UGANDA OUTLINES AMISOM REQUIREMENTS AFTER SUICIDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001095 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019 TAGS: PREL MASS MCAP AU UG SUBJECT: UGANDA OUTLINES AMISOM REQUIREMENTS AFTER SUICIDE BOMBING Classified By: Political Officer Tim Manarin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met Maj. General Nathan Mugisha, the force commander of the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM),on September 22 to discuss U.S. support for Uganda's contribution to AMISOM. Mugisha listed armored personnel carriers, IED detection capability, boats, and training for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces as AMISOM's most pressing requirements. Mugisha also cited the need for African Muslim nations to contribute forces to counter al-Shabaab propaganda. End Summary. -------------- AMISOM Wish List -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with Mugisha on September 22 to convey condolences for the deaths of four Uganda military personnel killed during the September 17 bombing of AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu by al-Shabaab. Also present were the DCM, the DATT, and Poloff. The Ambassador stressed our continued support for Uganda's participation in AMISOM and asked Mugisha how the U.S. could further assist Ugandan forces in Somalia. ¶3. (C) Mugisha, who was slightly wounded in the September 17 bombing, reported that Ugandan Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) morale remained high although Mogadishu was as tense as ever. He said there was a stalemate between al-Shabaab and TFG forces in Mogadishu as each was too weak to dislodge the other. He said the African Union (AU) was still able to protect key installations and was providing medical services for an estimated 300,000 civilians in Mogadishu, and that AMISOM was also providing clean water and food. He appreciated U.S. assistance and said AMISOM's presence in Somalia would not be possible without support from the U.S. and the international community. ¶4. (C) The General said the 5,000 AMISOM troops in Mogadishu was enough to guard key installations and maintain a balance between the TFG and al-Shabaab standoff, but that more were needed to tip this balance in the TFG's favor. Mugisha estimated that AMISOM forces could take the city in two days with an extra 5,000 troops. ¶5. (C) First on Mugisha's list of needs were additional armored personnel carriers to protect TFG officials and allow AMISOM members increased movement throughout the city. He said AMISOM's current vehicles were completely worn out and degraded by IED attacks. AMISOM also needs to enhance force protection including fortified medical facilities to protect personnel from mortars. In addition, improved maritime security capacity is necessary. He said AMISOM currently has only one small boat which is used to protect sea lanes coming in and out of the port of Mogadishu. ¶6. (C) Mugisha said AMISOM needed considerably greater capacity to counter IEDs and suggested basic measures like paving city streets to prevent extremists from planting IEDs in potholes and obtaining night vision capacity because al-Shabaab plants IEDs at night. Additional capacity to detect and disarm IEDs is also required. Mugisha also requested a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation (DDR) program to counter al-Shabaab's ability to recruit unemployed youth. Salary money for TFG soldiers is also needed as Mugisha noted that the TFG does not have the ability to pay its troops while al-Shabaab does. ¶7. (C) General Mugisha said AMISOM desperately needs Muslim peace keeping forces to counter al-Shabaab propaganda regarding infidel troops in Somalia. He noted that al-Shabaab is already trying to intimidate Djibouti into reconsidering its pledge to provide AMISOM with 470 troops. Mugisha estimated that 3 battalions of Muslim troops would be ideal. He also inquired about the status of a radio station promised to AMISOM to help diffuse TFG messages throughout the city. DATT responded that the concrete pad for the radio stations was recently completed. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador said AMISOM forces are confronted with many of the same challenges currently confronting U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. He reiterated U.S. appreciation for Uganda's contribution to Somalia and said both the U.S. and Uganda shared an interest in ensuring that Somalia does not become a haven for terrorists. -------------- Training, Training, Training -------------- ¶9. (C) Mugisha said additional, accelerated training for TFG troops was essential in order to provide Somalia with a professional army that cut across clan lines. He stressed the need for basic training for TFG forces and complained that TFG currently has nothing more than a militia. Mugisha recommended 6 months of training for platoon level officers and said 4,000 trained TFG troops would make an enormous difference. He cited lack of education as the biggest problem hindering current training of Somali forces and suggested educated Somalis from the Somalia Diaspora be recruited to support the TFG. He lamented the fact that without training, equipment given to the TFG ends up in the hands of al-Shabaab. He said Uganda has already trained 800 TFG troops and is in the process of training 700 more. He claimed that Tanzania was able to train TFG troops but lacked the funds to do so. He stressed the need to ensure that trained TFG forces remain together as a unit upon their return to Mogadishu as many of these units are broken apart to provide personal security for TFG officials. ¶10. (C) DATT said France was considering moving its training of TFG troops from Djibouti to Uganda. The Ambassador said the U.S. was committed to additional funding for AMISOM. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) General Mugisha is clearly interested in giving his men a fighting chance in a difficult situation. Intelligent, dedicated, and professional, his appeal for help was dignified and logical. He made it clear that Uganda would not cut and run and appreciated the assistance AMISOM had already received. One gets the sense that assistance with his very reasonable request could make the difference between success and failure in Somalia. LANIER