Afghanistan's Sub-National Governance Director Looks into

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000812 DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PHUM PGOV AF SUBJECT: Afghanistan's Sub-National Governance Director Looks into the Future ¶1. Summary: During the Ambassador's March 30 farewell call on Jelani Popal, Director of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG),Popal both predicted President Karzai's re-election and also laid out changes he believes the President will need to make in a next, final period in office if he is to leave a positive, lasting legacy. He also speculated on the future of the IDLG itself, preferring to see it take on a broader mandate coordinating overall government policy formulation and building up human capacity at both the central and sub-national levels. Finally, he raised a bit of doubt about his own future at the IDLG, at least in the short term, noting that he has suggested to the President that he be moved to another position during the election campaign out of concern that international suspicions of his perceived pro-Karzai bias are damaging support for the IDLG's work. End Summary. Post-Election: Need for a Better Team -------------- ¶2. While not going so far as to predict the President will be a shoe-in, Popal did suggest that the sizeable support the President enjoys in the country makes it quite likely he will win re-election. This is all the more likely, he noted, because of the lack of organized political parties to help assemble support across a spectrum for candidates. He recalled warning Ashraf Ghani about just this problem. So far, Afghan politicians have been too "selfish," Popal argued, to support creation of real political parties based on ideas, because they see such parties posing a danger to their highly personalized followings. ¶3. According to the IDLG Director, if the President, once re-elected, hopes to leave a positive legacy to the nation at the end of his next term, he will have to make some major changes. First and foremost, there must be personnel changes at senior levels. Papal pointed to Ministers Wardak and Atmar, along with National Directorate of Security (NDS) chief Saleh, as equipping the President with a solid security team - particularly since Atmar's take-over at Interior. The same, however, cannot be said for both the economic/development and governance portfolios. He suggested the President will need to find a bare minimum of two individuals he completely trusts to take the lead in each of these two critical subject areas. With such persons in place, Karzai must then step away from his constant micro-managing. The Future of the IDLG -------------- ¶4. Before laying out two scenarios for the IDLG's future, Popal briefly looked back on his agency's accomplishments to date, labeling himself "generally happy" with the IDLG's record. He prefaced his remarks, however, by noting the many obstacles with which the IDLG has had to contend in trying to carry out its mission of linking the people to the government in Kabul. The old informal links that once existed are simply gone, and Popal's attempt to jump-start the recreation of those links via the Afghanistan Social Outreach Program (ASOP) - through creation of temporary district-level shuras - has been largely still-born so far because of widespread suspicion among the International Community of the IDLG's motivation. He cited obstructionism in Parliament too as an impediment to progress. He noted that he wastes a huge amount of his time meeting with dozens of MPs a day to hear out their pleas for installing this or that constituent, associate or family member in one sub-national governance job or another. Lack of resources has stalled the IDLG's work as well. With a budget of less than USD 30 million to cover about 100,000 employees, Popal bemoaned the fact that he has had to spend so much of his time requesting funding from donors for the financing of IDLG programs. ¶5. On the plus side of the ledger, the IDLG chief cited four accomplishments. First, he believes his agency has succeeded in raising awareness of the importance of sub-national governance and in gaining recognition from major stakeholders of the need for addressing current shortcomings. Second, the IDLG has managed to craft several significant policy initiatives [Note: sometimes with the assistance of outside partners, such as UNDP]. Third, Popal pointed to the imminent three-day conference for the remaining batch of district administrators to provide them some basic, centrally guided orientation, training and evaluation. Through these conferences, the IDLG has mapped out the state of sub-national governance resources (or lack thereof) in all of the country's 364 official districts, assessed the qualifications of the administrators and determined which officials need to be replaced (about 100). Finally, Popal insisted he has been working "day and night" to create needed capacity in the IDLG itself to allow it to function as a professional organization. [Note: the IDLG has about 360 employees in Kabul, about 70 of whom it judges to be of KABUL 00000812 002 OF 003 professional quality, with a dozen of these in senior management positions.] ¶6. As for the way ahead, the IDLG director mapped out two possible approaches. On the one hand, he believes his agency could maintain its current role focused on overseeing the work of governors and district administrators; but he would advocate shifting the power of appointment from the Palace to the IDLG itself. What he would really prefer, however, would be to see the IDLG's focus broadened to allow it also to function as an "administrative affairs department" for the President. This would involve helping to coordinate national policy formulation, mapping out legislative strategy and taking the steps necessary to ensure sufficient capacity exists at both the national and sub-national levels to permit those charged with governance responsibilities to carry out national policies effectively. With such capacity in place, he would advocate transferring to governors the principal responsibility for hiring district administrators, with the IDLG limiting itself to a supervisory role and intervening directly in such appointments only by exception rather than as a rule. ¶7. Popal did not indicate how likely he believes it is that either of these changes will be introduced. He was clear, however, that he views the current system for managing the mechanics of governance as "very flawed." He noted that neither the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission nor the Senior Appointments Panel - both intended to help professionalize government service - are properly shielding the system from outside influence. Popal's Own Future -------------- ¶8. Popal was frank, and to all appearances, regretful in acknowledging how much of a lightning rod for criticism he has become, especially among international donors. He finds this a bit ironic, given the open arms with which the International Community welcomed the creation of the IDLG in mid-2007 and his appointment as its director. He said he realizes he has become very closely associated in people's minds with the President; and consequently potential funders are reluctant to support the IDLG's programs for fear that he will manipulate those programs to benefit the reelection chances of the President. He insists, however, that he did not take the job to serve any personal interest but instead to help bring about change. He cited the ASOP program as a case in point - his best effort to re-link the people and the government, an objective everyone agrees is of enormous importance, has barely managed to get off the ground because of fears the program will be politicized. To address this hamstringing of the IDLG, Popal says he has suggested to the President that he be shifted to a different position, at least for the duration of the Presidential election campaign. He indicated he has also considered trying to get international observers installed within the IDLG to provide greater transparency and reassurance. In the next breath, however, he admitted such observers would have to work without the knowledge of the President, whose hackles would almost certainly be raised by such international oversight. Comment -------------- ¶9. Popal appears to find himself between a rock and a hard place. He has been permitted to organize the Independent Directorate of Local Governance into the seed of an effective organization and develop potentially significant and constructive policy initiatives because he is close to the President and has his trust. But in an election year, it is just this proximity that has ended up tainting Popal in the eyes not only of some international stakeholders but also most of the political opposition as well. We see little prospect of his proposals for stepping aside or installing observers in the IDLG being implemented, though it is not beyond the realm of the possible that the President might find it expedient to sacrifice him at least temporarily in some kind of a level-the-playing-field bargain with his opposition. It is against this background that the Ambassador explicitly warned Popal to "stay away from the elections" or risk alienating International Community support for the IDLG for the foreseeable future. The most likely scenario currently appears to be for Popal to hunker down until after the elections and, if Karzai is returned to office, at that point seek to reenergize the IDLG and its sub-national governance agenda. But rather than see inaction on the governance front for the next six months, it should be possible to find a way to support a number of the IDLG's nascent initiatives, such as the Afghanistan Social Outreach Program and the governors' operational fund, which will allow progress to be made while minimizing opportunities for the misuse of funds for partisan ends. KABUL 00000812 003 OF 003 WOOD