DUTCH EMPHASIZE HEALTH AND EDUCATION IN URUZGAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000658 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2019 TAGS: KDEM MOPS NATO PREL GOV PK AF CA UK NL SUBJECT: DUTCH EMPHASIZE HEALTH AND EDUCATION IN URUZGAN REF: A. KABUL 587 ¶B. KABUL 567 Classified By: PRT Counselor Valerie C. Fowler, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Dutch Ambassador hosted a lunch on March 16 to help shape the perspective and situational awareness of Regional Command South (RC-S) for the three incoming Dutch senior civilian representatives who are preparing to arrive in Uruzgan in August 2009. Attendees also included a representative from the U.S. Embassy's State PRT office and UK Political Counselor Mark Bryson-Richardson. Canada was also invited but unable to attend. Unlike Canadian and UK counterparts, who have already presented their plans and ideas for international civilian military cooperation during the U.S. troop lay down (reftels),the Dutch are focused on bolstering their civilian focus in Afghanistan, and did not present any concrete ideas or plans for strengthened international cooperation moving forward. Rather, they were concerned that increased kinetic activity in Helmand and Kandahar could drive insurgents and violence into Uruzgan, forcing them to disrupt their "soft" approach to the province. A recurring theme throughout the lunch was the difference in priorities between the Dutch on one hand, and the U.S. and UK on the other hand. The Netherlands concentrates almost exclusively on health and education, wheras the U.S. and UK focus on counterinsurgency and stabilization, respectively. Conversation also touched on the possible political consequences of increasing U.S. troops in RC-S, counternarcotics, civilian casualties in the context of public opinion, and the influence of Iran and Pakistan. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The lunch hosted by the Dutch Ambassador and incoming senior political advisors on March 16 was centered on fundamental differences between primary objectives of the U.S. and UK, versus those of the Netherlands. The U.S. PRT rep highlighted our focus on counterinsurgency (COIN),while Bryson-Richardson explained the UK,s operations are centered on stabilization. By contrast, the Dutch Ambassador underscored the Hague's chief mission of improving health and education in Uruzgan. Bryson-Richardson said a recent UK-sponsored poll revealed that Afghan people prefer that their government provide law �A;and order and access to justice before access to health and education. The Dutch Ambassador argued back that the most important consideration is how the programs are implemented, and steadfastly maintained the Dutch policy of focusing on health and education programs. Note: The UK data is subject to debate. For example, an Asia Foundation survey suggests that Afghans' top preferences are: law and order, health, education and access to justice. COMISAF McKiernan stated to North Atlantic Council (NAC) Ambassadors on March 17 that education is an integral part of the COIN strategy. End Note. ¶3. (C) The lunch turned to the theme of counternarcotics (CN),for which U.S. and UK reps said we should expect an stronger kinetic focus throughout the south. The Dutch Ambassador expressed concern that this approach in Uruzgan would risk disrupting the status quo, in which the opium producers had, in his opinion, "opted out" of the conflict between GIROA and insurgents. He asserted military attempts to fight narcotics production would cause traffickers not previously linked to insurgents to generate new, unanticipated kinetic activity in Uruzgan. U.S. and UK reps rebutted his claim, saying the link between narcotics and funding for the insurgency is supported by strong evidence. The Dutch Ambassador stood his ground, rhetorically posing the question of what consequences could arise from removing the money-making potential of non-insurgent narcotics traffickers. The UK reps added that the British see counternarcotics in Helmand Province as a "governance" issue and saw their CN efforts there as supporting Governor Mangal,s credibility and legitimacy. ¶4. (C) The incoming Dutch PolAd raised the issue of civilian casualties and detainees in the context of public debate in the Netherlands. He said there is a strong link between these issues and public opinion, and that another big event could be strongly detrimental the public's already shaky support for Dutch presence in Afghanistan. In that context, the PolAd said he would not bet that the Dutch would be the lead in Uruzgan past 2010. He said officials in the Hague are discussing a range of options including remaining in Uruzgan under another lead nation, scattering Dutch forces throughout a number of provinces, or pulling Dutch troops out of Afghanistan altogether. KABUL 00000658 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) Comment: The lunch at the Dutch Embassy highlighted not a lack of commitment from The Hague, but rather a fundamental difference in perspective and preferred approach to Afghanistan by that country. The apparent skepticism of the Dutch to increased kinetic action by other coalition forces in the south seems to be driven by the perception that it will upset the "status quo" in Uruzgan, possibly driving insurgents into currently stable areas. We will need a nuanced approach if we wish to convince the Dutch that the new proactive policy is regional in scope, and designed to circle and eliminate the insurgency. Bringing them on board with a simultaneous intensification of CN efforts could prove equally challenging. Although public opinion is fickle, we should not anticipate that the Dutch will depart Afghanistan en mass in the near future. The fact that Dutch police mentoring teams (PMTs) were recently brought into the PRT Uruzgan, for example, may be an indicator that the Dutch intend to increase their civilian focus, but will remain here. End Comment. WOOD