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09KAMPALA181 2009-02-19 11:58:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kampala
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DE RUEHKM #0181/01 0501158
R 191158Z FEB 09
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000181 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/18

REF: A. 08 KAMPALA 1561


C. 08 KAMPALA 1469

D. 08 KAMPALA 1579

Classified By: Ambassador Steven A. Browning for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d

1. (C) Summary: UN Special Envoy Joachim Chissano fully
supports continued military action against the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) and is willing to weigh in as needed to
ensure the operation is completed, according to Nuno Tomas,
the head of Chissano's office in Kampala. Tomas confirmed
that Chissano recommended joint military action to Presidents
Museveni, Kabila, and Kiir in early December 2008 after LRA
leader Joseph Kony failed to sign the Final Peace Agreement
(FPA). Chissano remains in touch with the regional leaders
and LRA spokesman David Matsanga but does not believe that
Matsanga is talking to Kony. During a recent visit to
Maputo, Matsanga requested that Chissano call a stakeholders'
conference in Kampala, which Chissano refused to do.
Chissano is pleased that Museveni met with Sudanese President
Bashir at the African Union Summit because he (Chissano)
believes that a deal was struck to end Khartoum's support for
Kony, which would help Operation Lightening Thunder (OLT) to
succeed. Chissano reportedly advised Museveni not/not to end
the operation until the LRA leadership is dead or signs the
peace deal. He also urged Museveni to be more aggressive on
the ground and to not hold back because Uganda fears killing
civilians in firefights. Chissano stands by his December
statement to the UN Security Council and will keep a low
profile unless the regional leaders need him to express more
public support for the joint military operations. End

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2. (C) Nuno Tomas, the head of the UN Special Envoy's Office
in Kampala, told P/E Chief on February 18 that Chissano fully
supports continued military operations against the LRA in
northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). After
Kony's failure to sign the FPA on November 30, 2008, Chissano
told President Museveni and the diplomatic corps in separate
meetings on December 2 that military operations were needed
to change the negative dynamic of the peace process (ref A).
Museveni then informed Chissano about the plans for joint
military operations against the LRA. According to Tomas,
Chissano advised Museveni that the operations must be robust
and not stop "mid-stream." Chissano said that the LRA
leadership must be killed or forced to sign the peace deal.
Congolese President Kabila reportedly called Chissano to ask
if he should receive Sudanese Vice President Riek Machar and
Matsanga, who were making a tour of the region to buy Kony
more time. Chissano reportedly told Kabila that he should
meet with them and advise that Kony needs to immediately sign
the peace deal or call Museveni.

3. (C) Tomas said that Chissano was pleased that his report
to the UNSC on December 17 was well-received and that the
UNSC issued a supportive statement on December 22 (ref B).
Chissano has heard reports that the UN Mission in Congo
(MONUC) cannot help with logistics support for the Ugandan
troops. Chissano believes that the issue can be resolved in
DRC at UN Special Representative Alan Doss' level. Tomas
said that General Gaye, the MONUC force commander, was ready
to assist in the movement of Ugandan troops to protect
civilians. Chissano will follow the issue to see if there is
a role he can play, if needed, on an extension of MONUC's
mandate to allow the ferrying of Ugandan troops. (Note: On
February 9, Ugandan Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa told Slobadan
Kotevski Didi, the Head of Office of MONUC's that Uganda can
provide 2,000 additional troops to protect civilians, but
lacked the capacity to transport them. Didi told Kutesa that
MONUC's mandate would need to be revised to allow the
transport of Ugandan troops. End Note.)

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4. (C) Chissano continues to listen to Matsanga, but advises
him that Kony must call either Chissano or Museveni if he
wants a cease-fire to sign the FPA. Matsanga has disavowed
peace process mediator Riek Machar because his government is
participating in the operations against the LRA and has
latched onto Chissano and Tomas. Chissano does not believe
that Matsanga is talking to LRA leader Joseph Kony, according
to Tomas. Last week, Matsanga traveled to Maputo to see
Chissano when he heard that Tomas was headed to Kampala.

KAMPALA 00000181 002 OF 002

Matsanga reiterated calls for a cease-fire and cessation of
hostilities. Matsanga also claimed that Kony was ready to
sign the FPA, but would not go to Rikwangba assembly area
unless there were 200 troops from South Africa, Tanzania,
Mozambique, and Kenya to provide security. Chissano
reiterated that Kony must call either himself or President
Museveni to discuss these issues. Chissano was stuck with
Matsanga's hotel bills after the visit.

5. (C) Matsanga also demanded a stakeholders' conference,
similar to the one organized in November 2008 to give Kony
one last chance to sign the peace agreement (ref C).
Matsanga wants to discuss a cease-fire. Tomas expressed his
suspicion that Matsanga and the Diaspora want to use the
opportunity to play to the political opposition in Kampala.
Tomas advised Chissano against a stakeholders' meeting after
a recent trip to Gulu in which the northern leaders involved
in the peace process, including Acholi Paramount Chief Rwot
Acana, expressed support for the operation against Kony.
Tomas found that the only domestic opposition against the
operation came from parliamentarian Reagan Okumu and a few
members of the Acholi Parliamentary Group. Chissano views
Matsanga's request as an attempt to rewrite the history of
the events that led to the launching of Operation Lightening
Thunder, according to Tomas. Chissano has decided not to
travel to the region in March as originally planned, unless
Presidents Kabila and Museveni could use his presence at
their upcoming summit in Kasese, Uganda to demonstrate his
commitment to the operation.

6. (C) Matsanga remains fixated on his December 8 meeting
with Museveni, according to Tomas. Matsanga claims that
Museveni agreed to provide his personal direct telephone
lines to Kony (which Museveni provided during the meeting),
pay for the LRA delegation's upkeep (which Museveni did), and
not resort to military action against Kony in the wake of his
failure to sign the FPA (which Museveni did not say).
Ugandan officials deny that Museveni promised the latter (ref
D). Nonetheless, Matsanga shamelessly proclaimed to the
press that Museveni promised not to attack Kony. Matsanga
informed Chissano on December 9 that he had passed Kony
Museveni's telephone numbers. Chissano advised Matsanga that
Kony must use them immediately. From December 9-13, Matsanga
called Chissano repeatedly with excuses as to why Kony did
not call Museveni. On December 13, Matsanga claimed Kony had
promised to call Museveni on December 15. Tomas expressed
concern that Matsanga's boastful claims of talking to Kony
were unfortunate because they had and would continue to have
deadly consequences.

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7. (C) Chissano was pleased by the meeting between Museveni
and Sudanese President Omar Bashir during the African Union
summit, according to Tomas. In 2006, Chissano advised
Museveni that the solution to the LRA problem lay in Khartoum
during his first meeting with Museveni after being named UN
Special Envoy. According to Tomas, Chissano told Museveni
that the sooner Uganda reached an understaning on the LRA
with Sudan, the easier it would be to resolve the problem.
Tomas said that he heard that Museveni approached Bashir at
the summit and offered him a solution to the pending
International Criminal Court indictment. Museveni allegedly
told Bashir that African heads of state could form a
committee to investigate the ICC's claims. The two leaders
also discussed the fate of Joseph Kony, according to
Chissano's information. Bashir allegedly agreed to ensure
that there would be no lifeline for Kony from Khartoum if
Museveni lobbied other heads of state to find ways to counter
the ICC indictment. (Note: We have heard similar information
through other channels. End Note.) Based on this
development and Uganda's current positions on the ground,
Tomas said that Chissano was confident that OLT would succeed.

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8. (C) Publicly, UN Special Envoy Chissano stands by his
December statement to the UNSC, in which he advocated
military action to force the LRA to sign the FPA. Chissano's
private views, as relayed by Tomas, indicate that the UN
Special Envoy believes that the joint military operation must
continue until completion: either the elimination of the LRA
leadership or a signature on the FPA.