PAKTIKA PROVINCE: SECURITY CHALLENGES HINDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000528 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA NSC FOR WOOD OSD FOR WILKES CG CJTF-101 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF SUBJECT: PAKTIKA PROVINCE: SECURITY CHALLENGES HINDER GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT REF: KABUL 525 Classified By: PRT-SNG Director Valerie C. Fowler 1.4 (a),(b),and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Security worsened in the second half of 2008 in Afghanistan's Paktika province, affecting governance, development, and the work of the PRT. The PRT faced increasing limitations in its mobility and ability to reach the people. PRT construction projects saw cost increases, delays, and oversight difficulties. While Paktika,s security situation improved as 2008 ended, and the PRT has important development projects planned for 2009, increased focus on strengthening ANSF throughout the province will be needed if conditions for governance and development are to improve significantly. Relatively successful voter registration in December supports our view that, despite these difficulties, the people of Paktika desire responsible and accountable governance from GIRoA, as well as the benefits of development that the international community and an effective GIRoA can bring. Security Deteriorated as CF Presence Decreased -------------- - ¶2. (C) The security situation in Paktika deteriorated sharply in the summer and fall of 2008. Taliban forces took control of Paktika's Dila district, and GIRoA representatives abandoned Omna district center in November and the unofficial Charbaran district center in September. Taliban presence increased in and around the provincial capital Sharana and neighboring Mata Khan district, while Naka district and portions of Ziruk and Gayan districts remained enemy safe havens. Gomal district remained a transit zone for enemy forces moving from Pakistan to the interior areas of Regional Command East as well as Regional Command South. In several other districts (Bakhi Khel, Yaya Khel, Yusuf Khel, and Shakhilabad) GIRoA presence was challenged. In much of the province, increasing attacks against road traffic affected transport and communication between population centers. ¶3. (C) Security challenges increased in Paktika in line with the surge in enemy activity throughout Afghanistan's south and southeast. An additional factor was the redeployment of the Polish Battle Group from Paktika to Ghazni province, which created a temporary reduction of Coalition Forces in the western half of Paktika, including along the largest stretch of the southern border with Pakistan. This situation improved as the 1/506th battalion assumed the western Paktika battlespace and conducted regular operations to disrupt enemy activity, particularly during voter registration in December and into January 2009. CF strategic devotion of resources to the "Zadran arc" and Khost-Gardez road area, while benefiting some of Paktika's northeastern districts, reduced assets available for security in the remainder of the province. Isolation Presented Challenges to Governance -------------- ¶4. (C) The general lack of infrastructure combined with the poor security situation to keep Paktika isolated and to hinder effective coordination between the central government and the province. While security improved on the Sharana-Ghazni road ("MSR Florida," Sharana's connection to Route 1) after the arrival of 1/506, provincial officials continued to feel unsafe traveling to Kabul by road and often sought the use of ANA aircraft or USAID Air arranged by PRT. Central government officials and members of parliament rarely visited the province. To encourage MPs to communicate with their constituencies, PRT may propose in 2009 a repeat of its successful May 2008 effort to bring MPs to the province to meet the people. ¶5. (C) Provincial and district officials identified the lack of security as a primary cause of the continuing gap between the government and the people. The few members of the provincial council who actively attempted to perform their jobs could rarely visit their home districts, and officials from many districts could not easily reach the provincial capital. Similarly, ministry line directors had difficulty reaching districts beyond those surrounding Sharana, and many district-level line ministry positions remained vacant throughout the province. As a result, many people continued to believe that the provincial government showed little KABUL 00000528 002 OF 004 interest in their problems and could not deliver services to the districts. To mitigate this problem, PRT facilitated travel of line directors and provincial officials to the districts when possible. Sharana remained an unattractive location for government work, and most line directors had few competent substantive staff. The provincial line directors continued to live in their offices within the government compound or nearby and maintain their families in Kabul or other cities outside Paktika. The PRT plans to construct residential housing for government workers to alleviate this problem over time, but recruitment will remain difficult for the foreseeable future. Lack of NGOs and Security Problems Impede Humanitarian Efforts -------------- -------------- ¶6. (U) The PRT remained the single major actor in reconstruction and development efforts in Paktika. The UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) was absent from the province, although then-Governor Khpalwak continued to encourage it to establish a presence. UNAMA officials from Gardez made a few visits but did not venture beyond the Governor's compound and FOB Sharana. UNAMA representatives visiting in February 2009 told PRT they intended to make more visits to Sharana and would consider establishing a presence in 2010. Following the UN's lead, most NGOs stayed away from Paktika. Only three NGOs were active in the province at the end of 2008: the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan and the International Medical Corps, which operate health clinics; and BRAC, a Bangladeshi organization that implements community development projects under the National Solidarity Program. ¶7. (SBU) Although the World Food Program operated food-for-work and food-for-school programs in Paktika in 2008, insecurity impeded delivery of food to the intended recipients. Paktika residents in some 13 districts earned a total of 1,800 tons of food in the food-for-work program through cleaning irrigation canals and an additional 700 tons through the food-for-school program in 2008. But WFP was unable to deliver any of this food to the province in 2008. In February 2009, 1011 tons of the food-for-work supplies reached Sharana, and the PRT has been attending provincial disaster management committee meetings to create a plan for moving the food onward to the recipients. Delivery of supplies to the districts is complicated by lack of paved roads (only 50-60 kilometers of paved road exist),the unwillingness of truckers to transport goods without security escorts, and the high security premium truckers add to their normal rates. Enemy Activity Limits PRT's Reach and Mobility -------------- - ¶8. (C) The increased number of attacks on Coalition Forces and other acts of violence created new challenges to the PRT in carrying out its work. In 2005 and 2006, PRT convoys traveled freely over roads throughout the province to meet with district and tribal leaders, monitor projects, and assess developments frequently. The PRT's freedom of movement began to decline in 2007 and became more limited in 2008, especially following two attacks resulting in deaths and significant injuries. At present, the PRT rarely travels by road outside of Sharana because of the increased IED threat on established routes. More distant ground trips require the use of a route clearing package (RCP),reducing traveling speeds and making ground travel to much of the province impracticable. PRT increasingly relies on Army aviation assets to reach more distant areas of the province. However, competition for these aviation assets is also increasing, making military air an unsupportable long-term solution for meeting PRT objectives of moving around the province. ¶9. (C) These circumstances also restrict the PRT's ability to conduct grassroots engagement. Although members of the PRT continued to walk through bazaars and talk with the people where possible, the need to complete missions rapidly sometimes limited engagements outside Sharana to the district shura setting, with little opportunity for more private or focused contact work. There was usually little flexibility to meet immediate requests of locals to visit points outside district centers, although the PRT arranged follow-up missions where possible. Operational security requirements posed an additional dilemma: as the PRT could not inform district leaders in advance of its travel plans, finding key KABUL 00000528 003 OF 004 leaders present in their districts was often "hit or miss." Costs and Timelines for Construction Increase -------------- ¶10. (C) The increased enemy activity in Paktika affected the cost and timeliness of PRT construction projects in the summer and fall of 2008. Coalition Forces saw construction costs rise owing in part to contractors' difficulties in transporting materials into the province. Bid prices for a standard eight-room school rose from a 2007 average of $168,000 to a 2008 average of about $200,000. Many contractors no longer bid on projects located away from the major population centers of Sharana, Orgun, and Khair Kot city, reportedly because of fear of repercussion from cooperation with Coalition Forces. This resulted in a reduction of the competition in bidding that would otherwise help to control prices. Construction timelines suffered a similar inflation. Most contractors were not local to Paktika and needed to make frequent trips between Kabul and Sharana; however, contractors were often unwilling to travel the Ghazni-Sharana road. As a result, PRT engineers were sometimes unable to conduct regular meetings with contractors, meaning project schedules were delayed by an average of 25 percent. For larger projects, such as roads, the security situation brought progress in some areas to a halt. Voter Registration Relatively Successful -------------- ¶11. (C) Voter registration for the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections began in Paktika on December 13 and ended January 12, 2009. A total of 92,891 residents (47,684 men and 45,207 women) registered. Registration proceeded without any major incidents of violence or widespread irregularities. Two district field coordinators were kidnapped (they have since been released),and one resigned his post under Taliban threat. Registration in Gayan district was delayed by three weeks and began only after PRT facilitated a visit by Governor Khpalwak and the Provincial Election Official (PEO) to the district to prevail upon the district leaders to open the registration center. In the three months leading up to registration, the PEO reported Taliban threats to his family in Bermel district, but no attacks against him or his family occurred. In support of voter registration, PRT facilitated travel of the PEO and provincial council members to districts they could not reach independently, spoke to district shuras about voter registration during its missions, organized a U.S. election day event that offered provincial leaders an opportunity to speak to tribal leaders from around the province about voter registration, and conveyed information from the IEC to the PEO. Outlook and Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Paktika is sometimes called the most "left behind" province of Afghanistan. The exceedingly low level of education (the Ministry for Rural Reconstruction and Development's official literacy rates are 4 percent for males and 0 percent for females, although PRT believes it is higher),combined with lack of transportation and communication infrastructure, limits public awareness and civic engagement. Traditional tribal structures, however, remain a very real means of societal cohesion and decision-making at the local level. Still, security stands as the largest single factor that we can address to extend the reach of government and create the conditions for more widespread economic development. Significant measures to improve security for all of Paktika province are a necessary step in a two-way process of extending governmental influence and eliciting loyalty of the tribes and the people, especially along Paktika's approximately 400 kilometer stretch of Afghanistan's border with Pakistan. A greater effort to train, deploy, and continue to oversee and monitor more ANSF throughout the province will be needed if conditions for governance, development, and engagement by the international community are to improve. Continued tribal engagement will be necessary to elicit the support of the people for all these objectives, but without additional efforts to ensure the people's safety, such engagement may be viewed as an empty gesture. Nascent Pakistani military border cooperation, which is showing positive effects in Paktika, should continue. KABUL 00000528 004 OF 004 DELL