UGANDA/DRC: ADDRESSING JOINT MILITARY OPERATION'S

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000094 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM UG SU CG SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC: ADDRESSING JOINT MILITARY OPERATION'S HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES KAMPALA 00000094 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) attacks against Congolese residents in retaliation for joint Ugandan-Congolese-Sudanese military operations have raised concerns about the protection of civilians. Several assessment teams have traveled to the area of operations to make recommendations on additional protection and humanitarian assistant measures. Human Rights Watch (HRW) analysts expressed support for the joint operations and will advocate for more international assistance to ensure the operation concludes successfully. HRW will recommend that more pro-active measures are taken to rescue non-combatants and protect local villages from the LRA. The International Organization for Migration (IOM),UNICEF, and the Ugandan Peoples' Defense Forces (UPDF),conducted a joint assessment to make recommendations to the UPDF high command on protection issues. End Summary. - - - - - - BACKGROUND - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) International and non-governmental organizations assessments of the humanitarian and human rights situation on the ground in eastern Democracy Republic of Congo (DRC) give a picture of the current status of operations. UN organizations, led by the Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs, Human Rights Watch, and IOM/UNICEF/UPDF visited the affected areas over the past month. Their assessments track closely with one another. Post debriefed the HRW analysts and the IOM/UNICEF/UPDF team. - - - - - - - - - - HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) On January 20, P/E Chief and DATT met with HRW analysts who had just returned from eastern DRC after three weeks in Doruma, Duru, Dungu, and Faradje. Their mission was to examine the humanitarian and human rights situation in DRC in the wake of Operation Lightening Thunder, the code name for the joint military operations launched by Ugandan, DRC, and southern Sudan. HRW interviewed escapees, defectors, local community leaders, UPDF, and Congolese units. The analysts traveled with missionaries to Doruma, Duru, and Faradje. They said there was dried blood everywhere and bloodied clubs left behind. Local residents who were not in the villages at the time of the attacks had to bury the dead. In many cases, only one or two village residents remain alive. �A; ¶4. (SBU) HRW reported that the LRA killed 800 and abducted 460 Congolese citizens between September and early November ¶2008. Debriefs of two LRA sergeants that were in Camp Kiswahili during the initial attack confirm that on the day of the attack, all activities were normal. The women and children had gone out to the fields at 0630 and the LRA fighters were awaiting their daily "parade." LRA leader Joseph Kony left to hunt for the Christmas feast at 0900 with a number of his "concubines." The sergeants said the first "bombs" hit at around 0910. End Note.) Many people fled the camp. Most of the non-combatants who fled feared leaving the safety of the forests, according to the two sergeants. ¶5. (SBU) According to HRW, Kony,s rampage that started in September was a deliberate strategy to discourage defectors by turning local communities against them. HRW found that the LRA attacks were a direct response to the LRA defections in August and aimed at penalizing and discouraging local communities that had helped escapees. HRW views this wave of attacks as setting the stage for current LRA tactics being used against local populations. HRW estimates that at least 135 were killed and 300 abducted between September and November. ¶6. (SBU) LRA attacks from December 24-27 were coordinated, simultaneous, and particularly brutal, according to HRW. Three distinct LRA groups carried out attacks at Doruma, Duru, and Faradje. HRW estimates that there are about eight groups of LRA operating, but that only three or four of them containing high command elements are killing in a coordinated manner. Local residents and UPDF officers told HRW that the roaming LRA groups have GPS, Thurayas, and Motorolas for communication, which had been retrieved after LRA members went back into the destroyed camps before the arrival of Ugandan ground troops. The LRA often subdivides into small groups and then reconstitute themselves after missions, according to eye witness reports. HRW provided the following information about LRA configurations: KAMPALA 00000094 002.2 OF 003 --Group 1: LRA Deputy Okot Odhiambo (ICC indictee) is with about 100 combatants in the forests near Gangala, Gamaya, and Nawaku, which the UPDF says it has surrounded. Local residents say that this group is carrying a man on a stretcher who has some kind of leg injuries (Note: UPDF commanders believe this is Odhiambo, who was reportedly injured on the first day of attacks. End Note.) --Group 2: A group "managed" by ICC indictee Dominic Ongwen or members of his team, who killed 23 in Dijabe. This group, according to locals, had left Garamba National Park, killed people in Duru and Bitima, and then was pushed back when they attempted to go north to Yambio, southern Sudan. HRW said that local residents and UPDF believe this group is trying to link up with Odhiambo near Doruma. --Group 3: Lt. Col. Charles Arop and a group of 70 carried out the attack on Faradje and four villages to the southwest. UPDF believes this group is carrying out diversionary attacks that would allow Kony to rejoin Odhiambo or escape DRC. --Group 4: General Joseph Kony and his bodyguards. HRW had no information on where this group is located, but surmised he remained in DRC, possibly near Duru. ¶7. (SBU) The pattern of the LRA attacks was to begin with a few members wandering into the towns, in some cases scouting out the presence of Congolese and Ugandan troops. They sought out churches and other places where villagers had gathered for Christmas services and then called in waiting LRA attackers. Men and boys were lined up face down on the ground and clubbed to death with axes and clubs. Women and girls were raped and then suffered the same fate. In Faradje, there was a bit more use of automatic weapons but followed the same pattern. Children between ages 10-15 were abducted, children under 10 were used to carry things and then killed. On the way out of Faradje, hundreds of homes were burned to the ground. After the mass killings, the LRA ate the Christmas feasts that had been prepared and slept in the villages among the dead bodies. HRW puts the numbers killed in Faradje at 143 with 160 abducted. ¶8. (SBU) Local communities formed self-defense units, which are working with the allied forces. The Congolese Republican Guard units in the area are getting high marks from the local community leaders, according to HRW. These units have engaged the LRA without hesitation and have established good relations with community leaders. - - - - - - - - - - - HRW RECOMMENDATIONS - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (SBU) HRW said it is supportive of the military operation against the LRA, but is looking for ways to enhance the protection of civilians and rescue ex-combatants, women, and children from LRA hands. Some of HRW proposed recommendations may include: --The international community should call for more MONUC-provided logistics support to the allied forces and provide financial assistance to protection efforts. --Allied forces should be more pro-active in search and rescue operations and place reception centers closer to LRA locations, such as Gangala which is on the outskirts of the forest in which the LRA is hiding. New messaging should go out to those who want to escape about the locations of reception areas. --LRA supporters in the Diaspora and in Khartoum should be isolated and prevented from giving Kony a lifeline. - - - - - - - - - - - IOM/UNICEF ASSESSMENT - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (SBU) Kampala-based IOM and UNICEF offices are the lead humanitarian agencies for the protection and repatriation part of the operation. From January 6-14, IOM, UNICEF, and the UPDF conducted a joint assessment mission to Dungu to make recommendations to the UPDF high command about rescue of non-combatants and other protection issues. The assessment team found that there may be hundreds of escaped non-combatants hiding in the bush because they fear attacks by local Congolese communities. Kony has been effective in countering leaflet drops. Kony said that the leaflets have been printed with poison ink and that anyone who touches one KAMPALA 00000094 003.2 OF 003 will die. The team also found that LRA attacks on local communities were designed to punish those who have helped defectors and to pit the local communities against those who seek refuge. ¶11. (SBU) IOM, UNICEF, and the UPDF are recommending reception centers at Dungu, Kiliwa, and Rikwangba. Discussions are underway between the UPDF, Congolese military, and local community leaders on the best ways to help fleeing LRA and non-combatants. Those who have made it to Dungu say it is important to get word out via radio and other means about the locations of UPDF units. The fleeing LRA are afraid of local communities and now only trust the UPDF to protect them. The UPDF is considering incentive packages for local communities that protect fleeing non-combatants. Coordination between the UPDF and Congolese is very close, according to IOM. There are daily briefings in the morning and sharing of reports. Currently, rescued Congolese abductees are being handed over to COPI, an Italian non-governmental organization, which provides foster family care while family tracing is done. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶12. (SBU) Ugandan military officials are acutely aware of the need to provide protection for civilians and take additional steps to aid escaping LRA members. Ugandan forces are concentrating on capturing or killing key LRA leaders, and could use additional logistics support to move Congolese troops around to provide protection for local residents. The operation has been extended for an additional 21 days. Post is waiting for the IOM's final report, which will outline the plans for stepping up protection activities. BROWNING