NANGARHAR GOVERNOR SHERZAI'S SOFT PURGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000514

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF
SUBJECT: NANGARHAR GOVERNOR SHERZAI'S SOFT PURGE

Classified By: PRT Director Valerie C. Fowler for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)

Summary
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1. (C) Summary: Nangarhar Governor Sherzai has proposed
leadership changes in eight of the province's 21 districts.
Although the Independent Directorate for Local Governance
(IDLG) is legally charged with selecting district
administrators, Sherzai has a history of making unilateral
decisions on district leadership and informing IDLG after the
fact. Such wide-ranging district leadership changes have
been common for Sherzai since he became Nangarhar governor in

2005. Most district administrators in Nangarhar are
prominent tribal figures or former Mujahedeen with whom
Sherzai has developed a political relationship. The latest
round of changes came after concerns over a series of recent
security-related incidents in Chaparhar district.

The Sherzai Shuffle
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2. (U) Nangarhar Governor Gul Agha Sherzai has proposed
leadership changes in eight of the province's 21 districts,
shifting seven currently-serving district administrators to
new areas and adding one new district leader. The proposed
leadership changes are currently awaiting approval at the
national level by IDLG. Nangarhar Provincial Chief Executive
Director for IDLG, Mohammad Hanif Gardweal, told us he
expected the proposed changes to be approved.


3. (C) Although IDLG is legally charged with selecting
district administrators, Sherzai has a history of making
unilateral decisions on district leadership and informing
IDLG after the fact. "Governor Sherzai is politically very
strong and does not listen to IDLG," Mohammad Hanif declared.
In the past, IDLG has always approved Sherzai's nominations
for district leadership, Mohammad Hanif said. Sherzai, a
rotund former militia commander from Kandahar nicknamed "the
bulldozer," has instructed all eight district administrators
to begin work immediately in their new districts without
waiting for approval from IDLG.


4. (U) Such wide-ranging district leadership changes have
been common since Sherzai became Nangarhar governor in 2005.
He regularly shifts district administrators around within the
province, but rarely fires them outright. Some district
administrators have served in as many as seven districts.
Many see it as a way for Sherzai to flex his political
muscle, sending a message to district administrators that he
has the power to decide their political fate, while at the
same time forcing them to be loyal to him. He often shifts
administrators who he believes are performing poorly.
Sherzai has told the PRT on a number of occasions that he,
not IDLG, will decide who manages districts in Nangarhar.


5. (C) Most district administrators in Nangarhar are
prominent tribal figures with whom Sherzai has developed a
political relationship. Many are former Mujahedeen
commanders who rose to prominence during the Soviet
occupation. While some have turned in a decent performance
as district administrators, others have done poorly,
exhibiting a lack of administrative skills. Many owe their
positions to family and/or tribal connections, as well as
their relationship with Sherzai. Accusations are common that
many district administrators pay Sherzai to retain their
position.

The "Wrestler"
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6. (C) The latest round of changes came after Sherzai
criticized then-Chaparhar District Administrator Sayed
Mohammad for not cooperating closely with the district police
chief, combined with concerns over a series of recent
security-related incidents in the district. Sayed Mohammad,
a burly former Mujahedeen commander nicknamed "the wrestler"
who boasts about how he used to kill Soviet prisoners and
Afghan collaborators, was moved to the mountainous Nazyan
district on the border with Pakistan. This prompted a series
of shifts, with district administrators negotiating with
Sherzai to retain their district or upgrade to a more
prosperous one.


7. (U) Former Dur Baba District Administrator Isa Khan Zwak
was moved to Goshta, replacing a district leader who was

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assassinated in a roadside bomb February 7. Hassan Khan, who
had been Kot's district administrator, was shifted to
Chaparhar. Azizullah Shinwari moved from Nazyan to Kuz
Kunar. Abdul Latif, whom Sherzai had reportedly planned to
fire for allegedly trading land titles for cash, moved from
the lucrative Behsood district, which includes Jalalabad, to
the border district of Shirzad. Former Shirzad District
Administrator Abdul Haq moved to Kot. Shukrullah Durani left
Kuz Kunar for Behsood. The only new district administrator
named by Sherzai was 30-year-old Haji Abdul Qayum, son of the
slain Goshta district administrator. Haji Abdul is a
Jalalabad businessman and influential Shinwari tribal leader,
whose formal education does not go beyond high school. His
appointment as administrator for Dur Baba shows the
importance Sherzai places on tribal and family alliances.

Comment
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8. (C) Governor Sherzai has in the past been able to get
away with making unilateral decisions on district leaders
without consulting IDLG because of his close relationship
with President Karzai. However, Sherzai's recent public
statements that he might challenge Karzai in upcoming
presidential elections could affect that relationship. This,
in turn, could eventually affect his ability to roll the IDLG
at will. Sherzai governs like a traditional Pashtun leader,
utilizing personal relationships and alliances rather than
relying on governmental institutions like IDLG. His ability
to hire, fire or transfer district administrators ensures
that they obey him. In some ways, this has made him an
effective governor. In 2007 and 2008, he cajoled district
leaders into promises that they would prevent poppy
cultivation in their districts. However, this style also
hampers the long-term prospects for building governmental
institutions in Nangarhar. End Comment.


9. (U) This message has been reviewed by the Brigade Deputy
Commander and the State Department Regional Advisor.
DELL