UGANDA/DRC: OPERATION RUDIA II UPDATE (JULY 31,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000830 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/19 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS MARR UG CG SU SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC: OPERATION RUDIA II UPDATE (JULY 31, 2009) Classified By: Acting P/E Chief Jarahn Hillsman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Background: This cable is a periodic update on the regional military operation against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) known as Operation Rudia II. This report is not meant to provide an overarching narrative or polished analysis of the operation, but rather offers spot information gleaned in Uganda only, from U.S. Mission sources. We recognize the regional scope of the operation and the fact that our sources may be limited in their knowledge and perspective on Rudia II. This update has been cleared by Embassy Kinshasa, but not by Embassy Bangui due to the absence of classified communications there. End background. - - - - - - - - MILITARY UPDATE - - - - - - - - ¶2. (S NF) The Latest Numbers: The Uganda Peoples' Defense Forces (UPDF) continue to make progress in tracking and destroying small LRA elements throughout eastern areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR). According to reporting from the Kampala Combined Intelligence Fusion Cell (KCIFC),the UPDF has killed 31 LRA rebels, captured 11 LRA rebels, rescued two abductees, and recovered four weapons and 110 rounds of ammunition in various engagements with the LRA since July 15. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Violence Increases in the Central African Republic - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (S NF) KCIFC confirms that LRA elements have crossed the border and are moving deeper into CAR, with two independent sources reporting recent LRA rebel attacks as far west as Mboki on or about July 22. (Note: The UPDF reports that an attack on Mboki occurred on July 22, while other reports indicate that an attack occurred on July 24; DAO is working to confirm whether these were two separate attacks or one and the same. End Note.) These reports are particularly troubling because they appear to indicate the LRA is operating much further west into CAR than was previously thought. The CAR armed forces (FACA) killed two LRA rebels, recovered one LRA rifle, and reported three civilian deaths in Mboki (killed by LRA). ¶4. (C) Recent independent reports passed to us by Embassy Bangui from an American citizen (Amcit) in Zemio, CAR and from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in CAR also describe a July 21 attack on the town of Ligoua, located approximately 20 kilometers east of Obo. The Amcit said the LRA stole food supplies that had been distributed to local populations by the UN World Food Program (WFP),and that this was the second such attack targeting WFP food supplies in Ligoua. According to UN reports, the other occurred on June 20. ¶5. (S NF) On July 16, UPDF engaged with an LRA element approximately 60 kilometers north of the "no penetration line" (a line that stretches along the road from Obo to Bambouti, and which the UPDF and FACA troops had tried to prevent the LRA from crossing). The engagement occurred northeast of Obo, CAR and approximately 80 kilometers from the last known LRA element in CAR. The UPDF killed five LRA rebels in this fight, including officers John Ogenga and Obong Angeki. They also recovered two rifles and 89 rounds of ammunition. The UPDF estimates that approximately 100-150 people (both combatants and non-combatants) were in the area of this engagement. The UPDF also confronted the LRA in Basigbiri on July 15, rescuing two LRA abductees. Despite the LRA's deep infiltration into CAR, the UPDF continues to pursue and engage LRA elements with the permission of the CAR government. Additionally, the UPDF and FACA continue to conduct joint patrols along the "no penetration" line. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - UPDF Continues Pursuit of LRA in DRC; MONUC to Increase Troops - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (S NF) Since the July 15 update, UN associates in Kampala report and Ugandan government officials confirm LRA attacks in the following areas of the DRC: Ferry area; Kaki village (Faradje area); road to Duru between Kiliwa and Baika (60km northeast of Dungu center); Bangalu village (Niangara area); and Mbiangu (between Bangadi and Kapili). Although the KAMPALA 00000830 002 OF 003 majority of the known LRA elements are located in CAR, east of Bitima and the Faradje area, splinter groups continue to conduct attacks and operations in the Banda, Niangara, and Dungu areas. KCIFC estimates there are between 40-60 LRA fighters operating in these areas. According to UN Mission to the Congo (MONUC) political officers in Kampala, MONUC plans to increase its force strength from 600 troops, currently stationed in Dungu, Duru, and Faradje, to 1,000 troops, to include a contingent in Dingira. It is unclear at this point when this will happen. - - - - - - - - - - - POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) PolOff and Defense Resource Management Initiative (DRMI) Officer met with MONUC Political Officer and former International Criminal Court (ICC) investigator Matt Brubacher in Kampala on July 27 to discuss a new MONUC radio initiative that will target LRA defectors in the DRC. MONUC officers spent last weekend in Gulu working with the Acholi MEGA-FM radio station to develop broadcast capabilities that can reach LRA audiences in northeastern DRC. Brubacher is working with MEGA-FM to develop mobile transmitter capability for the Dungu area, and to schedule the radio show for the early morning hours, when the LRA reportedly listen to their shortwave radios. MONUC also plans to drop information pamphlets in conjunction with the radio broadcasts, encouraging defectors to seek amnesty and repatriation assistance. The radio program is scheduled to launch the week of August 3. ¶8. (C) While in Gulu, Brubacher interviewed two recently-released LRA combatants who were kidnapped eight years ago and sent "to abduct and kill" under the command of LRA senior leader Charles Arop near Faradje, DRC. The former combatants said the LRA is currently in a defensive, "kill and survive" mode - trying to evade UPDF pursuit and inflict maximum military and humanitarian costs. They also provided insight into Kony's Acholi assimilation procedures, which include teaching all abductees and combatants Acholi language and maintaining Acholi religious and cultural practices. Brubacher noted that the LRA's senior leaders are all Acholi and that Kony is not promoting any of the abductees into leadership positions to replenish his ranks; he sees this as a major vulnerability for the LRA. Based on interviews with these and other abductees, Brubacher estimates there are approximately 44 LRA leaders left and around 200-300 Ugandan fighters still with the LRA. ¶9. (C) Brubacher believes that recent LRA attacks in eastern DRC and southern Sudan are intended to distract and disperse the UPDF while LRA leader Joseph Kony moves further west to evade UPDF pursuit and find sanctuary in ungoverned areas of CAR. Released abductees say Kony has moved most of his dependents into CAR as well. ¶10. (SBU) Former UN Special Envoy for the LRA-affected Region of the Great Lakes Joaquim Chissano officially ended his term and delivered a final briefing to the UN Security Council on July 15, which received little attention in the local Ugandan press. In one article, northern Acholi religious leaders criticized Chissano's recommendation that military options should be pursued alongside diplomatic options. The leaders cautioned that military action would further destabilize the peace they are experiencing in northern Uganda and would endanger the lives of civilians abducted in Uganda, Sudan, DRC, and CAR. On the other hand, the Kampala-based MONUC poloffs said the DRC's Catholic leaders tend to support the idea of a military solution. (Note from Embassy Kinshasa: We are not aware of anything that would substantiate this assertion. End note.) Moreover, most northern Ugandans, both political leaders and the public, recognize, if only tacitly, the need to maintain military pressure on the LRA as the only viable means to get Kony to end his brutal insurgency by assembling and surrendering his forces as called for in the 2008 Final Peace Agreement negotiated with the Government of Uganda. - - - - - - - - - - - - HUMANITARIAN SITUATION - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C) The WFP office in Bunia, DRC confirms that WFP is presently providing food assistance to displaced people in the Dungu and Aru areas (Ituri District, targeting displaced people from the Faradje area in Haut Uele). Poor access, insecurity, and lack of on-the-ground partners have prevented WFP from expanding operations beyond these areas. However KAMPALA 00000830 003 OF 003 WFP plans to begin food assistance activities in Doruma and Faradje in August. WFP also plans to begin providing air drops to areas that are impassable by road, including Dingila and Niangara. Although the original plan was to start in Niangara, due to limited MONUC personnel transport resources, MONUC is only offering passage and on-the-ground protection to Dingila at this point; drops are scheduled to begin in Dingila as soon as this week, before 1 August. Airdrops to Niangara may not happen until the end of August, when a scheduled military rotation is complete. ¶12. (SBU) Regarding security, WFP Program Officer Peter Transberg told PolOff that "to date, there have been no confirmed incidents of LRA diverting WFP food, either before or after distributions, or of any LRA attacks linked to recent distribution of humanitarian assistance (food or other)." WFP recently established a "Do No Harm" action plan in DRC, which evaluates the potential impact and risks of providing humanitarian assistance in insecure areas. The Protection Cluster evaluates potential sites for humanitarian assistance, which a provincial-level inter-agency committee (CPIA) then reviews and validates. WFP believes this security assessment mechanism will further reduce the risk of post-distribution reprisal attacks. Niangara and Dingila have both been assessed by the inter-agency teams; decisions to approve assistance to these areas are expected this week from the CPIA in Bunia. WFP assures us that it will only do airdrops in locations where MONUC and FARDC protection is "guaranteed." ¶13. (C) According to information provided by the MONUC Head of Office in Kampala, the former UN administrative head of Dingila post believes the presence of MONUC troops (from Guatemala) is highly reassuring for the local population. They reportedly established good relationships with the population through their interpreter, and are conducting day and night patrols along the road between Buta and Dingila. The MONUC presence in Dingila is considered as protection against LRA incursions. - - - - - Comment - - - - - ¶10. (S NF) The UPDF appears to be making steady ) but slow - progress in pursuing and eliminating LRA elements in DRC. The UPDF is recovering weapons and ammunition from LRA fighters regularly, effectively weakening the LRA's strength and forcing the LRA into an evasive and defensive posture. But the vastness and remoteness of the terrain continue to make it very difficult for Rudia II coalition forces to strike a decisive blow and finish off the LRA once and for all. And, ironically, the operation's success in harassing LRA elements appears to be pushing the LRA leadership deeper into CAR, lengthening UPDF supply lines. A greater irony is that despite good cooperation from the FACA and the CAR government, this westward movement further reduces the chances of successfully eliminating the LRA leadership, absent the application of more troops, greater troop mobility, luck, or some combination of all three. End Comment. HOOVER HOOVER