Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL721
2009-03-25 06:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
KARZAI RAISES QUESTIONS ON U.S. ROLE IN AFGHAN
how-toVZCZCXRO8987 PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW DE RUEHBUL #0721/01 0840659 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 250659Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7910 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000721
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI RAISES QUESTIONS ON U.S. ROLE IN AFGHAN
ELECTIONS
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
--------
Summary
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000721
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI RAISES QUESTIONS ON U.S. ROLE IN AFGHAN
ELECTIONS
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (C) In his March 19 meeting with Deputy Special
Representative Paul Jones, President Karzai cited certain
rumors assertint that some Afghans were suspicious of U.S.
objectives in the upcoming election. He added that a number
of Afghan politicians claimed U.S. backing for their
candidacies. Jones made clear the U.S. position: we
supported continuity of authority in the post-May 22 period
and through to the inauguration, but we had no favored
candidate in the election. Karzai will soon seek a formal
Supreme Court interpretation on the continuity of authority
issue. Ambassador Wood informed Karzai he would depart post
on April 3.
-------------- --------------
Perceptions of U.S. role in Presidential politics
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Karzai turned much of the discussion toward the
presidential elections and perceptions (ostensibly of "the
Afghan people" but equally his own) of U.S. interference in
the political process. He objected to past conduct of U.S.
authorities who "permitted" a former U.S. Ambassador to
"campaign for president for over two years." He
characterized the circumstances as a sign of disrespect to
Afghanistan, and warned that the Afghan people would expect
greater transparency in U.S. actions, or the United States
risked growing distrust from the people.
3. (C) Karzai cited a number of opposition figures,
specifically Ashraf Ghani, Anwar Ahadi, Gul Agha Sherzai and
Mirwais Yasini, who claimed U.S. backing for their
candidacies. Karzai again argued that such rumors and
perceptions fed into growing Afghan mistrust of U.S.
objectives in the Afghan political process.
4. (C) Karzai claimed some Afghans believed the United States
had two objectives in the electoral context: (1) to create
and then support an opponent to Karzai and (2) to divide the
Pashtun vote. Karzai explained that he had held off on
formally declaring his candidacy because he wanted to
maintain his position and stature as the president to unify
the country.
5. (C) Jones reiterated that the United States had no favored
candidate in the election. In fact, everyone knew that the
United States supported continuity of authority in the
post-May 22 period and through to the inauguration. Some
could interpret that as the United States backing Karzai. In
fact, the United States would be neutral on the election.
--------------
Continuity of authority
--------------
6. (C) Karzai said a number of attendees at a recent
International Women's Day event urged him not to step down in
favor of an interim authority. They cited the turmoil from
the 1992 Rabbani interim authority, which extended its rule
beyond its deadline. Karzai also pointed to a recent
statement by Herati mullahs also declaring their opposition
to an interim arrangement.
7. (C) Karzai told Jones he wished to resolve the uncertainty
over this issue. He planned soon to ask the Supreme Court
for a constitutional interpretation of his authority to
continue as president in the post-May 22 period. Once the
Supreme Court delivered its interpretation, Karzai would then
take up the issue with the Parliament. He threatened to call
for a Loya Jirga if he could not reach a consensus with
Parliament.
8. (C) The Ambassador reiterated our position that Karzai
should continue in office through the post-May 22 period. He
urged Karzai to engage opposition leaders privately to seek a
practical solution that would avoid confrontation over the
issue. It would be helpful if Karzai would provide MPs
something to enable them to accept his continuity. Public
humiliation of the opposition would be a mistake. After some
back and forth, Karzai agreed to consult the opposition, but
insisted he could not concede anything that would be outside
the constitution.
--------------
Other issues
--------------
KABUL 00000721 002 OF 002
9. (C) Tripartite meeting: Karzai agreed with Jones'
assessment that the February 26 tripartite meeting began a
constructive discussion among the three countries,
particularly on intelligence sharing on cross-border issues.
Jones extended an invitation to Afghanistan to attend a
follow on session scheduled for May 6-7.
10. (SBU) Ambassador's Departure: Ambassador Wood concluded
the meeting by informing Karzai that he would depart Kabul on
April 3. Karzai lamented the Ambassador's departure, citing
the sometimes difficult substantive exchanges they had had,
but citing the loss of the Ambassador's departure given his
deep expertise on Afghan issues.
11. (U) Deputy Special Representative Jones cleared this
message.
WOOD
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI RAISES QUESTIONS ON U.S. ROLE IN AFGHAN
ELECTIONS
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (C) In his March 19 meeting with Deputy Special
Representative Paul Jones, President Karzai cited certain
rumors assertint that some Afghans were suspicious of U.S.
objectives in the upcoming election. He added that a number
of Afghan politicians claimed U.S. backing for their
candidacies. Jones made clear the U.S. position: we
supported continuity of authority in the post-May 22 period
and through to the inauguration, but we had no favored
candidate in the election. Karzai will soon seek a formal
Supreme Court interpretation on the continuity of authority
issue. Ambassador Wood informed Karzai he would depart post
on April 3.
-------------- --------------
Perceptions of U.S. role in Presidential politics
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Karzai turned much of the discussion toward the
presidential elections and perceptions (ostensibly of "the
Afghan people" but equally his own) of U.S. interference in
the political process. He objected to past conduct of U.S.
authorities who "permitted" a former U.S. Ambassador to
"campaign for president for over two years." He
characterized the circumstances as a sign of disrespect to
Afghanistan, and warned that the Afghan people would expect
greater transparency in U.S. actions, or the United States
risked growing distrust from the people.
3. (C) Karzai cited a number of opposition figures,
specifically Ashraf Ghani, Anwar Ahadi, Gul Agha Sherzai and
Mirwais Yasini, who claimed U.S. backing for their
candidacies. Karzai again argued that such rumors and
perceptions fed into growing Afghan mistrust of U.S.
objectives in the Afghan political process.
4. (C) Karzai claimed some Afghans believed the United States
had two objectives in the electoral context: (1) to create
and then support an opponent to Karzai and (2) to divide the
Pashtun vote. Karzai explained that he had held off on
formally declaring his candidacy because he wanted to
maintain his position and stature as the president to unify
the country.
5. (C) Jones reiterated that the United States had no favored
candidate in the election. In fact, everyone knew that the
United States supported continuity of authority in the
post-May 22 period and through to the inauguration. Some
could interpret that as the United States backing Karzai. In
fact, the United States would be neutral on the election.
--------------
Continuity of authority
--------------
6. (C) Karzai said a number of attendees at a recent
International Women's Day event urged him not to step down in
favor of an interim authority. They cited the turmoil from
the 1992 Rabbani interim authority, which extended its rule
beyond its deadline. Karzai also pointed to a recent
statement by Herati mullahs also declaring their opposition
to an interim arrangement.
7. (C) Karzai told Jones he wished to resolve the uncertainty
over this issue. He planned soon to ask the Supreme Court
for a constitutional interpretation of his authority to
continue as president in the post-May 22 period. Once the
Supreme Court delivered its interpretation, Karzai would then
take up the issue with the Parliament. He threatened to call
for a Loya Jirga if he could not reach a consensus with
Parliament.
8. (C) The Ambassador reiterated our position that Karzai
should continue in office through the post-May 22 period. He
urged Karzai to engage opposition leaders privately to seek a
practical solution that would avoid confrontation over the
issue. It would be helpful if Karzai would provide MPs
something to enable them to accept his continuity. Public
humiliation of the opposition would be a mistake. After some
back and forth, Karzai agreed to consult the opposition, but
insisted he could not concede anything that would be outside
the constitution.
--------------
Other issues
--------------
KABUL 00000721 002 OF 002
9. (C) Tripartite meeting: Karzai agreed with Jones'
assessment that the February 26 tripartite meeting began a
constructive discussion among the three countries,
particularly on intelligence sharing on cross-border issues.
Jones extended an invitation to Afghanistan to attend a
follow on session scheduled for May 6-7.
10. (SBU) Ambassador's Departure: Ambassador Wood concluded
the meeting by informing Karzai that he would depart Kabul on
April 3. Karzai lamented the Ambassador's departure, citing
the sometimes difficult substantive exchanges they had had,
but citing the loss of the Ambassador's departure given his
deep expertise on Afghan issues.
11. (U) Deputy Special Representative Jones cleared this
message.
WOOD