UPDATE ON GOVERNOR-LED RECONCILIATION PROGRAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 11 KABUL 000637 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: UPDATE ON GOVERNOR-LED RECONCILIATION PROGRAM Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) We recently received, on a close-hold basis, a copy of the first draft of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance's (IDLG) "program outline" for its governor-led Reconciliation Program. This document follows up on the "concept note" produced last fall by IDLG Deputy Director Barna Karimi. The new paper lays out more details for the creation of provincial-level "reconciliation shuras" and for the formulation of benefit packages to be offered to prospective reconcilees. It also seeks to address the issue of community resistance, takes account of the ongoing Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) process and suggests a first ) but incomplete ) way forward on dealing with justice issues. It does not yet include links to the existing PTS (Program Takhim-e-Solh, or Strengthening Peace) reconciliation program or specify a mechanism for vetting the low- to mid-level domestic fighters to be targeted. We have yet to detect a significant head of political steam behind the IDLG's initiative. Background -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Last fall, the IDLG, at the Palace's request, produced an initial "Concept Note" outlining the basic elements of a possible "governor-led" approach to encouraging low- to mid-level insurgents to lay down their arms, accept the constitution and return to the legal fold. The "Concept Note" was drafted by the IDLG's deputy director, Barna Karimi and was publicly presented for comment at an October 25 IDLG-organized regional governors' conference in Wardak Province. Little has been heard of the plan since. ¶3. (SBU) The IDLG reconciliation concept's main premise is that governors, along with top security officials and notables at the provincial level, are best placed to identify insurgents in their area who may be receptive to reconciliation. The notion is for governors to form 60- to 120-member reconciliation shuras at the provincial level with leading figures from all districts to help identify potential reconciles and, where necessary, act as brokers between the government and the insurgents. These would not be the same shuras being set up as part of the Afghanistan Social �A;Outreach Program (ASOP),though there could be some overlap in membership. The ASOP shuras are at the district level; and the reconciliation shuras would have a larger contingent of religious figures to help increase the effectiveness of their outreach efforts. With the help of these shuras as well as local National Directorate of Security (NDS) and police officials, the governor would assemble a list of potential candidates for reconciliation and submit these for vetting in Kabul (NDS and UNAMA). The authorities would also pull together tailored incentive "package" for governors (again possibly via the shuras) to put on offer. These would likely include such elements as immunity for past anti-state activites; protection from political opponents, securiy forces and intelligence services; security from the Taliban; a transition stipend; and jos or job training. ¶4. (SBU) Both individuas and groups of up to 100 would be targetedby the program (larger groups would deal with te central government directly). As explainedby IDLG Deputy Director Karimi, the government would only move to take up negotiations froma position of strength and not address the issue of hardcore Taliban members ) this issue must be addressed by higher-level, political initiatives orchestrated from the Palace and the Office of the National Security Advisor. governors would only work with insurgents who are in set locations ) those who are in the mountains or possibly holding a village or two, not those who are transient and move across the border. ¶5. (SBU) The IDLG claims it does not want to lead reconciliation ) this is something for the NSC or others. Rather, it believes it has an important part simply in coordinating with its governors and helping keep the program on track. To that end, the IDLG is thinking in terms of setting up a separate reconciliation unit within the ILDG, whose staff would need to be well paid in order to prevent them (and by implication the process) from becoming corrupted. A secondary benefit of the program would be that it would test the governors. Those governors who could not manage the program successfully would be removed. On the other hand, the IDLG believes that success would increase the governors' authority and connect them more closely with both KABUL 00000637 002.3 OF 011 the people and the central government. Update: Some New Elements but Other Important Details Yet to be Fully Worked Out -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Since producing its initial "concept paper," the IDLG has written a first draft of a &program outline8 which attempts to lay out in a bit greater specificity what a governor-led reconciliation program would look like. We were recently given a copy of this draft (text at para. 10). The document is marked "confidential" and we were requested to exercise discretion in handling it. IDLG Deputy Director Karimi insists it is not a finished product. He also indicates he has not had time recently to fine-tune it. ¶7. (C/NF) Although a number of elements are still missing, the outline adds three additional raw components. First, it seeks to address the issue of community resistance to accepting reconcilees and unhappiness with former insurgents' receiving special benefits. The program now emphasizes community engagement to seek buy-in to reintegration. This process is to be eased by incorporating rehabilitation projects for "damaged communities" into the program. A second important addition is the more explicit call for coordination with and involvement from other ongoing reintegration programs, most importantly the Ministry of Interior's Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) process. It mentions the UNDP's Afghanistan New Beginnings Program, which provides various forms of support to DIAG. It also clarifies the process by which insurgents would be required to hand over their weapons. Third, the outline attempts to address, at least partially, the concern raised by UNAMA regarding the lack of a viable justice component. The outline acknowledges that certain crimes will need to be reserved for the formal justice system. At the same time, it also calls for the application by the reconciliation shuras of lenient "customary justice" for many if not most former fighters willing to confess and apologize. As the paper itself acknowledges, the justice component is particularly complicated and requires further work. ¶8. (C/NF) Two other important elements fail to be mentioned in the outline but will need to be addressed in any final plan. How the current PTS (Program Takhim-e-Solh, or Strengthening Peace) reconciliation program is to relate to this IDLG-crafted program needs to be specified. The IDLG's Karimi has suggested PTS and its head, Meshrano Jirga Speaker Professor Mojaddedi, might focus on higher-level reconciliation or play a symbolic role welcoming back reconcilees. With Palace funding, the PTS program has continued to limp along and, given Mojaddedi's close links to President Karzai, it is difficult to imagine the IDLG program moving forward without any regard for PTS. The second element missing from the program outline, but something suggested in the earlier concept note, is the mechanism for vetting prospective candidates for reconciliation. This aspect of the program is of key importance to us, and Karimi insists the failure to address this in the most recent draft was not intentional and will be included as it is further fleshed out. The outline does include a provision for membership for donors on the program's "national-level steering committee." "Next steps" also underscores the need to build consensus for the program among "key stakeholders," including "key members of the international community." This holds out some prospect for our concerns being addressed. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The fact that Karimi has not had the time to push forward work on his draft is understandable in light of his extremely heavy workload; yet it also suggests this particular program may not be a current priority for the Palace (though Karimi insists it has Presidential support). Clearly his proposal still needs considerable work. But even when his proposal is fully formulated, he is unlikely to find it a simple task to get the relevant ministries on board for realigning their scarce resources to be supportive. Ultimately, the program will have to depend on significant donor funding. On this score, Karimi is quick to remind that at the Paris conference several nations indicated their interest in supporting reconciliation financially. A final caution to note is the target group of the program ) mid- to low-level domestic fighters. Giving these individuals a designated and sanctioned way back into the legal fold can make an important difference, but this does not translate to the higher-level political breakthrough that some have in mind when they speak of "reconciliation." It is this latter, KABUL 00000637 003 OF 011 we suspect, that may also be more on the mind of President Karzai in this election year. ¶10. (C/NF) Begin text: (CONFIDENTIAL) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan The Independent Director of Local Governance (IDLG) Governor-Led Reconciliation Program First Draft 15 January 2009 ¶I. Project Summary Background -------------- Recent years have seen the rolling out of a number of security reform initiatives, including Focused District Development, Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups and DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-Integration). However, despite some successes with these programs, the security situation in the Afghan provinces has been steadily deteriorating in the last few years. For example, more than 200 districts are under insurgency, and many are effective no-go areas for the government. The majority of the districts in key provinces adjacent to Kabul such as Logar and Wardak are now under actual or de factor Taliban control, and the number of attacks against government and ISAF troops has more than doubled in the last year alone. IDLG was created by means of Presidential Decree in May 2007 to make a difference to people's lives by improving governance at subnational level and improving subnational service delivery. IDLG's primary means of achieving this objective is through working with and strengthening the subnational governance institutions under its authority, including the offices of the Provincial Governors, the offices of the District Governors and the municipalities, and by institutionalizing planning and budgeting. Since May 2008, ILDH has been leading an inter-governmental effort to develop a new Subnational Governance policy. This policy is intended to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the different subnational governance institutions and lay out a road map for the development of subnational governance in Afghanistan over the new 5 years. The policy, now in a late draft and before a cabinet-level review committee, re-affirms the role of the Provincial Governor in planning and coordinating the delivery of services to people through the provincial line departments and other state institutions present at subnational level, and re-affirms the fundamental responsibility of the Provincial Governor to foster peace and stability in the Province. This program proposes to support ongoing security initiatives by giving the Provincial Governors the lead in the process of reconciliation between the state and illegal armed groups acting in the provinces and districts. The program will also focus the subnational service delivery system on supporting the reconciliation process, by providing re-integration services to demobilized members of armed groups, and rehabilitation of damaged communities. By combining these elements under the leadership of the governor, the program will foster a reconciliation process which is consistent with the ILDG's mandate and the draft policy for subnational governance in Afghanistan. Program objectives and outcomes -------------- The objectives of this program are To foster reconciliation at the provincial level and thereby -- Improve security and stability in the provinces -- Reduce insurgent and anti-government activity -- Help individuals and communities damaged as a result of violence done by anti-government armed groups to recover To restore the ability of customary governance structures to engage in the process of reconciliation thereby -- Using social capital and traditional authority in the provinces to dissolve anti-government elements -- Applying customary/tribal justice to the reconciliation process To build the capacity of the Provincial Government to promote KABUL 00000637 004 OF 011 peace and foster reconciliation by -- Developing the capacity of the Provincial Governor to address reconciliation issues -- Building systems in the Office of the Provincial Governor to facilitate governance of peace and stability-related programs -- Focusing provincial-level service-delivery systems on the planning and implementation of activities necessary for reconciliation The outcomes of this program will be that The state and non-state groups are reconciled, and -- The provinces are more secure and sable -- Insurgent and anti-government activity is reduced -- Communities damaged by violence are at least partially rehabilitated Customary governance structures are able to engage in reconciliation, and -- Social capital and traditional authority are powerful forces binding local people to the state -- Justice is seen to have been done in the reconciliation process as a result of customary justice having been dispensed The Provincial Governments actively promote peace and foster reconciliation in virtue of -- The Provincial Governors personally having the capacity to engage in this issue -- Systems to support reconciliation existing in the Office of the Provincial Governor -- The Provincial service-delivery system delivering service needed by the reconciliation process Project Design -------------- The project's design is based on the following elements Provincial Governor Leadership. In each province, the program will be under the leadership of the Provincial Governor. The Governor will play the critical role in directing all of the elements of the program, by coordinating with provincial security forces, convening the &reconciliation Shura8 (see below) and by ensuring that the subnational service delivery system provides re-integration support and rehabilitation for victims. Critical role of province-level Shura. A provincial-level &Reconciliation Shura,8 convened by the Governor and including the major tribal and religious leaders of each district, will play a critical role in several components of the program. The Shura will use its own connections to open negotiations with militia members, and will be responsible for carrying them out. In addition to securing an agreement to de-mobilize, the Shura's negotiation process will generate the link to justice in the program, and contribute to the rehabilitation of victims. Community engagement. Effected communities will be asked to assent to the initiation of the process and will be given the opportunity to nominate civil society groups that can represent them. This will make the process consistent with the Afghan customary adaptation of Islamic approaches to reconciliation, in which the victim may initiate the process by asking an arbitrator to settle their grievance for them. Use of customary justice. The Shuras will be expected to apply lenient but clear customary justice to the surrendering militia. After receiving a full account of the crimes of the surrendering individuals, and a sincere acceptance of guilt and remorsefulness, the Shura will censure the individuals. The combination of account, remorse, apology and censure will constitute a kind of justice that local people will recognize and understand, and therefore will combat the tendency to see the reconciliation program as a type of amnesty. (This process should have some limit such that the most serious crimes should be treated only by the formal justice system.) Re-integration support for demobilized militia. The program will provide re-integration support for surrendering militia members including short-term cash support, assistance with developing an alternative livelihood, and social assistance. Rehabilitation for damaged communities. The program will provide rehabilitation to communities that have been badly damaged by the violence of militia members that have surrendered. This will include recognition of the damage done, creation of the perception that justice has been done and a program of integrated community development. Damaged KABUL 00000637 005 OF 011 communities will also be offered to express their forgiveness for the damage done to them. Development through subnational service delivery system. The program will harness the subnational governance system to deliver the services needed for reconciliation, especially re-integration and rehabilitation. In this program, the governor will coordinate the development and delivery of these services by relevant provincial line departments, and supervise their implementation. The program will therefore deliver stability and reconciliation through the combined use of traditional governance structures and the formal governance structures that IDLG is committed to strengthening. The structure of the process will also be consistent with traditional and Islamic approaches to reconciliation and grievance resolution. II. Project Activities Community-Driven Justice and Reconciliation -------------- The first step in each province will be the establishment of the &Reconciliation Shura.8 This will then launch the reconciliation process. This will then produce critical outputs into the reconciliation process. These activities are described further in the following paragraphs. The members of the reconciliation Shura should be - Key religious leaders from each district - Key tribal leaders from each district - The District Governors - The members of the Provincial Council - Members of civil society groups that represent victims (e.g., Internally Displaced Persons),and if possible representatives of victims not yet organized into Civil Society Groups. To the maximum possible extent, the religious and tribal leader members should be the participants of the Shuras that are organized by the Governor-led pre-planting campaign, as these individuals have already signaled their willingness to work with the government and support the rule of law. Members of existing Shuras, such as the district-level tribal Shuras, or the Shuras organized by the Afghanistan Social Outreach Program may also be included. The general objective is to avoid needless multiplication of the number of Shuras in the province. For the formation of the Shura, the activities will be as follows: - Community Mobilization. Communities in the areas effected by violence will be asked to assent to the process and, if any exist, select members of a civil society organization to represent victims in the Shura. This will be managed by the District Governors and the maliks/arbibs, or the village councils/CDCs - Identification of members. The Provincial Governor will identify the members of the Shura, and invite them to convene. The members may include members of Shuras convened by the Governors for other purposes. The final list of invited Shura members should include all of the most influential local people in the province. - Orientation. An initial meeting of the Shura will be convened to explain the reconciliation process to the members. The rationale and structure of the overall process should be explained, and the role of the Shura within it. After the program has reached phase II (See below),it will be possible to allow selected Shura members to meet Shura members from other provinces to learn from their experiences. Members of the reconciliation Shuras will received an allowance for travel, accommodation, food and a telephone card, and also a small personal gift from the provincial governor. There will be no payment for their services. Each Shura will be allowed and encouraged to develop their own process for dealing with the militia members, provided it delivers the essential outputs listed below. An example or guideline process will be supplied to them, however, which they will be free to follow or adapt. The guideline process will be as follows: - Contact and initiation. The members of the Shura will use their personal contacts and networks to bring members of KABUL 00000637 006 OF 011 armed groups to the Shura, preferably in groups (so that they can be dealt with at the same time). The Shura and the provincial governor will guarantee their security so that they can participate without fear of arrest. - Agreement in principle. Those before the Shura agree that they would be willing, in principle, to disarm and receive customary justice for their actions, and that thereafter they would be assisted in establishing new livelihoods. This allows the Shura to move on to the specifics of the case. - Narrative and statement of remorse. Those before the Shura must provide a full account of their activities as part of the militia. Those disbanding must make a sincere apology and express remorse for their actions as condition of the process being completed. - Presentation of evidence of disarming. The individual before the Shura should present the evidence of their registration at a local MOI (Ministry of Interior) disarmament center, and surrender of their weapons. - Determination of outcome. On the basis of the apology and expression of remorse and the account of activities, the Shura must officially recognize the wrong-doing of the disarming militia with a statement of censure. In so doing, the Shura is considered to have applied customary justice. As mentioned above, the Shura should be free to adjust or modify process provided critical outputs are delivered. The critical outputs of the process should be - Individuals referred to disarmament and re-integration program. The process must be such that upon that prior to completion of the Shura process, the participating individuals have been referred to a MOI facility to be registered and to surrender their weapons and ammunition. - Report of application of customary justice. The structure of the process must be such that some kind of justice is seen to be done. The process should include a consideration of evidence and a passing of judgment and this process must be presented as the process of justice itself. - Narrative of wrong-doing. Those before the Shura must provide a full account of their activities so that the Provincial Reintegration and Rehabilitation Committee can identify victim communities, and so that the state can officially recognize their suffering. As mentioned above, the scope and level of crimes that can be addressed through this justice system will be carefully defined, such that the most serious offenders are excluded form this process and can (be) dealt with through the formal justice system. IDLG will work with partners to identify how the legal basis for this can be established, and will also determine if there is need for a Presidential Decree empowering the Shuras to waive the claim of the formal justice system to prosecute those who have been through the customary justice system. Disarmament and Demobilization -------------- As mentioned above, prior to completion of the Shura process, the disarming groups will be referred to a MOI facility to disarm. - Registration. The individuals should travel to a MOI center for disarmament and, upon presenting proof of completion of the Shura process, register there. - Handing over of weapons. Upon registration, the individuals should surrender their weapons and ammunition. - Participating in regular monitoring/follow-up. The participants in the program will be monitored by the MOI facility to ensure that they have not returned to arms. Re-integration and Alternative Livelihoods for Militia Members -------------- Militia members who have completed the surrender process and been subjected to customary justice then receive three types of support. - Re-integration payment. Individuals will receive a small cash stipend of $50-$75 per month for a period of six months, KABUL 00000637 007 OF 011 to enable a transition to a new livelihood system. - Social support. Individuals will receive assistance in adapting to life outside an armed group, such as counseling or mediation with community members. - Alternative Livelihood support. Individuals may select one alternative livelihood program such as - Return to formal education system. For younger candidates, it will be possible to allow them to return to the schooling system. Some scholarship or stipend will be provided to cover the costs associated with this, such as travel or school books. - Vocational training. In this program, participants should receive a set of training in some livelihood system that is appropriate for the economic environment in the province, i.e., carpentry or tailoring. Upon completion of the training, the person should receive a basic set of tools in order to allow them to practice their trade. - Employment skills training. For more entrepreneurial individuals, training in skills such as business planning, banking or marketing can be provided. This will assist the individual who already has relevant skills to establish an enterprise. - Employment assistance. A subsidy may be paid to a local employer to reduce the cost of hiring individuals in the program. This will be for a finite period of time and would be gradually phased out. - Integrated rural development. When a large number of individuals form the same rural area disarm, they will have the option of a small rural development project being conducted in their areas, including, for example, introduction of improved crop varieties, development of an agricultural cooperative and improvement of the local secondary road. As discussed below, all of these activities should be implemented by the Line Ministry that has the appropriate mandate. These ministries will comprise the ministries that provide education and vocational training services (the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs) and the ministries responsible for rural development (the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development). The role of the Provincial Governor is to lead the planning of these services, and to monitor their implementation. The program will include a mechanism to adapt and refine the content of the re-integration program to the particular circumstances and types of groups being disarmed. The objective of this adaptation will be to ensure that the Shura process, package of re-integration and rehabilitation packages provides the right balance between justice, incentives for the aggressor and rehabilitation for the victim in every situation. Rehabilitation of Damaged Communities -------------- The program will identify communities that have experiences a high degree of damage done by individuals demobilizing within the province. The communities will be targeted for an integrated set of activities to help to rehabilitate them, including - Information program. An information program will be conducted, explaining the necessity of reconciliation, while also highlighting the fact that the government recognized the harm done to them, and that the perpetrators have been subject to customary justice. - Forgiveness. Damaged communities will have the opportunity to express forgiveness for the damage done to them in a formal statement or formal ceremony. This will give the communities the opportunity to feel that reconciliation is something that they themselves can contribute to, and not just a process in which they are passive recipients. This process may help communities to engage in current and future activities and events, and focus less on their grievances, which will directly contribute to reconciliation. - Livelihood improvement. A set of rural development KABUL 00000637 008 OF 011 activities will be implemented to improve the economic status of the affected community, for example improving road access or water-resources. It should include infrastructure, public good provision and improvement of economic opportunities. - Community Development. Additional activities will be implemented to strengthen the community, for example by building or strengthening the local Agricultural Cooperative or establishing other self-help groups. These activities should involve a high level of participation in design, implementation and monitoring, and should cover as large a section of the community as possible. As with the re-integration activities, these will be implemented by the appropriate line ministries, i.e., the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. III. Program Management Management Structure -------------- The elements of the management structure will be - National-level Steering Committee. This will include IDLG, MOI, MOD, the Ministries responsible for reintegration and rehabilitation programs, and any donor or major implementing agencies. This committee will monitor the performance of the program against targets, ensure corrective actions are taken when targets are missed, and ensure that resources are delivered to activities as planned. - Office of Provincial Governor. As mentioned above, the provincial governor is the critical link between the line ministries, the Shuras and the national steering committee. The governor will be supported by a team within his/her Sectoral Technical Services division who will liaise between the governor an the line ministries and produce an integrated provincial report based on the activities of all participants. This team will include the office of - Security and Judicial Sector - District Affairs - Socio-Cultural Development -Reconstruction and Development - Economic and Development - Provincial Security Committee. This committee will supervise the Shura and demobilization process. - Provincial Reintegration and Rehabilitation Committee. This committee will supervise the re-integration, livelihood and rehabilitation activities. The committee will identify the needs in this area, ensure that the appropriate line ministry plans, budgets and implements programs to address these needs, supervises the activities and produces an integrated report of them. In later stages of the program, the committee will ensure that all activities are submitted to the provincial budget, as described in the draft policy on subnational governance. - Provincial Reconciliation Shura. As described above, the Provincial Reconciliation Shura makes contact with antigovernment element, negotiates disarmament and applies customary justice, before referring disarming fighters into the rest of the system. - Security-related Line Ministries. These ministries, primarily MOI and MOD, implement the disarmament and demobilization activities. - Development-Related Line Ministries. These ministries implement the re-integration/Alternative Livelihoods program, and the rehabilitation programs for damaged communities. The overall organizational structure is described in the chart above. (not included in this message) Implementation Modality -------------- The implementation modality will avoid the creation of parallel structures and not include mechanisms that prevent the government agencies from developing their own implementation capacity. The elements of the program will be implemented as follows: KABUL 00000637 009 OF 011 - Planning and monitoring activities. These activities can be implemented directly by the provincial administration and by national organizations using existing resources (operating budget). There is no need for specific implementation modality. - Shura process. The Shura process should be organized by the office of the Provincial Governor (PGO). Cash and materials needed for the Shura can be delivered through PGO procurement, with support from IDLG in the case of any items beyond the procurement threshold for the PGO. - Security activities. The security activities should be directly implemented by MOI and MOD, and should be financed by earmarked transfers to MOF. - Rehabilitation and re-integration. As discussed above, the line ministries should have the responsibility for implementing these programs. Initially, this may be done with an implementation partner but this should transition to direct ministry implementation by year two of the initiative. The planning, budgeting and implementation of rehabilitation and integration activities will be made consistent with the approach to subnational planning and finance prescribed by the draft subnational governance policy. To the maximum possible extent, the participating line ministries will be supported to include these activities in their annual plans and budgets, and these plans and budgets approved by the Provincial Governor and Provincial Council prior to be disaggregated and submitted to the parent ministries in Kabul. In order to achieve this, the implementing partners will be expected to include a capacity-building component for their partner ministry so that they can plan, budget and implement the activity themselves. Capacity Building -------------- The following Capacity-Building activities will be needed - Provincial Governor. The Provincial Governor should be given training in reconciliation, DDR programs (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) and peace building and should be helped to understand the role of the Provincial Governor in these processes. - Provincial Governor's Office. Some or all of the key positions in the PGO may be vacant, and so will need to be recruited. Once all positions are filled, the staff should be trained in reconciliation, DDR and peace-building, and receive special coaching for their role in the program. The staff will be assisted in the development of working systems and procedures for discharging their particular responsibilities, and may also receive some additional training in project management, reporting, M and E, etc. Some office equipment may also be needed. - Reconciliation Shura. The Shuras will need orientation and should also be given opportunities for learning exchanges with other Shuras. The Shuras should also be assisted in the process of reviewing their own performance, identifying weaknesses, implementing solutions, and so on. - Security Ministries. The Capacity of the security ministries to operate the disarmament centers and to monitor demobilized armed group members needs to be built. It may be appropriate for a partner agency to hire staff for the centers, and they should provide assistance in developing operating procedures. - Development Ministries. As discussed above, the capacity of the ministries involved in re-integration and rehabilitation programs will receive capacity-building in planning, budgeting and implementing these programs. This should be provided by their implementing partners in conjunction with the actual delivery of services. Further capacity-building activities and programs may be identified at a later date. Budget Categories -------------- The Program will incur the following costs Cost Cost-Bearing Agency KABUL 00000637 010 OF 011 Travel for Provincial Gov to participate in orientation, etc. - IDLG Salaries for Sectoral Technical Services division staff - IDLG Travel for STS staff for training - IDLG Office equipment for STS staff - IDLG Salaries for Staff for Disarmament Center staff - IDLG Office and security equipment for Disarmament Centers - MOI/MOD Travel, accommodation and hospitality costs for Shura - IDLG Cost of retaining implementing partner for development - Line ministries Cost of directly-implemented line ministry programs - Line ministries More work will need to be done to develop a detailed budget, including a needs assessment for the capacity of the PGO Sectoral Technical Services division and the Disarmament Centers. Individual costs of re-integration packages and rehabilitating programs must be developed, and these combined with a need/demand forecast. This work will take place in the next rounds of planning for this program. Roll-Out Schedule -------------- Afghanistan (Provincial) Reconciliation Project (APRP) will initially focus on the provinces around Kabul where the security situation is not satisfactory, such as Maidan/Wardak, Logar and Kapisa provinces. The national coverage will be ordered into phases as follows: Phase 1: Maidan/Wardak, Logar and Kapisa Phase 2: Ghazni, Khost, Paktia and Paktika Phase 3: Helmand, Kandahar, Farah, Uruzgan Phase 4: Loghman, Kunar, Nangarhar and Nuristan Phase 5: Baghdis, Herat and Ghor Phase 6: National coverage, where and whenever situation permits If resources are available and there is implementation capacity, provinces may be brought forward to earlier phases, and the overall process may be shortened. Reporting and Performance Management -------------- The program will track and report the following types of information on a monthly basis: -- Impact information. Indicators of impact, measuring stability and provincial administration capacity, are the most important and high-level activities. -- Narrative of activities. An account of activities such as Shuras held and re-integration programs (partially) implemented should be given. This should include an account of problems experienced and solutions that were used. -- Indicators of activities. Indicators of activities such as the number of Shuras, number of people disarmed, number of communities supported through re-integration, and so on, should be given. -- Expenditures and disbursements. Total and per-unit expenditures and disbursements in each area, e.g., on Shuras, re-integration payments, livelihood support, etc. should be given. Each province should aggregate all provincial performance and activity data into a single provincial report, prior to submission to the national steering committee. Next Steps for Implementation -------------- This will be a major program that will take considerable effort to launch. The next steps for implementation include building stakeholder consensus, establishing the legal basis for the program, designing the re-integration and rehabilitation packages, and coordinating the program with other Security Sector activities. These are described in the following paragraphs. IDLG and key partners will build consensus around program with key stakeholders, e.g., Provincial Governors, Line Ministries involved in law enforcement or development at KABUL 00000637 011 OF 011 provincial level, other public organizations, e.g., Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and key members of international community. This may lead to the launch of a formal Program Development Steering Committee to oversee the development of the initiative. IDLG will work with national and international stakeholders to clarify the legal basis of this program. Work will be done to establish how and if the findings of the customary justice system can be recognized in law, what the limits on the Shura process are, and any other legal arrangements that might be needed (for example making the proceedings in the Shura inadmissible as evidence in the formal courts). Significant additional work must be done to plan and cost reintegration packages. For example, it will be necessary to estimate potential need/demand for reintegration and rehabilitation in each province, and to develop operational plan and costing for different reintegration and rehabilitation packages. It will also be necessary to design a flexible funding modality to allow channeling of resources to appropriate line ministries, depending on need/demand in each province. This process will require collaboration of all implementing agencies and also donors. Lastly, the program design will have to ensure consistency with other DDR and reconciliation programs ongoing at subnational level in Afghanistan, for example the Ministry of Interior Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) initiative and activities under the UNDP Afghanistan New Beginnings Program. In cases where structure and processes proposed in this document have already been created, methods for avoiding unnecessary replication and duplication should be development ) for example the national-level steering committee developed for the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups might serve as the steering committee for this initiative, assuming that IDLG joined this steering committee. Similarly, development initiatives planned and implemented under this initiative should be coordinated with those implemented by the UNDL National Area-Based Development Program. It can be expected that this alignment process will emerge as a result of further planning and mobilization of other stakeholders. End Text. WOOD