2008 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE

S E C R E T KAMPALA 000272 FOR DS/IP/AF AND DS/ITA AND DS/CC E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2029 TAGS: APER ASEC SUBJECT: 2008 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ),KAMPALA REF: A. STATE 13023 ¶B. 08 KAMPALA 01490 ¶C. KAMPALA 0169 ¶D. KAMPALA 0271 Classified By: RSO DCRONIN FOR REASON 1.4(g). Political Violence ¶1. (S) Demonstrations ¶A. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country prone to carrying out significant anti-American demonstrations? Not generally, however during the reporting period there was one public protest of significance held by the local Muslim population on 16 January 2009. While the protest focused primarily on the group's anger over the Israeli military offensive into Gaza, there were clear hostilities toward the west in general, including the U.S., as evidenced by anti-U.S./ anti-west banners being carried by some in the protest group. (Note: Uganda's Muslim community is sizable (approximately 12 percent of the total population),but are split between two rival muftis, rendering it somewhat weak and ineffective. They have not carried out any significant demonstrations targeted specifically against the U.S. in Kampala. End note.) i. Have there been anti-American demonstrations in the country within the last 12 months? As noted above. ii. Have anti-American demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S. Diplomatic facilities? No iii. What is the average size of an anti-American demonstration? N/A iv. Are anti-American demonstrations usually triggered by U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by domestic issues? N/A ¶B. Are demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? Generally peaceful, but have on occasion turned violent, resulting in deaths of both protesters and bystanders. i. Have violent demonstrations resulted in damage to USG property or injuries to USG employees? No. ii. Have violent demonstrations ever penetrated our perimeter security line? No. ¶C. Have there been any anti-government demonstrations in the country within the last 12 months? Yes. Police have continued their crackdown on unsafe public transportation (taxi buses and motorcycle) which has led to several violent demonstrations by those drivers. Police are quick to deploy the anti-riot police, who respond with tear gas to disperse the demonstrators. i. Have any anti-government demonstrations taken place near of in front of U.S. diplomatic facilities? Yes, but not within the past year. ii. What is the average size of an anti-government demonstration? Between 200 and 500. iii. Are demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? There were twelve recorded demonstrations in downtown Kampala and its surrounding areas in the past twelve months. Of the twelve, ten turned violent with the use of tear gas, clashes between police and demonstrators, burning tires, and in two cases live rounds being discharged. iv. Have any demonstrations resulted in damage to USG property? No ¶2. (S) Macro conflict conditions ¶A. Is the host country currently engaged in an interstate or intrastate conflict? (This may include battles between organized and violent drug cartels). The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF): ADF operate along the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) border. Between late March and Early April 2007, the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) ambushed ADF groups crossing the DRC border into Uganda killing approximately 70 ADF members. Recent reports suggest the ADF may be interested in a peace deal with GoU. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA): LRA, who were active around northern Uganda for decades, have been mostly inactive within Uganda since August 2006, around which time the UPDF forced them out of Uganda and into the general safety of the Garamba Forest in neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). After the ongoing Juba peace talks failed a final time in late 2008, a joint offensive by the tri-border nations (Uganda, DRC, and South Sudan) was launched against LRA forces residing in Garamba Forest in eastern DRC in December ¶2008. The ongoing offensive has resulted in a scattering of LRA fighters, and has severely degraded LRA command and control. Reports indicate an estimated 346 abductees have been rescued and 67 LRA rebels killed. To date, there have been no signs of reconstitution of LRA forces within Uganda, nor have there been any retributive actions by the LRA in Uganda, although the possibility for such actions remain a concern. Karamoja Region: While generally improving, the security situation in the Karamoja region continues to be an area of unrest and official USG travel to the region is contingent on prior COM approval and armed escort by UPDF. In 2008, there were almost daily occurrences of gunfire exchanged between Karamajong warriors and Ugandan military forces, mostly involving attempts by Karamajong warriors to steal cattle. (Note: According to the UN, who monitor activity in the region, there were also at least nine successful road ambushes by Karamajong warriors in 2008 involving the firing of weapons. End note.) DRC civil war with General Laurent Nkunda: An additional regional concern that continues to affect Uganda is the ongoing conflict between the government of the DRC and the militia forces of Rwandan-backed rebel leader General Laurent Nkunda. Clashes between Nkunda's rebels and DRC troops in eastern DRC (and in some cases with citizen militia groups) have resulted in a large influx of refugees into southwest Uganda in recent months. In January 2009, with DRC President Kabila's permission to obstensibly fight the Hutu militias within DRC, the government of Rwanda sent troops into DRC but instead set a trap and captured Nkunda. Currently, the Rwandan military are holding Nkunda in eastern DRC as they figure out what to do with him. (Note: The arrest has become very political, with Rwanda reluctant to bring him back to Kigali where he enjoys popularity among the Tutsi population, and equally reluctant to hand him over to the DRC government where the possibility of Nkunda being paraded, tortured or executed could result in substantial domestic backlash. End note.) The impact of this arrest on the regional security situation is not immediately known, however early indications are that without their leader, Nkunda's group is fragmented and likely to find it difficult to regain it's previous predominance. Oil Exploration: In recent years, oil exploration companies have discovered large oil reserves in the Lake Albert/West Nile region of Uganda (northwestern Rift Valley border region). These deposits, which span an area that crosses into DRC, have ignited a strong interest from across Uganda as the GoU determines the legal and fiscal framework for managing petroleum revenue. Reports of illegal land seizures already exist, and local communities in western Uganda have become increasingly apprehensive about government-proposed plans for how to share oil wealth. The lack of clearly defined borders in the region, along with the trans-border orientation of the underground oil reserves, create some inherent security concerns with regard to GoU/DRC geopolitical relations. While GoU and DRC have shown an early willingness to formally discuss the issue, neither government has moved forward to implement formal arrangements such as a demarcation of the border. Further, the DRC side of the border lacks infrastructure, and the central government lacks complete control over their portion of the area. (Note: On August 3, 2007 a British employee for an oil company working in Uganda was killed on Lake Albert in a fire fight between what were possibly DRC soldiers and oil company security guards (REFTEL B) Currently, there are two western oil companies on Lake Albert surveying areas for oil reserves. End note). A related capacity/border issue in the region is the formation of a fledgling Ugandan maritime force that is slated to patrol Lake Albert. While this will benefit security in the area, it may also lend itself to the imbalance in land forces that already exists in the West Nile border region. ¶B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency that is limited to a specific region or a countrywide civil war? Is it limited to specific regions? Intrastate conflict, limited to specific regions. ¶C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. diplomatic facilities located in this region? Yes. In June 2007, USAID opened an office in the northern Uganda town of Gulu that is staffed by three COM US direct hire employees who reside in the town. There are seven LES assigned to the Gulu office. While the district of Gulu experienced significant intrastate LRA-affiliated rebel conflict prior to August 2006, the town of Gulu is now generally safe from intrastate conflict. The U.S. Central Command Combined Joint Task Force for Horn of Africa (CJFT-HOA) has a team house in Gulu with approximately seven staff. Lastly, Centers for Disease Control (CDC) are stepping up their research efforts in Arua and are maintaining a near constant presence of personnel in Arua, including permanently placed CDC contractors. ¶D. Have any of the factions involved in these intrastate conflicts signaled or demonstrated an anti-American orientation? No ¶3. (S) Host Country Capabilities ¶A. Are law enforcement agencies professional and well-trained? No, professional and well-trained GoU law enforcement personnel are very scarce. Northern and eastern Uganda lack major public safety and security infrastructure; police are poorly trained and poorly equipped, especially those assigned to the northern and eastern regions of Uganda. (REFTEL C) ¶B. Have they been trained by U.S. agencies? Yes If so, please elaborate on effectiveness of training. Ugandan law enforcement personnel have in the past been frequent participants in ICITAP and ILEA sponsored training which has taken place inside and outside Uganda. Past ILEA/ICITAP training has focused on community policing, counter-terrorism, forensics, border and immigration enforcement, financial investigations, trafficking in persons, and anti-corruption efforts. While attendees and trainers alike have described the training to be worthwhile and relevant, with the hope that the training will pay dividends as the trainees rise in the ranks and become trainers and role models for new law enforcement personnel, lack of general police and judicial effectiveness remain a paramount concern. (REFTEL C) ¶C. Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious, widespread corruption inside their agencies? Yes. DOJ/ICITAP/OPDAT through USAID have dedicated two individuals to work along side police and prosecutors to train them in detecting corruption and to increase their capacity to detect, deter and prosecute corruption cases. However, there is some doubt if these programs have the political backing by the GoU to succeed. For instance(as noted in REFTEL C),"Uganda's corruption legislation does not comply with international conventions and obligations. There are no comprehensive asset forfeiture provisions in Ugandan law. Legislation is needed to provide for the seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime, instrumentalities of crime and, in the event the proceeds cannot be traced, the seizure and forfeiture of substitute assets. Uganda has no witness protection, whistle blower, qui tam legislation or infrastructure to support these tools which are necessary to effectively combat crime." A public poll carried out by the leading newspaper in Uganda on the subject of governmental corruption in the fall of 2008 found the public believed the Ugandan Police Force to be the most corrupt of all governmental agencies, although the quality of the polling cannot be known. ¶D. Are the intelligence services professional and capable of deterring terrorist actions? Intelligence services are cooperative and contribute what their limited training and resources allow, but are not comprised of well-seasoned intelligence professionals. Nonetheless, when provided with the appropriate support the services have been able to disrupt terrorist actions in Uganda. As laid out in Post's March 2009 Counter-Inteligence Working Group (CIWG) annual report, "Uganda is responsive when terrorist threats are identified, but could improve its capabilities with better coordination among the various law enforcemetn and security agencies." (REFTEL D) ¶E. Have the intelligence services been cooperative with US Embassy requests for information and support? Yes, generally. There is regular intelligence sharing between the GoU and the U.S. though the extent of Ugandan reciprocity is often frustrating. (REFTEL D) (S) F. Assuming there have been significant terrorist threats in recent years, have host country security services been able to score any major anti-terrorism successes? In August 2008, in the run-up to the 10-year anniversary of the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, a threat arose specific to the US Embassy. Local police and intelligence services were willing and established mitigation measures to deter an attack. However, they were unable to detain any suspects. More recently, in November 2008, Ugandan intelligence services arrested a group of al Shebaab terrorists at a planning meeting at a local golf club that was widely reported in public venues as a success. There have been numerous other successes of arrests and/or detention of suspected terrorists in Uganda that are recorded in other means of communication. ¶G. Has host country been responsive (RE: timeliness and allocation of resources) to Embassy requests for protective security? Yes. ¶H. How does the Embassy assess the overall security at major airports in the country? (Excellent, very good, good/average, poor) The international airport (Entebbe) is considered to be good/average but corruption is rampant in Uganda and airport workers could be complicit in this corruption. For instance, Ugandan police and security personnel working at Entebbe Airport detained several suspected criminal/terrorist types, however on more than one occasion during this reporting period the detained subject was 'released' by airport officials before they could be turned over to higher authorities. ¶I. How effective are customs and immigration control agencies? (Effective, average, ineffective) Ineffective and again subject to corruption. ¶J. How effective are border patrol forces? (Effective, average, ineffective) Ineffective. Uganda, being a land-locked country, has very long porous borders with all of its neighbors. This vulnerability is further highlighted by GoU,s lack of a robust maritime security strategy on it's border lakes (Lake Victoria, the second largest lake in the world, and Lake Albert) which each have ill-defined international borders. In April 2005, USG-funded immigration computer systems were activated at four border posts; Entebbe International Airport, Police Special Branch Headquarters and Immigration Headquarters. Due to lack of usage however, Ugandan border forces remain largely ineffective. Recent arrests and increased screening protocols at the airport enacted prior to October 2006 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) however, are still in place. Recently, these have resulted in an increase in the number of arrests of suspected terrorist-affiliated individuals. This is a promising development and shows a willingness on the part of GoU to increase the effectiveness of airport border security officials. Ugandan border control authorities have made a concerted effort to improve border control measures, however their effectiveness remains to be determined. Furthermore, RSO and CTJF-HOA also visited the northern boundary posts between South Sudan and Uganda in August 2008. These border posts were found to be vulnerable to illicit trade due to lack of information management systems, under-manning, and almost non-existent border control policies in Southern Sudan. Indigenous Terrorism ¶4. (S) Anti-American Terrorist Groups ¶A. Are there indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups in country? No ¶B. If yes, how many? Two, the LRA and the ADF. ¶C. Have these groups carried out an anti-American attack within the last 12 months? No ¶D. Were there any other anti-American attacks? No ¶E. Have groups attacked U.S. diplomatic targets? No. ¶F. Have these groups attacked U.S. business, U.S. military, or U.S. related targets? There have been no reports of any attacks in the past 12 months. However, there are ongoing sporadic extremist sabotage attempts against U.S.-funded and supported Ugandan peacekeeping forces deployed to Somalia. ¶G. Have groups limited their attacks to specific regions or do they operate countrywide? Attacks are limited to specific regions (in the past insurgents have operated countrywide). The LRA elements have entered the north-east area of the Democratic Republic of Congo and at the moment remain fragmented around this area. The LRA has minimal to nonexistent presence in the northern portions of Uganda and minimal presence in southern Sudan. ¶H. If attacks are limited to regions, are there any U.S. diplomatic facilities located in these regions? There are no facilities, however there are some USAID, DOD and CDC projects and operations dispersed throughout Northern Uganda, areas affected by the LRA conflict. USAID has an office in Gulu. All US employees under COM authority are required to submit a Restricted Area Travel Request to the RSO prior to traveling to any districts in the northeastern regions of Karamoja. ¶5. (S) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups ¶A. Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not anti-American) in country? Yes. ¶B. If yes, how many? Yes. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) fall under indigenous - Terrorist groups. ¶C. Have groups carried out attacks in the capital or in areas where US diplomatic facilities are located? Not in recent years. ¶D. Were these attacks lethal and /or indiscriminate? N/A ¶E. Have there been any Americans killed or injured in these attacks? Not in recent years. Transnational Terrorism ¶6. (S) Transnational Terrorist Indicators ¶A. Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a presence in country? Yes. Al-Qaeda and Al Ittihad Al Islamya (AIAI)/Al Shabaab. ¶B. How does the Post assess this presence? Is it an operational cell? Financial cell? Support cell? Propaganda cell? Al Qaeda is a confirmed support structure and AIAI/AS is reported to have a support, propaganda cell and a good ability for financial planning and/or operational planning. Al Qaeda operatives have in the past traveled in and out of Uganda. There is a growing link between al-Shebab Somali extremists and ADF. ¶C. Is the host government sympathetic to these groups? No. ¶D. Are there suspect non-governmental organizations (NGOS) in the country that have a relationship with any of these groups? Are their international NGO,s operating in Uganda that have connections to transnational terrorism in other countries? Yes. They are: - Islamic Call Society - Munazzamat Al-Dawa-Al-Islamiyyah - The International Islamic Relief Organization - The African Muslim Agency - The Iranian Ahl Al-Bayt Society - The Muslim World League ¶E. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country that are sympathetic to these groups? Yes. There is a Somali community in Uganda, a small portion of which are sympathetic to these groups. ¶F. How does the Post assess the level, intent, and scope of hostile intelligence services (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Serbia, Sudan, Et. Al.) in country relative to potential anti-American terrorist acts? There is no official Iraqi or Syrian presence in Uganda. Post cannot confirm whether there is an intelligence presence within the two-man Iranian Mission. There is a Serbia-Montenegro consulate but Post is not aware of any intelligence service capabilities. There is a confirmed Sudanese intelligence officer in Uganda; the Sudanese intelligence services have been cooperating with USG intelligence services for nearly a decade. China, Russia, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) have not declared an intelligence presence. However, DPRK does have a Korean overseas mining and industrial development (KOMID) office in Uganda. The KOMID office has been primarily facilitating arms sales with the Uganda People's Defense Forces. ¶G. How does the Post assess the availability of weapons and explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile terrorist elements? Very high, due to a combination of lax border enforcement and varying degrees of security and customs and immigration controls on the border. ¶7. (U) End of SEPQ. BROWNING