OPPOSITION LEADERS ANNOUNCE TWO OPTIONS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000789

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV AF PREL KHUM
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADERS ANNOUNCE TWO OPTIONS FOR
INTERIM PERIOD

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. On March 28 opposition leaders announced that
they had agreed among themselves on two possible options for
resolving the post-May 22 presidential continuity issue to a
gathering of diplomatic representatives: a transitional
mechanism based on political consensus or a caretaker
government based on the presidential succession articles of
the Constitution. Presidential candidates Anwarulhaq Ahadi
and Abdullah Abdullah explained the options and answered the
diplomatic attendees' questions during the politically and
religiously influential Gailani family-hosted event. The DCM
stated that there is a need for continuity and stability of
government from May 22 until the next inauguration as
Afghanistan cannot afford the distraction of a prolonged
political crisis while facing an insurgency, adding that we
recognize the concerns of the opposition about a "level
playing field" and believe addressing those concerns should
be the focus of discussions leading to a political consensus
on the way forward. During the ensuing discussion, the
organizers made clear their preference for the caretaker
government option, but implied they would accept President
Karzai remaining in office through the next inauguration if
election stakeholders could decide and implement conditions
ensuring a level playing field for opposition candidates.
The event was billed as a meeting of all opposition forces
but the absentees (inter alia VP Massoud, Speaker Qanooni,
Hazara Leader Mohaqqeq) were as noteworthy as the attendees.
The presentation, explanation, and subsequent sidebar
discussions as well as the absence and vague terms of the
actual declaration all suggest disarray among the opposition
rather than unity. To the extent this was designed to force
Karzai to negotiate on the opposition's terms, the initiative
is likely to be seen as stillborn.

Attendees
--------------

2. (C) The Afghan attendees included the organizers, Pir
Gailani, head of the religiously and politically influential
Gailani family and his son Hamid Gailani, Deputy Speaker of
the Upper House, United Front presidential candidate Dr.
Abdullah Abdullah, announced presidential candidate Dr.
Anwarulhaq Ahadi, Junbesh Party leader Sayed Noorullah,
United Front Leader and MP Burhanuddin Rabbani, royalist
Mustafa Zahir, MP Ishaq Gailani (Hamid's cousin),MP Mahmud
Gailani (Pir's grandson),and MP Mohammad Akbari. Noorullah,
Ishaq Gailani, and Zahir left abruptly at the speeches,
conclusion, not staying for the following reception and
informal conversation. The foreign attendees included
representatives from the U.K., German, Italian, Polish,
Norwegian, and Saudi Embassies, among others.

Notable Absentees
--------------

3. (C) Likely presidential candidate Ahmad Ali Jalali and
United Front leader First Vice President Ahmad Zia Massoud
did not attend. Hamid Gailani announced that Herat Governor
Anwari represented Shia leader Ayatollah Mohseni and
Ayatollah Orfani represented Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqqeq,
although neither Anwari nor Orfani spoke up to confirm this
assertion. Lower House Speaker and UF Leader Yunus Qanooni
told poloff he participated in the drafting of the two
options but did not attend the reception because he felt it
was inappropriate as Parliament's leader to do so.

Discussion
--------------

4. (C) Ahadi outlined the group's two options for the interim
period: 1) a transition mechanism based on political
consensus 2) an interim government following the line of
succession delineated in the Afghan Constitution for cases of
death or resignation of the President and Vice Presidents,
which would likely mean Upper House Speaker Mojaddedi would
serve as caretaker president. Under pressure from the
questions and comments of the international community, Ahadi
admitted that one possible consensus approach would be for
Karzai to remain in office until a new president is
inaugurated.


5. (C) The DCM presented the U.S. position: the USG's new
strategic plan announced on March 27 is a serious renewal of
our commitment to Afghanistan, and it is designed to
reinforce stability in Afghanistan precisely to help set the
conditions for free and fair elections. We would not welcome
any solution which puts our commitment at risk especially one
which would lead to a period of distraction, political
turmoil, and weak governance in the critical electoral
period. There is a need for continuity and stability of
government from May 22 until the next inauguration as
Afghanistan cannot afford the distraction of a prolonged
political crisis while facing an insurgency. That said, we

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recognize the concerns of the opposition about a "level
playing field" and believe that should be the focus of any
discussions leading to a political consensus on the way
forward.


6. (C) Later in the discussion, the British Charge presented
the U.K. position: Afghan political leadership should take
the lead in deciding how to resolve the continuity of
authority issue. However, there is a clear need for a stable
government. To that end, conditions to ensure a level
playing field should be considered.


7. (C) Ahadi rebutted the assertion that a caretaker
government would negatively affect the country's security.
The leadership of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of
Defense, and National Directorate of Security would remain
the same. Thus, the major ministries controlling security
would continue as before, as would international military
support. Abdullah added that delaying making a decision
about the interim period, rather than making the decision to
put in a caretaker government, would lead to insecurity.


8. (C) Responding to the German Ambassador's question
regarding conditions necessary to guarantee a free and fair
election, Abdullah claimed the voter registration numbers
were artificially high and questioned the competence,
effectiveness, and independence of the Independent Election
Commission. Ahadi alleged that some government departments
are essentially campaigning for Karzai and claimed the group
could provide detailed evidence of these activities if
requested.


9. (C) In conversation on the margins with the DCM, Ahadi
said the opposition leaders' first choice was to have an
interim government, led by someone other than Karzai. Due to
the international community's pressure for Karzai remaining
in office, however, the leaders decided to present the second
option of a political consensus, allowing Karzai to stay in
office with limitations geared towards reducing his ability
to unfairly tilt the election in his favor. The
international community should present its ideas for ways to
limit Karzai's power and to level the playing field for the
opposition, Ahadi said.

Comment
--------------

10. (C) Mohaqqeq's absence and Noorullah's quick departure
hints that both leaders (and thus at least factions of the
Hazara Wahdat Party and the Uzbek Junbesh Party) are
uncomfortable openly supporting the opposition. Although the
organizers were at pains to stress that the declaration had
the support of such prominent figures as VP Massoud, Speaker
Qanooni, Mohaqqeq, and others, and that these three had
participated in all the discussions, their absence was
noticeable. That, the silence of key figures like Rabbani
and the differing interpretations of what was meant by the
phrase "transitional mechanism" suggest that there is little
agreement on a way ahead even among those supposedly united
in their opposition to Karzai. In fact, what they mostly
signaled was growing frustration that Karzai is in a
commanding position to control the direction and pace of any
negotiation. Finally, the weakness and inconsistency of the
groups' self-serving arguments were on display to all: we
accept the extra-constitutional election date but reject an
extra-constitutional extension of Karzai's term of office; we
are only concerned about a fair electoral process but want to
change the government to achieve that; and, no one except us
(especially not the Supreme Court or the Independent Election
Commission) can be trusted to act only for the good of the
nation.

Declaration
--------------
BEGIN TEXT.
In the Name of God
Declaration of Heads of Political Parties and Prominent
Political Personalities of Afghanistan
On March 28th, 2009, a large number of Afghan political
leaders met to discuss the issue of the end of the
presidential term and the need for a transitional mechanism
(May 22nd, 2009 until the taking of the oath of office by the
newly elected president). The participants unanimously
decided that:


I. In accordance with article 61 of the constitution of
Afghanistan, the term of the president ends on May 22nd of
the 5th year after his or her election. Thus, it is
unconstitutional for the president and his vice presidents to
remain in office after that date. Any disregard of this
provision of the constitution will cause serious political
unrest throughout the country.


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II. Taking into consideration the fact that elections are not
going to be held within a time frame specified by the
constitution, to avoid any vacuum of legitimate power and to
ensure the transparency of the upcoming elections, it is
imperative that all important stakeholders agree on one of
the following two options:

i. a political consensus on a transitional mechanism.

ii. a transitional mechanism that is based on articles 67 and
68 of the constitution.

Given the urgency of the matter, and taking into
consideration the importance of legitimacy of government and
the transparency of elections, we hope that all stakeholders
will, as soon as possible, accept one of the two alternatives
for appointing a transitional head of state.
END TEXT.

WOOD