

KATHMANDU 00001163 002 OF 002


--Cease unilateral declarations of autonomous states and
other undemocratic actions;
--Fully respect freedom of speech and of the media;
--Halt trade union and youth wing excesses that contribute to
the environment of distrust.

UNMIN
--------------

5. (C) The PM complained that after playing a constructive
role, UNMIN of late had become too biased and partial to play
as constructive a role in Nepal as he had hoped. Despite
this unhappiness (particularly the most recent
Secretary-General report that called for a national unity
government in Nepal),he confirmed that he would recommend
that the Cabinet approve a single, limited, and final request
for an extension of UNMIN,s mandate to last &three or four
months.8 He ruled out any broadening of UNMIN,s mandate to
include political matters. UNMIN could play an effective
role in supporting the rehabitation/reintegration process
through its arms monitoring function, but should limit itself
to that activity. He suggested that in a December 22 meeting
with Maoist leader Dahal (Prachanda),they both agreed that
decisions leading to reintegration/rehabilitation could be
taken quickly, and (unreastically, to our view) be completed
by the end of May 2010. The PM indicated that the GON could
provide, as an annex to their mandate extension request, a
more specific, measurable timeline on steps to integration.

Comment
--------------

6. (C) The PM,s comments were more organized and clearly
presented than usual; it was also significant that he had
included other senior Ministers in this briefing to
demonstrate agreement among the &big three8 (UML, NC, and
the Gachchhadar faction of the MJF) of his coalition
government. The tone was reasoned; the six points
enumerated by the PM also appear reasonable and constructive.
His points on the need to address
rehabilitation/reintegration are valid, though the timeline
to do so seems fairly unrealistic to us due to the current
low levels of trust and flexibility by any of the parties.
The GON,s probable stance on UNMIN,s extension is not
surprising, and tracks with all other previous indications
that the governing parties (and presumably the Government of
India) would like to see UNMIN heading for the door. Despite
the current environment, it is an encouraging sign that the
PM and Maoist leader Dahal continue to meet, and discuss the
way forward in some detail. That continued conversation,
along with recent Maoist unilateral (and positive) moves to
demobilize the 4,000 disqualified combatants from the
cantonments (last week) and suspend its obstruction of
Parliament (yesterday),are positive signs in the midst of
the impasse.
BERRY

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