UGANDA: ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON'S MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001275 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM ASEC PINS UG SUBJECT: UGANDA: ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON'S MEETING WITH OPPOSITION AND CIVIL SOCIETY LEADERS REF: A. KAMPALA 1055 ¶B. KAMPALA 01074 KAMPALA 00001275 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Aaron Sampson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Opposition and civil society leaders told Assistant Secretary Carson that President Museveni's consolidation of power, closure of political space, and reliance on the military have negated any hope for free and fair elections in February 2011. Concerned that Uganda is slipping toward a potentially violent electoral confrontation, participants urged the U.S. to pressure Museveni to respect democratic norms. Assistant Secretary Carson stressed the importance of constructive and non-violent opposition, reassured participants of the importance of Ugandan democracy to the U.S., and said the U.S. has an obligation to speak out if Uganda strays off course. End Summary. -------------- Decision 2011: "Uganda is in Trouble" -------------- ¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson and Ambassador Lanier discussed the 2011 presidential election with leaders of six opposition political parties and two civil society groups on October 25 at the Ambassador's residence. Opposition party representatives included four individuals with presidential ambitions: Jimmy Obote Akena, son of former President Milton Obote and a key member of the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) party; John Ssebaana Kizito, president of the Democratic Party (DP); Ken Lukyamuzi, president of the Conservative Party (CP); and Bidandi Ssali, president of the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP). ¶3. (C) Former DP president and ex-presidential candidate Paul Ssemogerere said the preconditions for free and fair elections in February 2011 are not in place. He said Museveni's abolition of presidential term limits, the fusion of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) with state structures and the military, the partisan Electoral Commission, and Museveni's contempt for opposition political parties suggested that he will do anything to subvert the electoral process. Ssemogerere accused Museveni of using his position as President, NRM Chairman, and Commander in Chief to ensure victory though intimidation, patronage, and manipulation of the electoral process. ¶4. (C) Referring to the Ugandan Supreme Court decision that declared the 2006 presidential election neither free nor fair, CP president Ken Lukyamuzi said opposition parties could not participate in elections administered by the same Electoral Commission responsible for the failures of 2006. He cited the recent closing of radio stations, intimidation of journalists (refs. A and B),and police orders requiring prior approval for any political gathering larger than 20 individuals as evidence of curtailed freedoms of expression and assembly. "Uganda is in trouble," said Lukyamuzi, "something must be done to avoid bloodshed." 5 (C) Jimmy Obote Akena said the elections will be "incredibly difficult" because Museveni is no longer assured a first-round victory. He said violence was likely as one cannot predict how Museveni will handle a situation where defeat is possible. "I fear what he will do under these circumstances," said Akena. Describing Uganda as a military dictatorship, current DP president John Ssebaana Kizito complained that the Ugandan military (UPDF) permeates all aspects of civilian life. FDC vice president for eastern Uganda, Proscovia Salaamu Musumba, said Museveni is "hell-bent" on staying in power and that the opposition has done what it can to promote positive change. Musumba listed an impartial Electoral Commission as a minimum requirement for credible elections, along with an overhauled electoral register and the reinstatement of presidential term limits. -------------- U.S. Influence and Interests -------------- ¶6. (C) Several participants discussed U.S. interest in the 2011 election, with some portraying the U.S. as a potential positive influence while others saw the U.S. as part of the problem. Musumba asked the U.S. to use its leverage to avoid violence, noting that "bush wars" and bloodshed are Uganda's only means of resolving political conflict. Former NRM Minister turned PPP president Bidandi Ssali said the international community arrived too late in Kenya, and that KAMPALA 00001275 002 OF 002 now is the time to prevent bloodshed in Uganda. Describing his own personal sense of hopelessness and impending doom, Ssali said "we are sitting on a time bomb which will flare like what happened in Rwanda because the people of Uganda have lost hope." ¶7. (C) Ssali and civil society leader Livingston Ssewanyana said Museveni uses Ugandan support for counter-terrorism and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to boost his standing with the U.S. Ssali wondered whether Museveni's stance on terrorism absolved Uganda of its democratic shortcomings. Ssewanyana said the Ugandan people get "a very raw deal" on terrorism because Museveni believes that as long as he is the "blue eyed boy" for counter terrorism, he can ignore or suppress internal voices of dissent. ¶8. (C) Another former NRM Minister turned vocal Museveni critic, Miriam Matembe, predicted that the international community would do nothing and questioned whether it was worth so much money and so many lives to hold an election she regards as already decided. The Secretary of the CP party wondered if the U.S. would step in, after the results are tallied and violence has flared, to broker a power sharing government similar to those in Kenya and Zimbabwe. -------------- Museveni's Base: Military and Economic Might -------------- ¶9. (C) Ssewanyana said Museveni regularly canvasses the country and is aware of popular discontent, but that the UPDF and NRM long ago replaced the Ugandan people as Museveni's real power base. Ssewanyana said Museveni uses these institutions to instill fear to influence electoral outcomes, and that the real challenge for opposition parties and others is demilitarizing Ugandan politics. He warned that the moment Uganda's oil reserves start flowing, Museveni will no longer need democracy or the international community because economic growth trumps human rights and democracy. The FDC's vice president for western Uganda, Amanya Mushega, agreed that Museveni is cognizant of popular sentiment in Uganda, but questioned whether the military would accept serving as a force for violent repression for any extended period of time. -------------- Moving Uganda Forward -------------- ¶10. (C) Drawing on his own experience as Ambassador to Uganda from 1991 to 1994, and Uganda's tragic history during the Amin and Obote II regimes, Assistant Secretary Carson encouraged participants to strive to move Uganda forward toward greater peace and democracy. He said that no one wants to revisit the disasters of the 1970s and 80s, and that neither Africa nor Uganda needs more conflict or violence. Assistant Secretary Carson encouraged opposition leaders to ensure that their political disagreements with Museveni remained civil and non-violent. Responding to questions about the U.S. response to potential violations of democratic norms, Assistant Secretary Carson referred to President Obama's speech in Ghana, saying the U.S. has an obligation to speak out in defense of key principles like democracy, human rights, openness, and tolerance and will do so if Uganda begins to drift off course. -------------- Comment: Fear and Foreboding -------------- ¶11. (C) The fear and frustration expressed by opposition and civil society leaders about the 2011 electoral process is genuine. Perhaps of greater concern, however, is a growing sense among many opposition leaders that violence is coming and that it is neither in their power nor their interest to prevent it. Some opposition parties, like the CP, may be banking on enough election related strife to force a power sharing agreement brokered by international actors. After 23 years under Museveni, others may be gambling that the army or massive popular unrest will sweep Museveni from power. Barring a negotiated settlement between Museveni and the opposition over the Electoral Commission and related electoral reforms, the level of eventual confrontation may hinge on Museveni's ability to use his political experience, patronage, intimidation, and force to defeat the opposition. The prospects for credible and peaceful elections under any of these scenarios are very uncertain. LANIER