STATE OF COUNTERTERRORISM IN UGANDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KAMPALA 000271 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR DS/ATA, DS/IP/AF, DS/ITA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2029 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM KE UG SUBJECT: STATE OF COUNTERTERRORISM IN UGANDA REF: KAMPALA 169 Classified By: Political Officer Samuel Madsen, Reasons 1.4 b,d ¶1. (C) Summary: The Government of Uganda (GoU) is a willing partner in the fight against terrorism and an important member of the East African Regional Security Initiative (EARSI). Uganda is responsive when terrorist threats are identified, but could improve its capabilities with better coordination among the various law enforcement and security agencies. In addition, Uganda's basic law enforcement capabilities remain weak (Ref A). Ugandan law enforcement and security agencies could benefit from additional training and assistance. However, credible past allegations of the GOU's use of anti-terror organs to intimidate, harass, and torture perceived political opponents have previously limited our ability to train some personnel engaged in counter-terrorism. The GOU should be encouraged to establish a tough legal regime and rule of law, curb corruption, and stop human rights abuses, which would provide a strong foundation for counterterrorism efforts. End Summary. - - - - - - - BACKGROUND - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) The following assessment is based on the reporting by a Nairobi-based officer from the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI) who visited Kampala, Uganda, from 27-29 January for meetings with mission officers and host country officials involved in counterterrorism. During these meetings, the participants offered their opinions regarding the threat of terrorism in Uganda, the ability of the GoU to conduct counterterrorism operations, and areas in which additional cooperation and assistance are needed. - - - - - - - - - - - SECURITY ENVIRONMENT - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Uganda faces a wide variety of security challenges, including the threat of violence from both domestic and transnational extremists. Ugandan security forces have joined with neighboring countries to confront the violent rebel group the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) both inside and outside Uganda's borders. The Ugandan Police Force (UPF) is working to replace the Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF) in providing security in rural areas from which the LRA has been displaced. The government also faces a residual threat from Islamic extremists. While attacks by the Islamic Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have ceased, numerous officers stated that Ugandan territory continues to be used by extremists for travel, fundraising and other activities to facilitate terrorist actions in other countries in the region. Security officers also expressed concern over radicalization among Ugandans, including efforts to recruit Ugandan citizens for terrorist attacks in other countries. Related security concerns include widespread corruption within the law enforcement and criminal justice systems, trafficking in persons and money laundering. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - COUNTERTERRORISM AGENCIES - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Post's Regional Security Officer (RSO) arranged a meeting for the visiting S/CT coordinator where he was briefed by the leadership of all of the major Ugandan counterterrorism agencies that make up the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT) (Note: The RSO characterized the JATT as being something like a dysfunctional family - KAMPALA 00000271 002 OF 005 with the various members coming together only in time of crisis. He also observed that this meeting was the first time he had seen the entire group together around one table. The JATT is named in Post's annual Human Rights Report (HRR) due to allegations of torture and other acts of intimidation against perceived regime opponents. End Note.) The participants provided the following characterization of the GoU's counterterrorism agencies: - The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The JIC is the top level security body in Uganda. The JIC consists of the chiefs of all of the intelligence and security services. It normally meets weekly and on other occasions as needed. The JIC has tasking authority to various agencies to address counterterrorism and other security issues. - The Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT). The JATT was established in 1999 after a rash of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks illustrated the need for a task force to identify, track and apprehend the perpetrators. The JATT is a multi-agency effort. It conducts CT activities at the Tactical, Operational and Strategic levels. - The Ugandan Police Force (UPF) Police Anti-Terrorism Unit (PATU). The UPF is responsible for counterterrorism outreach and education, with the PATU being its primary CT force. The PATU,s CT mission emphasizes education and infrastructure protection. This effort includes counterterrorism awareness and security education aimed at the public as well as law enforcement agencies. The PATU monitors and reviews potential targets for vulnerabilities to terrorist activities and issues "Be On the Lookout" (BOLO) advisories for suspected terrorists as needed. The PATU is responsible for responding to terrorist incidents. This includes conducting hostage rescue operations and post-incident technical response. They also protect major public events. Following a terrorist incident, the UPF/PATU will work under the direction of the JATT to conduct a post-event investigation. The PATU is in the process of re-structuring. Besides the ATPU, the UPF's Criminal Investigations Division (CID) investigates threats and other suspected terrorist activities. The UPF also has offices responsible for Border Control, Customs and Airport Security. - The Internal Security Organization (ISO). The ISO is Uganda's domestic intelligence agency, based in the Presidency. It includes a counterterrorism directorate that monitors both domestic and transnational extremist groups. The major focus is on intelligence collection against suspected terrorists, with actionable intelligence passed to the JATT. A major challenge for the ISO is monitoring Somalis residing in Uganda. - The External Security Organization (ESO). The ESO's counterterrorism mission predates 9/11. In the late 1990,s, al-Qaeda operatives located in Sudan sought to assist rebels of the ADF who were attacking the government of Uganda. The ESO actively works with Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF) troops assigned to the AMISOM mission in Somalia. ESO and the GoU also participate in regional CT initiatives with neighboring countries. The agency recognizes and supports a broadly based 3D (Diplomacy, Development, Defense) approach to CT. ESO leaders believe there is a need for more joint interaction among all agencies in order to appreciate all aspects of terrorism. - - - - - - - - - - - - BILATERAL COOPERATION - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) The U.S. and Uganda cooperate in a number of areas related to counterterrorism, peace and security: - U.S. relations with the Ugandan CT organizations are KAMPALA 00000271 003 OF 005 generally good. The Embassy works with the Ugandan JATT and other intelligence and security services sharing intelligence information, with varying success. Uganda uses the U.S. supplied Personal Identification and Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PICES) program and equipment effectively at the major ports of entry and authorities have gotten several hits on suspicious travelers. The PICES system in Uganda is being upgraded and the government would like to integrate the system with those of Kenya, Tanzania and other regional participants. - The Resident Legal Advisor's (RLA) assistance efforts are largely directed at countering corruption. However, Millenium Challenge Coorporation (MCC) funding for this program runs out at the end of this year. The RLA is working on assisting prosecutors as well as promoting legislative reform. There is strong political support in Uganda for law enforcement training. The RLA's anti-corruption program is providing training in basic police skills and evidence collection/processing. The police are also receiving training in computers and financial fraud. In the past two months 2000 police have been trained in community policing. - The ICITAP program is included in Embassy Kampala's Mission Strategic Plan through 2011. The Embassy has also requested 1207 funds for police infrastructure improvements. - Military-to-military ties are good. DOD works with the UPDF on combating the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and also provides support to Uganda,s AMISOM force in Somalia. There is regular intelligence sharing with the UPDF on the LRA and terrorist groups in Somalia. The U.S. is also providing maritime security training for the AMISOM force as well as for UPDF maritime forces on the large lakes that form a substantial part of Uganda's borders. All rural firearms crimes fall under the jurisdiction of the UPDF. The populace generally views the Ugandan military as being effective. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CAPABILITIES AND NEEDS: SELF-ASSESSMENT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Ugandan officials identified a number of areas where Uganda needs to improve its CT efforts. - Leaders of the JATT listed the following requirements for Uganda to be able to properly address CT: a) Legislation to deal with critical weaknesses in the Ugandan legal structure. b) Technical capacity building. c) Training. Uganda has received some CT training from the U.S. and other donor nations but it needs more, (most CT training currently comes from Israel). d) Equipment. The JATT suffers from critical shortfalls to a whole range of material requirements, including sidearms, technical systems, a reliable communications system and vehicles. The JATT also lacks a headquarters building with proper technical facilities for investigations, analysis and C3. - The PATU chief did not list specific needs but noted a general need for a wide range of training and equipment. He also noted the inadequacy of the Ugandan legal system for dealing with complex crimes. - The ISO representative stated a need for a searchable database of known al-Shabaab members. - The ESO is also in need of training and technical support in order to improve its CT capabilities. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CAPABILITIES AND NEEDS: U.S. ASSESSMENT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - KAMPALA 00000271 004 OF 005 ¶7. (C) Capability shortfalls and needs identified by U.S. Mission Kampala personnel: - There was a broad consensus that the current law enforcement and legal systems in Uganda are wholly inadequate. All offices agreed that the Uganda police, prosecutors and courts lack the laws, procedural training, technical expertise and material resources to deal with terrorist or criminal cases effectively. - Lack of rule of law allows security agencies to use "terrorism" charges in order to harass, intimidate, and torture perceived regime opponents. - Post is limited in its ability to provide training to senior officers in JATT, CMI, and the Police CT Unit. - Corruption among the police and courts is widespread and pervasive. Ugandan citizens have little or no faith in the effectiveness or impartiality of the judicial system. - The Ugandan legal system currently has no capacity to track or combat terrorist financing. There is little political will to update the applicable laws. Proposed Anti-Money Laundering legislation is stalled in the parliament. - There is currently no effective law enforcement forensics laboratory or evidence storage facility in Uganda. - The UPDF previously provided security in northern Uganda. However, after pushing out the LRA guerrillas the military is withdrawing from the area and turning responsibility for security over to the police. The police are trying to fill the vacuum but suffer from a total lack of infrastructure. Smugglers of various sorts and people traffickers are moving into the area. The police have no idea how much terrorist related trafficking might be happening in the area due to their lack of basic law enforcement skills (such as developing sources and informants). The police have no capacity to infiltrate extremist organizations. - The UPDF has a robust security presence in Uganda's Karamoja area, bringing much needed security infrastructure to the northeastern border region. The police are only now beginning to reestablish a presence throughout this region. When the UPDF begins to draw back its security elements, the law and order sections will be faced with the same challenges they currently face in the post LRA-affected regions. - - - - - COMMENT - - - - - ¶8. (C) One of the key themes repeated by many different sources was that extremists continue to operate in Uganda and have the ability to use it for terrorist travel and financing and for facilitating attacks in other countries. Uganda needs to be integrated into regional CT efforts. However, the Ugandan government's counterterrorism agencies face major challenges in seeking to establish an effective counterterrorism regime. There is an urgent need for the various Ugandan government agencies to work together in an integrated fashion on a routine basis, not just when threats arise. The law enforcement and judicial systems are particularly weak. The GoU could benefit greatly from outside assistance such as training for CT personnel and creating the physical and technical infrastructure necessary for an effective CT program. However, the most critical measures are those legal, judicial, and human rights, as well as organizational and policy reforms which must be taken by the Ugandan government itself in order to overcome corruption, inefficiency and human rights abuses and provide the fundamental conditions of rule of law that are necessary KAMPALA 00000271 005 OF 005 to defeat extremism. BROWNING