NEPAL: MIDWEST NEPAL CALM, MAOIST SUPPORT DECLINES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001047

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MIDWEST NEPAL CALM, MAOIST SUPPORT DECLINES

REF: KATHMANDU 0741


1. (SBU) Summary. Support for the Maoists in two districts
in midwestern Nepal appears to have decreased since the April
2008 elections, as ethnic-based political movements gain
strength. During a trip to Banke and Bardiya districts,
EmbOffs found the security situation generally calm.
Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is mixed;
Young Communist League (YCL) criminal activity down, but
local peace committees are not functional and only some
Maoist-seized land has been returned. No one has confidence
that politicians will finish the new constitution on time or
that it will make any difference in their lives. End Summary.


2. (SBU) EmbOffs traveled to Bardiya and Banke Districts in
Mid-Western Nepal October 28-30, and met with the Chief
District Officers (CDOs),senior police officers, human
rights activists, party leaders, and officials from the
National Human Rights Commission and Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees. EmbOffs also met with
representatives of the Tharu ethnic group, the largest ethnic
group advocating for greater autonomy (septel). Bardiya and
Banke districts were among the most affected by the 10-year
Maoist conflict; in Bardiya district alone, more than 200
people disappeared or were abducted, the highest number of
any part of the country.

Security Situation Improved but Uncertain
--------------

3. (SBU) The security situation in the two districts appeared
generally calm, according to the CDOs and police officials.
The Government of Nepal,s Special Security Plan (reftel) has
had a positive impact in the districts; the increased police
presence and enforcement had reduced the number of road
blockades and overall criminal activity. However, the police
complained about the lack of needed resources -- manpower,
vehicles, and radios -- to implement the plan. Many Village
Development Cooperatives (VDCs) had no police presence at
all, only "symbolic" visits from time to time.


4. (SBU) One of the large Terai-based criminal/political
gangs, the Jwala Singh faction of the Janatantrik Terai Mukti
Morcha, remained somewhat active in the region, and continued
extorting money from wealthy residents. The local officials
complained that Jwala Singh members often fled to India when
under pressure. India and Nepali officials meet regularly,
and cross-border cooperation was improving, Banke CDO
Birendra Bahadur Baniya reported.


5. (SBU) The local police reported that simmering tensions
between religious (Hindu-Muslim) and ethnic
(Tharu-Terai-Pahadi) groups remained their primary security
concern. Police worry that a small incident could spark a
larger conflict, such as happened a few months ago when a
fight between a Muslim and Hindu led to communal violence,
forcing police to use tear gas. Local populations often
resent the government officials sent from the "hilly"
(Pahadi) region of Nepal to run affairs in their region. For
example, in Nepalgunj, the capitol of Banke District in the
Terai, Muslims account for nearly 40 percent of the
population. In Bardiya district, more than 50 percent of the
population is Tharu. Yet, none of the senior government
officials in either district were Tharu, Madhesi, or Muslim,
and only a handful of the police came from local communities.

Peace Process Incomplete
--------------

6. (SBU) While the security situation is improved, little
progress has been made on key peace process issues. The
local peace committees -- created by the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement to prevent conflict and promote peace at the local
level -- are not functional in either district. In Banke,
the various parties are fighting over the nomination of the
coordinator; in Bardiya, the Maoists have refused to
participate. Nepalgunj-based human rights activist Ganesh
Regmi said the LPCs were a "great idea" that has been
high-jacked by petty party politics.

KATHMANDU 00001047 002.2 OF 003




7. (SBU) In the two districts, the Maoists have yet to return
all of the land seized during the conflict -- a key
requirement of the CPA -- although the picture is complex.
During the conflict, the Maoists did not always seize the
land for themselves, but rather handed it over to the
"tillers" who previously farmed the land for landlords. The
tillers supported the Maoists not for ideological reasons,
but because they personally benefited from Maoist policies.
Now that the conflict is over, the tillers do not want to
return the land, even if the local Maoists ostensibly request
it. In some cases, the Maoists have "negotiated" for the
return of the land, but the tillers are allowed to keep a
larger percentage of the crop (often half instead of a third)
-- an unsatisfactory result for the landlords. In some ten
percent of the cases, the Maoists/tillers have yet to return
any control, reported the Bardiya Nepali Congress leader
Krishna Man Shrestha.


8. (SBU) On the positive side, nearly all contacts reported
that the criminal activity of the Maoist-affiliated Young
Communist League had dropped considerably, with only sporadic
reports of looting. (Note: YCL activity is reportedly higher
in certain parts of eastern Nepal. End note.) The local
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist leaders and local government
officials also appear to cooperate well. During EmbOff,s
visit, the two sides met to discuss the modalities of
upcoming Maoist protests to ensure they did not turn violent.


Maoist Support Waning?
--------------

9. (SBU) In these two districts, most observers report that
political support for the Maoists has decreased somewhat
since the April 2008 elections. (Although we tend to agree
with these reports, they are anecdotal; there is no accurate
polling data in Nepal.) Many ethnic Tharus, who voted en
masse for the Maoists, no longer support the party. When the
Maoists were in power, many Tharus believe they did little to
help them. Tharu leaders are discussing forming their own
political party or joining with other oppressed ethnic groups
(Janjatis) in a larger political movement (septel). In
Bardiya, Maoists no longer hold large rallies because no one
comes, the CDO reported.


10. (SBU) Other major political parties, the Nepali Congress
and Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (UML)
say they are trying to capitalize on the declining Maoist
support, but with little success. Organizing in rural areas
in Bardiya district remains very difficult, according to
district UML leader Ashok Koirala, where the violent conflict
with the Maoists continues to loom large in the minds of the
local population. This "mentality of fear" is difficult to
change. While the Maoists may profess commitment to
democracy, no one has any illusions about their ultimate game
-- seizing absolute control. One Nepali Congress leader
suggested that the Maoists still have "guns and money," and
thus will likely win the next election, regardless of their
popular support.

Constitution, What Constitution?
--------------

11. (SBU) Asked about the constitution drafting in Kathmandu,
not a single Nepali, from senior official to storekeeper, had
any faith in the process. Comments like the leaders only go
to Kathmandu to "eat and drink," the constitution "means
nothing for my life," and "they won,t be done on time" were
common. Several leaders worried that the division of the
country in ethnically-based federal states could spark
conflict, given Nepal,s complex ethnic diversity. If a
Tharu state ("Tharuwaat") is declared in this part of the
country -- as proposed by the Maoists and UML -- several
observers worried violence might break out between Tharus and
the Madhesis. If the area becomes part of a Madhesi state --
as the Terai-based parties seek -- the Tharus will protest.
The "hilly" (Pahadi) population, many wealthier landlords or
government officials, are uncertain how they will fare in a

KATHMANDU 00001047 003 OF 003


new federal structure.

Comment
--------------

12. (SBU) The generally calm security situation in
previously-volatile regions is encouraging, but masks deep
inter-ethnic and inter-party tensions. The fragile situation
underscores the importance of completing the peace process
rapidly and reestablishing effective government control
throughout the country. If accurate, the reports of
declining Maoist support among allies like the ethnic Tharus
would pose serious political problems for the Maoists as they
prepare for the next election.
BERRY