NEPAL: MAOIST DEPUTY OUTLINES POSSIBLE DEAL;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001130

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOIST DEPUTY OUTLINES POSSIBLE DEAL;
COMPLAINS ABOUT VISA

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Randy W. Berry. Reasons 1.4 (b/
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Sitting under the portraits of Marx,
Trotsky, Lenin, Stalin and Mao, United Communist Party of
Nepal-Maoist Vice Chairman Narayan Kaji Shrestha "Prakash"
told Charge that the political parties were close to
resolving the political impasse, a statement we have heard
repeatedly (and skeptically) in recent months. Shrestha
admitted that the Maoists are a "party in transition" that
needs to change. The long delays in approving his visa to
the United States were "humiliating," Shrestha said. Charge
reminded Shrestha that we continue to wait on Maoist actions
to remove them from the terrorist lists, which would
eliminate long delays in visa approval. END SUMMARY.

Outlines of Political Compromise
--------------

2. (C) During a December 10 meeting at his Kathmandu home,
Narayan Kaji Shrestha "Prakash" said he was optimistic that
the three-party task force would be able to resolve the
current political impasse, which had caused the Maoists to
block parliament and publically protest. (Note: The roots of
the recent crisis stem to then-Prime Minister Dahal's
decision to fire then-Chief of the Army Staff Katawal.
President Yadav overturned Katawal's firing on May 4 -- a
move the Maoists call unconstitutional -- leading Dahal to
resign in protest. End note.) "There is no alternative to
consensus," Shrestha said. If the parties cannot bring the
peace process to its "logical conclusion" and promulgate a
new constitution, it will be a "disaster."


3. (C) Shrestha outlined the key elements of a political
compromise "package":

-- parliamentary motion on "civilian supremacy," which would
state clearly that the civilian government controls the Nepal
Army;

-- amendments to the Constitution that would "clarify" the
rights and responsibilities of the President to avoid any
future "confusion;" and

-- a public appeal to the nation from the President which
would urge Nepalis to forget the past and unite to form a new
constitution.


4. (C) The Maoists have dropped their demand that the
President apologize for his actions in May 2009 or state that
his action was unconstitutional. Maoist leader Dahal
"Prachanda" met the President recently to discuss the
political package. The President said he "would take
positively" whatever compromise the three parties reached.
Shrestha also clarified that the Maoist demand for a
"government of national unity" -- presumably led by them --
was not a precondition for resolving the political impasse.
Shrestha added that a government of national unity remained
critical to moving the peace process forward.

"Party in Transition"
--------------

5. (C) Charge urged the Maoists to demonstrate maximum
flexibility in reaching a political agreement with the
government. The United States strongly supports the peace
process and calls on all parties, including the government,
to support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Charge
noted that the blocking of parliament and continued land
seizures were neither consistent with the CPA nor democratic
principles. Shrestha said that most of the land the Maoist
seized had been returned, and disinterestedly said he was
unaware of new seizures. (Comment: The recent seizures have
been front-page news and broadly accepted as fact.) He noted
frankly that the Maoists are a "party in transition,"
although they were "mainly" democratic and committed to peace
and human rights. The party "needs to change."

Visa Delays "Humiliating"

KATHMANDU 00001130 002 OF 002


--------------

6. (C) Shrestha asked about the status of his visa
application to attend the UN General Assembly, which has
lingered for two months. UNMIN had invited Shrestha in his
role as Deputy Leader of the Constituent Assembly to meet
with UN officials. Shrestha found the visa application
process "humiliating." (Ironically, the waiver for
Shrestha's visa came through later in the day December 10,
following the meeting.)


7. (C) Charge stressed that because of the designation of the
Maoist as a terrorist organization, the waiver process
requires time. The best solution to this problem would be
for the Maoists to take action on the terrorist list
benchmarks, as explained by A/S Blake, former Ambassador
Powell, and other U.S. officials over the past 18 months.
Shrestha, the number two official in the party, was not aware
of the terrorist list benchmarks, and said he believed the
Maoists were simply waiting for the U.S. terrorist list
removal process. Charge reviewed the key expectations for
him.

Comment
--------------

8. (C) While the compromise outlined by Shrestha appears
reasonable, the current problem is not the legal details of
the agreement, but rather the political will to move forward.
The Maoists remain divided -- some want to drop the
unpopular protests and rejoin the political process, while
others are committed to escalating pressure and retaking
control of government. Maoist leader Prachanda is attempting
to straddle the two camps, an increasingly precarious
position. We will continue to engage the GON, political
parties, and Maoists to urge all sides to demonstrate
flexibility.


9. (C) On the terrorist designation, the fact that the Vice
Chairman of the party had no idea about the removal process
underscores for us the need to present the Maoists with a
non-paper containing specific action items, as endorsed by
the recent Inter-Agency Policy Committee. Clearly, earlier
engagements with Dahal and Bhattarai are not trickling down.
We also believe that travel to the United States by senior
Maoist leaders generally advances U.S. interests.
BERRY