NANGARHAR GOVERNOR SHERZAI'S SOFT PURGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000514 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA NSC FOR WOOD OSD FOR WILKES CG CJTF-101 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF SUBJECT: NANGARHAR GOVERNOR SHERZAI'S SOFT PURGE Classified By: PRT Director Valerie C. Fowler for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Summary: Nangarhar Governor Sherzai has proposed leadership changes in eight of the province's 21 districts. Although the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) is legally charged with selecting district administrators, Sherzai has a history of making unilateral decisions on district leadership and informing IDLG after the fact. Such wide-ranging district leadership changes have been common for Sherzai since he became Nangarhar governor in ¶2005. Most district administrators in Nangarhar are prominent tribal figures or former Mujahedeen with whom Sherzai has developed a political relationship. The latest round of changes came after concerns over a series of recent security-related incidents in Chaparhar district. The Sherzai Shuffle -------------- ¶2. (U) Nangarhar Governor Gul Agha Sherzai has proposed leadership changes in eight of the province's 21 districts, shifting seven currently-serving district administrators to new areas and adding one new district leader. The proposed leadership changes are currently awaiting approval at the national level by IDLG. Nangarhar Provincial Chief Executive Director for IDLG, Mohammad Hanif Gardweal, told us he expected the proposed changes to be approved. ¶3. (C) Although IDLG is legally charged with selecting district administrators, Sherzai has a history of making unilateral decisions on district leadership and informing IDLG after the fact. "Governor Sherzai is politically very strong and does not listen to IDLG," Mohammad Hanif declared. In the past, IDLG has always approved Sherzai's nominations for district leadership, Mohammad Hanif said. Sherzai, a rotund former militia commander from Kandahar nicknamed "the bulldozer," has instructed all eight district administrators to begin work immediately in their new districts without waiting for approval from IDLG. ¶4. (U) Such wide-ranging district leadership changes have been common since Sherzai became Nangarhar governor in 2005. He regularly shifts district administrators around within the province, but rarely fires them outright. Some district 
administrators have served in as many as seven districts. Many see it as a way for Sherzai to flex his political muscle, sending a message to district administrators that he has the power to decide their political fate, while at the same time forcing them to be loyal to him. He often shifts administrators who he believes are performing poorly. Sherzai has told the PRT on a number of occasions that he, not IDLG, will decide who manages districts in Nangarhar. ¶5. (C) Most district administrators in Nangarhar are prominent tribal figures with whom Sherzai has developed a political relationship. Many are former Mujahedeen commanders who rose to prominence during the Soviet occupation. While some have turned in a decent performance as district administrators, others have done poorly, exhibiting a lack of administrative skills. Many owe their positions to family and/or tribal connections, as well as their relationship with Sherzai. Accusations are common that many district administrators pay Sherzai to retain their position. The "Wrestler" -------------- ¶6. (C) The latest round of changes came after Sherzai criticized then-Chaparhar District Administrator Sayed Mohammad for not cooperating closely with the district police chief, combined with concerns over a series of recent security-related incidents in the district. Sayed Mohammad, a burly former Mujahedeen commander nicknamed "the wrestler" who boasts about how he used to kill Soviet prisoners and Afghan collaborators, was moved to the mountainous Nazyan district on the border with Pakistan. This prompted a series of shifts, with district administrators negotiating with Sherzai to retain their district or upgrade to a more prosperous one. ¶7. (U) Former Dur Baba District Administrator Isa Khan Zwak was moved to Goshta, replacing a district leader who was KABUL 00000514 002 OF 002 assassinated in a roadside bomb February 7. Hassan Khan, who had been Kot's district administrator, was shifted to Chaparhar. Azizullah Shinwari moved from Nazyan to Kuz Kunar. Abdul Latif, whom Sherzai had reportedly planned to fire for allegedly trading land titles for cash, moved from the lucrative Behsood district, which includes Jalalabad, to the border district of Shirzad. Former Shirzad District Administrator Abdul Haq moved to Kot. Shukrullah Durani left Kuz Kunar for Behsood. The only new district administrator named by Sherzai was 30-year-old Haji Abdul Qayum, son of the slain Goshta district administrator. Haji Abdul is a Jalalabad businessman and influential Shinwari tribal leader, whose formal education does not go beyond high school. His appointment as administrator for Dur Baba shows the importance Sherzai places on tribal and family alliances. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Governor Sherzai has in the past been able to get away with making unilateral decisions on district leaders without consulting IDLG because of his close relationship with President Karzai. However, Sherzai's recent public statements that he might challenge Karzai in upcoming presidential elections could affect that relationship. This, in turn, could eventually affect his ability to roll the IDLG at will. Sherzai governs like a traditional Pashtun leader, utilizing personal relationships and alliances rather than relying on governmental institutions like IDLG. His ability to hire, fire or transfer district administrators ensures that they obey him. In some ways, this has made him an effective governor. In 2007 and 2008, he cajoled district leaders into promises that they would prevent poppy cultivation in their districts. However, this style also hampers the long-term prospects for building governmental institutions in Nangarhar. End Comment. ¶9. (U) This message has been reviewed by the Brigade Deputy Commander and the State Department Regional Advisor. DELL