UGANDA/DRC: OPERATION LIGHTNING THUNDER UPDATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000352 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/19 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM UG CG SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC: OPERATION LIGHTNING THUNDER UPDATE (APRIL 7, 2009) REF: A. IIR 6 913 0159 09 ¶B. KAMPALA 347 Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: This cable is a periodic update on the regional military operation against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) known as Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT). This report is not meant to provide an overarching narrative or polished analysis of OLT, but rather offers spot information gleaned in Uganda only, from credible U.S. Mission sources here. We recognize the regional scope of OLT and the fact that our sources may be limited in their knowledge and perspective on OLT. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - MILITARY SITUATION - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) In a revealing meeting requested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ambassador, DCM, and DATT met April 6 with Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa, Defense Minister Crispus Kiyonga, and Security Minister Amama Mbabazi. Also in attendance were Chief of Defense General Aronda Nyakairima and Chief of Military Intelligence Brigadier General James Mugira. The Ambassador used the meeting to push for clarity on the government,s strategic outlook for OLT. Kutesa said that the Government of Uganda (GOU) maintained a "total and unwavering commitment" to the success of the operation. The slow speed of progress, he acknowledged, stems from constraints imposed by the operation,s political coalition with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),the Government of Southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR). It is also physically constrained by the terrain in and around Garamba National Park. ¶3. (C) Expounding on this, Aronda acknowledged that it was hard to see dramatic progress from a distance when looking at counter-insurgency operations like OLT. Militarily, Aronda said that OLT was following the lessons learned by the Ugandan Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) in Operation Iron Fist, which drove the LRA out of northern Uganda between 2002 and ¶2006. The keys, he said, are shrinking the area of movement for the LRA, depriving it of food, and learning the terrain. It takes time to create these conditions, said Aronda, but the process is ongoing now, with the kind of incremental success one would expect from this kind of operation. Under counterinsurgency doctrine, Aronda said, high-risk, large scale assaults are to be avoided. But OLT is not, he emphasized, at a stalemate. LRA food supplies have been found and destroyed, and the LRA leadership is on the run. When asked, he said he thought final victory was "months away." Aronda suggested that if there is confusion or doubt about UPDF goals, strategy, or tactics, he would welcome regular visits from U.S. policymakers and analysts from Washington and Africa Command for face-to-face briefings on the status and progress of OLT. ¶4. (C) Aronda underlined the importance, and also the constraints, of working with Uganda,s coalition partners. Sudan Peoples Liberation Army troops are "in need," he said. The operation is now nominally Congolese, he said, and has been re-named "Rudia II". The Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) has promised to insert another brigade in support of OLT. When this brigade arrives and in what condition remain to be seen, acknowledged Aronda. But both he and Kutesa underlined the importance of the political coalition to the overall effort. Drawing an analogy to the efforts of the USG to get NATO to commit more troops to Afghanistan, he noted that the UPDF is doing the best it can to maintain the momentum given the constraints imposed on it by the coalition. DRC President Kabila, Aronda reiterated, agreed at the Mponde Summit on March 4 that the bulk of the UPDF forces that left the DRC after March 15 should stay in the vicinity, and that they could be called back into action from southern Sudan if conditions require it. UPDF intelligence squads inside DRC, he reiterated, are combat troops who are engaging LRA units regularly. (Note: See ref A for further details on the size and location of UPDF forces in the Garamba theater, as reported to us earlier by Aronda. End Note). ¶5. (S NF) Meanwhile, Ugandan military officers have relayed their concerns that the Congolese military has not engaged an LRA group led by Lt. Col. Charles Arop which is operating southwest of Faradje. This group has become the de facto headquarters and supply element for the LRA and is extremely dangerous. This group is responsible for a number of attacks on villages in the area aimed at re-supply. KAMPALA 00000352 002 OF 002 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - MEDIA AND PUBLIC RELATIONS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (U) On April 5, the New Vision carried an interview by internationally respected journalist, Els De Temmerman, with Katto Kpenze, a Central African Republic abductee, who served as LRA leader Joseph Kony's "doctor" for the past year (Ref B). Kpenze escaped from the LRA on March 30 near Sakure, a village on the border between Sudan and the DRC. In the interview, Kapenze describes Kony's eccentricities and appalling atrocities against civilians committed by the LRA over the past year. He also describes life in the bush as difficult after the launch of OLT in mid-December 2008. He recounts being "constantly on the move" because UPDF soldiers "were hot on our heels." He describes the decision to withdraw Ugandan forces as "bad news for the population" because the Congolese army "is not doing much to fight the rebels" and the LRA is not afraid of them. Kpenze also confirms the lack of contact between Kony and his deputy, Okot Odhiambo. Finally, Kpewenze says that Kony has survived through is instincts and the use of diversionary tactics to throw off his pursuers. BROWNING