AFGHANISTAN/COUNTERNARCOTICS: DRUG USE IN THE ANP

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000996 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR INL, INL/AP, SCA, AF E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SNAR PGOV SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN/COUNTERNARCOTICS: DRUG USE IN THE ANP ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Pervasive illicit drug use remains a serious impediment to building an effective Afghan National Police (ANP) force. Testing of incoming recruits at ANP Regional Training Centers (RTC) show an average 17% positive return (primarily THC, but also opiates),comparable to national levels of drug use by the Afghan adult population. In response, several Regional Training Centers recently initiated a pilot program to provide medical assistance for physically addicted police students during the most recent classes; results are still pending. End Summary. TESTING THE TRAINEES: -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Drug testing at the Regional Training Centers (RTCs) for Afghan National Police (ANP) students began in May 2008. All students are tested by the U.S. in-processing teams for THC, opiates and amphetamines during in-processing. While individual class rates vary from 4% to 38%, on average roughly 17% test positive. There is a general trend for students from the southern and western regions to test positive at higher rates than their northern counterparts, and the rates are considerably lower for students in the classes that have a literacy requirement. THC is by far the most commonly abused drug; opiate use accounts for approximately 5% of the positive test results. ¶3. (SBU) There is general agreement within the GIROA that all students testing positive for any illegal drugs should be summarily dismissed from the RTCs and the police force. As with most things in Afghanistan, however, the manner in which this problem is addressed is more nuanced. The Ministry of Interior (MOI),which oversees the ANP, currently admits students into police training who test positive only for THC, but rejects those who test positive for opiates. Any member of the ANP who fails a second drug test of any kind is supposed to be dismissed automatically. Effectively implementing even this policy is problematic, however, as responsibility for dismissing police staff rests with regional Afghan commanders. In many cases, test results are either ignored by the Afghan police commanders at the RTC and the students remain in training, or they're sent home, but remain untrained members of their district's police unit. ¶4. (SBU) In addition, obtaining accurate testing results is complicated by the rapid metabolism rate of opium-based drugs. Many 
students who are addicted to opium reportedly quit taking the drugs a few days before reporting to the RTCs. Even though they're clearly experiencing excruciating withdrawal symptoms, they may not test positive, so there's no objective basis on for dismissal. WHY SO HIGH?: -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Several factors contribute to the high rate of illegal drug use among police recruits. In much of Afghanistan, for example, smoking hash is as socially accepted as drinking tea. Also, opium-based drugs are widely used in Afghanistan in place of the non-narcotic painkillers available in Western nations. These often traditional medications are extremely easy to obtain, unregulated, and can lead quickly to physical addiction. The addiction starts early - mothers quickly learn a teething baby is soothed if given a poppy pod to chew on, and a bit of opium in milk or tea calms a crying child. ¶6. (SBU) Unsophisticated police recruiting methods are also partly responsible for the relatively high drug use rates among trainees. In the basic police courses, in which literacy is not a requirement, police recruits are more likely to be conscripts than volunteers. Village elders are often given a quota to fill for their districts, and young men are ordered into the ANP accordingly for a two-year contract. As a rule, the police recruits are vetted through the local police districts and the Ministry of Interior before they're permitted onto the RTCs for training, but at this point in the police development program, there is no central recruiting center that can screen the recruits before they're admitted into the ranks of the ANP, or provide treatment for them. REHABILITATION EFFORTS: -------------- ¶7. (SBU) On a more positive note, there is evidence to suggest that rehabilitation efforts in a controlled environment, such as an RTC, can be effective. Positive peer pressure to the effect that "good KABUL 00000996 002 OF 002 Islamists don't do drugs" - a message uneducated recruits may be hearing for the first time - has shown to be an effective motivator. Also, the controlled RTC setting provides a good opportunity to address physical addiction originating from poor medical treatment early in the addict's life (see para 5.) ¶8. (SBU) In February 2009, short-term drug rehabilitation "pilot programs" were put in place in four RTCs, with funding provided by the British government. At the same time, in-processing at these RTCs was extended from three to seven days to accommodate the program, during which British-trained Afghans provided on-site medical care for the students exhibiting withdrawal symptoms, and made available education classes for all the police trainees. ¶9. (SBU) There are several advantages to providing on-site care programs before classes begin. Withdrawal symptoms from opium can be quite severe, and students going through withdrawal previously had disrupted entire classes. Such students also often required hospitalization - hospitalization that was frequently unavailable, or exposed the students and RTC staff to the dangers of nighttime travel from the RTCs. Finally, ensuring a student is drug- and agony-free before weapons training is always a good thing. ¶10. (SBU) Unfortunately, British funding for the RTC-based medical care and education pilot program was limited, and other sources will be required to continue the program at the four target RTCs and/or to expand it further. Embassy Kabul and CSTC-A are currently exploring other possible funding sources for the program. RICCIARDONE