NEPAL: PM NEPAL'S NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001112 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: PM NEPAL'S NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PEACE PROCESS REF: A. KATHMANDU 1102 ¶B. STATE 119813 ¶C. KATHMANDU 1079 ¶D. KATHMANDU 1090 ¶E. 12/1/09 OFFICIAL-INFORMAL ¶F. KATHMANDU 1105 ¶G. KATHMANDU 1079 AND PREVIOUS ¶H. KATHMANDU 1109 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Randy W. Berry. Reasons 1.4 (b/ d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a December 4 meeting, Prime Minister M.K. Nepal took a hard-line on the Maoists, showing little flexibility on reenergizing the peace process. The "ultra-left" and "untrustworthy" Maoists will be allowed to come into government only after their combatants leave the cantonments. The PM wants to move 4,000-6,000 Maoist combatants into "new security institutions," like a border security or forest guard, with only a handful integrated into the Nepal Army -- a proposal the Maoists would strongly resist. UNMIN is not helping the peace process due to its bias in favor of the Maoists. The PM said UNMIN should not have an expanded political mandate, and he refrained from confirming the GON would request a mandate extension at all. The PM strongly hinted that he would promote Toran Singh to Lieutenant General after an "investigation," despite concerns about his human rights record. END SUMMARY. "Maoists Cannot be Trusted" -------------- ¶2. (C) Charge met Prime Minister M.K. Nepal at his residence the evening of December 4 for one and half hours, following the PM's return from Mount Everest base camp, where he led a cabinet meeting focused on climate change (ref A). Charge urged the Prime Minister to demonstrate maximum flexibility in reaching a political agreement with the Maoists. Per ref B instructions, Charge said that the United States remained committed to helping the people of Nepal to complete the peace process, but there is urgent need for all the parties to work together to make progress. Charge noted that he delivered a similar message to Maoist leader Prachanda (ref C) and Nepali Congress leaders (refs D and E). ¶3. (C) The Prime Minister took a tough line on the Maoists, saying they "cannot be trusted." The Maoists have a "an extreme left mindset" that has not changed. The GON's 21-party coalition has told the Maoists that they will never return to government until they "dismantle their private army." According to Nepal, closing the Maoist cantonments ;must precede the approval of a new constitution (scheduled to be completed in May 2010). The international community should be "very specific and concrete" about its demands on the Maoists -- insisting they get rid of their arms, army, and paramilitary organization -- not simply calling for respect for abstract ideas like "the rule of law" or "democracy." The PM specifically referred to the usefulness of the United States "tagging" the Maoists as terrorists; Charge assured the PM that the U.S. Government has demanded that the Maoists make concrete progress on ending violence, respecting human rights, promoting the peace process, and others issues before we would consider removing them from the terrorist list. Integration Possible, but Not into the Army -------------- ¶4. (C) On the integration of Maoist combatants, PM Nepal suggested that a deal with the Maoists is possible. He unrealistically predicted that the process could move quickly if there is flexibility (complete in "even one month"). On the numbers for integration, Prachanda told the PM and Nepali Congress leader G.P. Koirala that the Maoists would be satisfied with the integration of 4,000 - 6,000 combatants, with the rest rehabilitated. Instead of the Army, Nepal said the Maoists should be integrated into new "security institutions," like a forest guard, industrial sector guard, border security guard, or Armed Police Force. (Note: the KATHMANDU 00001112 002 OF 003 Maoists want to be integrated into the Army. End Note.) A "few" Maoists who "meet standards" could join the army, but "you must not allow the Maoists to contaminate" the institution of the Army, which must remain apolitical and neutral, Nepal said. Any integrated Maoist combatants must sever his or her ties to the party structures and reverse the "indoctrination" and "brainwashing" from his or her People's Liberation Army service. ¶5. (C) Nepal also suggested that he was considering a plan to induce Maoist combatants out of the cantonments with promises of cash and jobs, tossing out a figure of 200,000 - 500,000 rupee per combatant (USD 2,500 - 7,000). In his view, many Maoist combatants are unhappy and would "defect" if "we could assure them of their safety, training and a job." Such an exodus would be a "big problem for the Maoists, and big solution for the country." Pressed by Charge whether such an initiative would violate the Comprehensive Peace Agreement or be perceived as provocative, PM Nepal slightly backed off, noting that the combatants were Nepali citizens; if they "happened to walk out of the camps," the government would have an obligation to assist them. "What's the Use of UNMIN?" -------------- ¶6. (C) Asked about the upcoming UNSC decision on UNMIN's future, PM Nepal sharply criticized UNMIN as biased in favor of the Maoists, asking rhetorically "what is the use of UNMIN; has their presence helped?" According to Nepal, the Maoists "do whatever they want," and yet UNMIN only speaks in favor of the Maoists. He cited two incidents where police stopped armed Maoists, in Kapilvastu and more recently in Banke, where UNMIN "sided with" the Maoists and urged the police to release the armed combatants. (Note: UNMIN claims the Kapilvastu incident as one of their recent successes, saying it played the key role in diffusing tensions. End Note.) The PM said that UNMIN's efforts to "upgrade itself" would be a "big mistake," referring to the U.K. proposal to expand UNMIN's political mandate (ref F). UNMIN is nothing more than a "spokesman for the Maoists." The PM said he was planning to call a meeting of the P-5 to discuss the GON's views on UNMIN's extension, a proposal the Charge encouraged. Committed to Human Rights, but Toran Singh Likely Innocent -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Bringing up the controversial case of Toran Singh (ref G),the Prime Minister said he has "taken seriously" the concerns of the international community about the promotion of General Singh to Lieutenant General. A committee of three cabinet secretaries is investigating his case, and Nepal will respond to "objective facts," not "subjective" impressions. If guilty, Singh should be punished, but if innocent, he "should not suffer." The "morale of the Nepal Army" is at stake with the Singh promotion, the PM claimed, and therefore he must be "very careful." The Maoists have "penetrated" many of the country's security institutions, even the police and Armed Police Force. The Nepal Army is the "last institution" the Maoists are trying to capture, and they will "not be satisfied" until they do. It was the Maoist "bad luck" that they resigned -- due to their "own internal conflicts and wrong calculations" -- otherwise, they would have tightened their grip even more. ¶8. (C) Charge repeated U.S. concerns about Singh's promotion, stressing the need for a credible investigation of the Maharajgunj incident which assigned blame. Absent such an investigation, the promotion could affect U.S. military cooperation. (Note: the Nepal Army is accused of allegedly torturing suspected Maoists at Maharajgunj Barracks and executing 49. End Note.) In response, the PM suggested that the Maharajgunj incident may require the formation of another committee for "further investigation" but that should not hold up Singh's promotion. He admitted that it "may be difficult" to find out what really happened. The PM held up Singh's promotion for some six months because of the concerns from the international community. He wanted to find out the facts and "create the environment" for Singh's promotion KATHMANDU 00001112 003 OF 003 (comment: leaving the strong impression that he plans to promote Singh soon). Charge again stressed that an investigation that exonerates Singh and vaguely promised future investigation would not be viewed as a credible response to the situation. ¶9. (C) The Prime Minister reiterated his personal commitment to human rights and ending of the culture of impunity. He said he plans to prosecute emblematic human rights cases, involving both the Army and Maoist, mentioning by name the Maina Sunuwar case. (Charge noted that the deployment of Major Basnet, who was indicted in the Sunuwar case, has sent a negative signal about Nepal's commitment to human rights to the international community, a charge to which Nepal did not reply (ref H).) Nepal also complained that the international community always highlights the Army's human rights record, and never about Maoist human rights abuses, noting that the Maoist "extortion" in villages and the border is "rampant." Comment: Long Road Ahead -------------- ¶10. (C) The Prime Minister's aggressive tone on the Maoists, integration, and Toran Singh does not bode well for the peace process or human rights. Despite the weakness of his 21-party coalition, Nepal and his government appear increasingly hard-line on the peace process -- perhaps due to the perception that Maoist political support is waning or Indian support for Nepal's government is increasing. Nepal's suspicions about the Maoist intentions are valid, but his position does little to build confidence or encourage consensus on the peace process. Following the delivery of demarches over the past two weeks to Maoist leader Prachanda, Nepali Congress leaders, and now the Prime Minister, we are skeptical about the prospects for political progress in the short term. The interests of the parties diverge significantly, each is maneuvering for advantage, and there is little incentive to compromise. Post will continue to look for opportunities for press for flexibility and consensus, but believe we may be in for a rough few months in Nepal's never-ending peace process. BERRY