UGANDA: MUSEVENI AND BUGANDA KING MEET TO DEFUSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001164 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS KDEM UG SUBJECT: UGANDA: MUSEVENI AND BUGANDA KING MEET TO DEFUSE TENSIONS REF: A. KAMPALA 01055 ¶B. KAMPALA 01075 ¶C. KAMPALA 01096 Classified By: Political Officer Tim Manarin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni held direct talks with the Buganda King for the first time in four years on September 30. The meeting helps to reduce tensions between Buganda and the central government following the September 10-12 riots that left as many as 27 dead, but reports indicate that Museveni and the King made little progress toward resolving Buganda's demands for federal autonomy and for the re-opening of the Buganda-run Central Broadcasting Service (CBS) radio station. End Summary. -------------- Museveni and the King -------------- ¶2. (C) In their first face-to-face meeting in four years, Buganda King Ronald Mutebi met with President Museveni on September 30 to discuss the rising tensions between the ostensibly cultural Buganda Kingdom and Uganda,s central government. These tensions led to violent riots September 10-12 (see ref A. for background). The event was widely covered in the press with front page photos of Museveni personally greeting the King. The lack of specifics has led to wide speculation over what was discussed. Buganda,s Attorney General Apollo Makubuya and Information Minister Medard Sseggona Lubega separately told Embassy on October 1 that the discussion was largely cordial and did not delve deeply into the main points of contention, which were left for a later time. Major sticking points which contributed to the deadly September 10-12 riots include Buganda's long-standing demand for federal autonomy, the Kingdom's staunch opposition to proposed land reforms, and the status of the Buganda-run Central Broadcasting Service (CBS) radio station, which was closed by authorities during the riots for allegedly inciting violence. ¶3. (C) The two Baganda Ministers said that the King unsuccessfully lobbied Museveni to reopen CBS radio. Local press reports said the King rejected Museveni's demand that CBS drop all of political programming as a prerequisite for reopening. Minister Makubuya observed, however, that Museveni put forward his best public face for the meeting by giving the King a reception typically reserved for Heads of State. Makubuya said Museveni previously received the King in a more casual manner in years past. -------------- To Federate or Not To Federate -------------- ¶4. (C) Local press reports that Museveni and the King ended the meeting with a commitment to hold future meetings to address the fundamental issues separating the two sides, namely Buganda,s longstanding demands for greater political power and autonomy. Beyond recovering all the 9,000 square miles of land seized by the central government in 1966, Buganda is stubbornly demanding a federal system designed to recreate the kingdom as a semi-autonomous, regional government. The Buganda plan would turn Buganda into a constitutional monarchy of sorts, with an elected regional parliament reporting to the Buganda King. The actual powers of the King, whether real or ceremonial, remain unclear. The Baganda claim Museveni promised this "federo" form of government in the 1980s when Museveni needed Bugandan support to win the so-called "bush war" that brought him to power. ¶5. (C) However, Buganda's federal plan is a non-starter for the Ugandan government, and also many non-partisan pundits, as it would essentially create a state within a state located in the geographic, economic, and political center of the country. Others have noted the incompatibility with democracy of an empowered Buganda state led by an unelected, unaccountable monarch. Others still point to the extremely messy precedent it would set for Uganda,s other, smaller cultural kingdoms. Some fear Buganda's "federo" demand is the first step towards national disintegration. Museveni's counter proposal, dubbed the "Regional Tier" system, would give local districts the option to form larger, democratically elected but largely powerless regional governments. Following the riots, Museveni issued orders to move ahead with the Regional Tier plan (ref. B),despite KAMPALA 00001164 002 OF 002 evident confusion over how it would be implemented. ¶6. (C) Buganda Attorney General Makubuya speculated that the latest confrontation will cost Museveni Buganda's once-solid political backing, and said it is now unlikely Museveni can win the presidency in 2011 through a free and fair election. Makubuya accused Museveni of deliberately trying to weaken the Kingdom in advance of 2011 by encouraging various sub-ethnic groups such as the Banyala, Baruuli, Basese, and the Bakooki to agitate for their own kingdoms. -------------- Comment: Standoff Far from Over -------------- ¶7. (C) The Baganda are Uganda's largest ethnic group and comprise approximately 18 percent of the Ugandan population. Although the Baganda have traditionally supported Museveni, many believe Museveni may have permanently alienated them through the promotion of his own Banyankole ethnic group (ref. C) during his time in power and through his failure to address growing political dissatisfaction within Buganda. If Museveni has indeed written off capturing the wider Buganda vote, he may be siding with smaller ethnic groups located within the Buganda Kingdom to try to chip away at greater Buganda and rescue one or two percentage points from central Uganda in advance of the February 2011 presidential election. ¶8. (C) One would not have expected much from this initial meeting between Museveni and the Buganda King given the intractability of the underlying issues, especially Buganda,s demand for a federal-style monarchy in the heart of the country. However, there was great short-term value in terms of calming the waters simply in having the two meet and shake hands in public. Longer-term, Museveni and the central authorities cannot accept Buganda's demand for greater autonomy without endangering overall stability and national unity. Yet Baganda nationalists continue to cling to their demands for a federalized monarchy, and cannot abandon it without losing their political raison d,etre. A stalemate thus remains. How and when it is resolved will have enormous implications not only for the results of the 2011 elections, but also for the country,s longer-term stability. HOOVER