Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL499
2009-03-03 14:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AHADI PONDERS TERMS FOR AN
VZCZCXRO8013 PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW DE RUEHBUL #0499 0621412 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 031412Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7611 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 000499
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AHADI PONDERS TERMS FOR AN
INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Christopher Dell, Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 000499
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AHADI PONDERS TERMS FOR AN
INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Christopher Dell, Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d)
1. (C) Presidential candidate and former Finance Minister
Anwarulhaq Ahadi on March 3 told the Charge he could
reluctantly accept the President as head of an interim
government if certain changes served to check Karzai's
"abuses" of the power of incumbency. Ahadi suggested
replacements for two key Karzai re-election figures as
essential conditions for a level playing field. Jelani
Popal, head of the Independent Directorate of Local
Governance (IDLG),who manages the governors for Karzai and
also donor-funded community aid programs, must go. Abdullah,
deputy head of the intelligence service NDS, likewise is
squeezing local leaders to support Karzai and must be
removed, according to Ahadi. Ahadi was willing to consider
measures proposed by other politicians, such as a longer
campaign period or a freeze on appointments, but remained
clear that Karzai's opponents face a steep challenge to match
the President in grassroots influence and funds.
2. (C) Ahadi described in some detail his own struggle to
organize a national campaign. He acknowledged he is skating
over a serious schism in his Pashtun nationalist Afghan
Millat party, once his base of political organization.
Karzai has co-opted Popal, the party's titular number two,
Ahadi admitted, so Ahadi has decided to postpone questions of
"party discipline" until after the election. His campaign
office in Kabul is up and running and next Wednesday will
host a conference for representatives of varied ethnic,
political, and social groups, including religious, tribal,
and jihadi leaders. He is working now to set up provincial
offices despite a shortage of funds. These provincial
offices will try to gain the support of local leaders, and
Ahadi will concentrate instead on "policy." He will soon
visit major cities, starting with Mazar, Herat, Jalalabad,
and, if possible, Kandahar. Ahadi noted wryly that Afghan
players often expect to sell their support to the highest
bidder; he, in contrast, is seeking campaign contributions.
"This is the most difficult thing I have ever done," Ahadi
confessed. "I am more comfortable in the intellectual
sphere."
3. (C) As for a platform, Ahadi stressed "Fifty percent of
the country's problems are due to a lack of leadership. My
main message is the need to change the leadership." He is
supplementing this anti-Karzai strategy with an election
manifesto, highlighting the issues of corruption and
security. On security, he would like to see international
forces do more. On corruption, he believes a few exemplary
prosecutions, plus a few new technical controls, would serve
to deter and curb future abuses.
4. (C) Ahadi agreed with the Charge's point that August 20
remains the best possible date for elections. In response to
the Charge's statement on the US position on an interim
government and the need for stability, Ahadi was willing to
accept Karzai leadership between May and August, but still
preferred Karzai step down. When the Charge raised the
possibility of election safeguards, listing several Afghan
proposals, Ahadi agreed safeguards were needed and promised
to respond in a few days with his own ideas.
DELL
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AHADI PONDERS TERMS FOR AN
INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Christopher Dell, Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d)
1. (C) Presidential candidate and former Finance Minister
Anwarulhaq Ahadi on March 3 told the Charge he could
reluctantly accept the President as head of an interim
government if certain changes served to check Karzai's
"abuses" of the power of incumbency. Ahadi suggested
replacements for two key Karzai re-election figures as
essential conditions for a level playing field. Jelani
Popal, head of the Independent Directorate of Local
Governance (IDLG),who manages the governors for Karzai and
also donor-funded community aid programs, must go. Abdullah,
deputy head of the intelligence service NDS, likewise is
squeezing local leaders to support Karzai and must be
removed, according to Ahadi. Ahadi was willing to consider
measures proposed by other politicians, such as a longer
campaign period or a freeze on appointments, but remained
clear that Karzai's opponents face a steep challenge to match
the President in grassroots influence and funds.
2. (C) Ahadi described in some detail his own struggle to
organize a national campaign. He acknowledged he is skating
over a serious schism in his Pashtun nationalist Afghan
Millat party, once his base of political organization.
Karzai has co-opted Popal, the party's titular number two,
Ahadi admitted, so Ahadi has decided to postpone questions of
"party discipline" until after the election. His campaign
office in Kabul is up and running and next Wednesday will
host a conference for representatives of varied ethnic,
political, and social groups, including religious, tribal,
and jihadi leaders. He is working now to set up provincial
offices despite a shortage of funds. These provincial
offices will try to gain the support of local leaders, and
Ahadi will concentrate instead on "policy." He will soon
visit major cities, starting with Mazar, Herat, Jalalabad,
and, if possible, Kandahar. Ahadi noted wryly that Afghan
players often expect to sell their support to the highest
bidder; he, in contrast, is seeking campaign contributions.
"This is the most difficult thing I have ever done," Ahadi
confessed. "I am more comfortable in the intellectual
sphere."
3. (C) As for a platform, Ahadi stressed "Fifty percent of
the country's problems are due to a lack of leadership. My
main message is the need to change the leadership." He is
supplementing this anti-Karzai strategy with an election
manifesto, highlighting the issues of corruption and
security. On security, he would like to see international
forces do more. On corruption, he believes a few exemplary
prosecutions, plus a few new technical controls, would serve
to deter and curb future abuses.
4. (C) Ahadi agreed with the Charge's point that August 20
remains the best possible date for elections. In response to
the Charge's statement on the US position on an interim
government and the need for stability, Ahadi was willing to
accept Karzai leadership between May and August, but still
preferred Karzai step down. When the Charge raised the
possibility of election safeguards, listing several Afghan
proposals, Ahadi agreed safeguards were needed and promised
to respond in a few days with his own ideas.
DELL