NURISTAN: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON GOVERNANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000609 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID AF SUBJECT: NURISTAN: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON GOVERNANCE REF: 08 KABUL 1373 Classified By: PRT and Sub-National Governance Director Valerie C. Fowl er for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Governor Jamaluddin Badr, who took office in late November, is beginning to assert his presence in Nuristan and implement personnel changes. His efforts to date are generally being met with optimism. However, most provincial officials continue to live and work outside of Nuristan and are only minimally effective. Logistical and security issues hindered voter registration, with only 14,620 Nuristanis registered, 17 percent of the 2004 numbers and well below the 38 percent national average. Popular support for the central government remains strong despite a perceived lack of support and attention from Kabul. There is little support for the Taliban or their agenda, but they are often tolerated or even supported as a result of fear or intimidation. THIRD TIME IS THE CHARM -------------- ¶2. (C) Jamaluddin Badr was appointed governor in late November 2008 after six months of leadership turmoil. Governor Tamim was dismissed in July 2008, and his replacement, Hazrat-Din, was killed on September 5 when his vehicle veered into a ravine. Badr has begun to assert himself as a leader, and he intends to oversee personnel changes, which began with the recent selection of a Mandol district administrator. While Deputy Governor Abdul Marmur Halim remains an important tribal figure, he does not overtly participate in administrative or political issues, and does not have Badr,s trust. The governor describes most of the line ministerial line directors as incompetent and/or dishonest. They are rarely present in the province, preferring to reside and work in Jalalabad or Kabul due to the isolation of the capital city of Parun, the lack of decent housing, and the arduous, expensive, and insecure travel to Parun. At the governor,s request, the U.S. military will employ six advisors in the governor,s office for a one-year period. DISTRICT GOVERNORS ON THE FRONT LINES -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The long absence of a governor put additional pressure on district administrators to be the face of GIRoA during the past six months, but their activities were limited by resources, corruption, and even complicity with insurgents. Governor Badr is pursuing a replacement for Waygal District Administrator Ziaul Rahman, who remains in place despite being implicated by a classified U.S. military investigation for colluding with the enemy in the July 2008 attack in Wanat that killed nine U.S. soldiers. Nurgram, Barg-e Matal, and Doab district administrators were the most active, but were limited by the fact they had only one or two substantive staff members despite at least a dozen on each payroll. District shuras in Barg-e Matal and Doab met regularly and contributed significantly to local stability. Mandol,s new district administrator, Abdul Qadir, follows a predecessor who was not resident in Mandol and left no institutional framework in place. The Kamdesh district administrator, Anayatullah, remains in office but his influence is decreasing, particularly with the 100-man shura. Wama district administrator, Din Mohammed, plays a limited role in district government, depending heavily on local elders to govern the area. ¶4. (C) An ally of the governor, Taj Mohammed, was appointed head of the Provincial Council (PC) in mid-February, and their close relationship is expected to result in greater control of the PC by Badr. The Council reportedly met only twice in 2008, both times in Jalalabad. The female members of the Council could not attend, citing security concerns. LOGISTICS AND SECURITY UNDERMINE VOTER REGISTRATION -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The Independent Election Commission (IEC) conducted voter registration in Nuristan in October during Phase One. There were some delays in the process due to poor logistics planning and some security issues (elections materials were burned en route, and the provincial elections officer was briefly kidnapped). Mobile teams reached many remote villages, and a two-week extension of the process allowed the IEC to make up for lost time. Despite the extension, only 14,620 Nuristanis registered, 17 percent of the 2004 numbers and well below the 38 percent national average of 2004 numbers. Elections officials are currently outlining plans KABUL 00000609 002 OF 002 for upcoming elections and appear to be incorporating lessons learned from VR. GOVERNMENT REMAINS POPULAR -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Despite a lack of significant government activity and a perceived lack of attention from Kabul during the past eight months, there is still popular support for the government, and a great deal of disdain for the opposition. When asked, most Nuristanis profess their indifference or outright hostility to the Taliban and their agenda. Yet, even in this context, in many parts of Nuristan, the opposition is tolerated and even supported. This appears driven more by fear based on intimidation or material considerations than by conviction. ¶7. (U) For more information on Nuristan, please visit Nuristan on intellipedia at: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Nuristan Province. WOOD