Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL421
2009-02-27 13:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
CHARGE DELIVERS MESSAGE ON AUGUST ELECTION
how-toVZCZCXRO4940 PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW DE RUEHBUL #0421/01 0581349 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 271349Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7513 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000421
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV AF
SUBJECT: CHARGE DELIVERS MESSAGE ON AUGUST ELECTION
PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY
REF: A. KABUL 413
B. KABUL 244
Classified By: CDA Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000421
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV AF
SUBJECT: CHARGE DELIVERS MESSAGE ON AUGUST ELECTION
PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY
REF: A. KABUL 413
B. KABUL 244
Classified By: CDA Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C/NF) SUMMARY. On 2/26, the Charge met separately with
United Front (UF) leader Burhanuddin Rabbani, Lower House
Deputy Speaker Mirwais Yaseni, Hazara leader and MP Haji
Mohammad Mohaqqeq, and UF member, and grandson of the late
king, Mustapha Zahir Shah to inform them of U.S. support for
the 8/20 election date as well as a strong central government
headed by President Karzai from after 5/22 until the
inauguration of the next president. Three of them preferred
Karzai step aside after 5/22 in favor of a non-partisan
interim leader, while Yaseni did not oppose Karzai remaining.
Most understood the U.S. position and would be willing to
consider a political agreement that would leave Karzai in
place over the summer.
U.S. Position
--------------
2. (C/NF) In his separate meetings with Rabbani, Yaseni,
Mohaqqeq and Zahir, Charge explained the U.S. position on
elections and transitional authority (ref A). Charge
declared that the United States recognized that the weight of
legal opinion had concluded that the President's term ended
on 5/22, but equally, as a practical matter, elections could
not be held before 5/22. Thus, the only way forward was a
political understanding between Karzai and the opposition.
The United States understood and accepted as legitimate the
opposition's concerns about the power of the incumbency, but
all had to reach a solution that preserved 8/20 and left the
president and government in place.
3. (C/NF) In previous meetings, each of the four had told us
they expected Karzai would manipulate government resources to
benefit his campaign, leading them to push for his
resignation after 5/22 if he intended to run for re-election
on 8/20. Karzai's consideration of an early election, a
development that would all but end the opposition's hopes for
victory, has softened their stance. Most now welcome U.S.
efforts to lead the Afghan political establishment to a
consensus political agreement, though the thought of Karzai
remaining in office for three-five more months may yet take a
few days to sink in.
Rabbani
--------------
4. (C/NF) Rabbani reaffirmed his support for the 8/20
election date and told Charge he "understood" the U.S.
position, but did not accede to our view. He and the UF
would promote security and stability in the country. Still,
he believed Karzai was looking for any means to stay in power
in order to exploit the advantages of incumbency. He was
skeptical any voluntary limitations on Karzai's executive
authority over the summer would satisfy opposition concerns.
Governors, police chiefs, and district administrators who
might improperly influence the election in Karzai's favor
were already in place, he said. Like other leaders, he
suspected that late-breaking news that Karzai could call an
earlier election was a ploy to create a crisis in order to
remain in office. Rabbani added that the delay in resolving
the post-5/22 presidential continuity question was holding up
an announcement of the UF's candidate. "We want to solve
these other questions first," he said.
Yaseni
--------------
5. (C/NF) Deputy Speaker Yaseni, who affirmed his intention
to run for president (ref B),told Charge he would support
Karzai remaining in office after 5/22 and an August election
date. In return, he requested the international community
undertake certain commitments to ensure a free, fair, open,
and transparent election, and prevent the Palace and other
government agencies from interfering on behalf of Karzai's
campaign. One concrete request was to prevent the security
services from harassing candidates. The Charge said the U.S.
would in any case support such actions, calling them "the
minimum requirements for a free election." Yaseni warned he
may not be able to publicly commit to all aspects of the U.S.
position without upsetting some of his supporters, but would
put the interests of the country and a successful
election ahead of his own.
Mohaqqeq
--------------
6. (C/NF) Head of the Hazara-based Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Mardum
Mohammad Mohaqqeq affirmed his support for the 8/20 election
KABUL 00000421 002 OF 002
date, saying early elections were impossible due to weather
conditions, lack of time for the opposition to organize, and
the need for open and fair elections for all Afghans.
Mohaqqeq supported creation of a caretaker government headed
either by Upper House Speaker Mojaddedi, Lower House Speaker
Qanooni, or Chief Justice Azimi, but expressed willingness to
consider a caretaker government under Karzai, as long as the
president operated under diminished authorities. Mohaqqeq's
ideas on limiting his authority included putting the IDLG
under the Ministry of the Interior, and replacing Interior
Minister Atmar and IEC Chairman Ludin with neutral figures to
ensure fairness in the elections. He could not predict the
UF's response to such a proposal.
Zahir
--------------
7. (C/NF) Mustapha Zahir also supported the 8/20 election
date. He expressed concern that the presidential continuity
question would lead to a crisis that could destabilize the
country after 5/22. The UF and other opposition groups would
oppose any effort by Karzai to move the election forward,
which he expected the president would announce this week.
Zahir appreciated pressure from the international community
to keep Karzai in line and agreed that only a political
consensus could provide an acceptable way forward. "Karzai
is not the same man I knew 10 years ago," he said. "He's
tired and unsure about his team." Palace and MFA protocol
chief Amb. Seddiq had recently called Zahir to request he
lend his support to Karzai's plan to remain in office. Zahir
said he was worried Karzai would use him and his family's
name as a "trophy" and was still considering what role he
might take. He preferred Karzai not stand for reelection and
remain president through the interim period. At the same
time, Zahir was committed to using his family's good name to
promote national unity. He would encourage the Palace,
Parliament, and political leaders to seek a political
agreement that put national interests ahead of their own.
DELL
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV AF
SUBJECT: CHARGE DELIVERS MESSAGE ON AUGUST ELECTION
PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY
REF: A. KABUL 413
B. KABUL 244
Classified By: CDA Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C/NF) SUMMARY. On 2/26, the Charge met separately with
United Front (UF) leader Burhanuddin Rabbani, Lower House
Deputy Speaker Mirwais Yaseni, Hazara leader and MP Haji
Mohammad Mohaqqeq, and UF member, and grandson of the late
king, Mustapha Zahir Shah to inform them of U.S. support for
the 8/20 election date as well as a strong central government
headed by President Karzai from after 5/22 until the
inauguration of the next president. Three of them preferred
Karzai step aside after 5/22 in favor of a non-partisan
interim leader, while Yaseni did not oppose Karzai remaining.
Most understood the U.S. position and would be willing to
consider a political agreement that would leave Karzai in
place over the summer.
U.S. Position
--------------
2. (C/NF) In his separate meetings with Rabbani, Yaseni,
Mohaqqeq and Zahir, Charge explained the U.S. position on
elections and transitional authority (ref A). Charge
declared that the United States recognized that the weight of
legal opinion had concluded that the President's term ended
on 5/22, but equally, as a practical matter, elections could
not be held before 5/22. Thus, the only way forward was a
political understanding between Karzai and the opposition.
The United States understood and accepted as legitimate the
opposition's concerns about the power of the incumbency, but
all had to reach a solution that preserved 8/20 and left the
president and government in place.
3. (C/NF) In previous meetings, each of the four had told us
they expected Karzai would manipulate government resources to
benefit his campaign, leading them to push for his
resignation after 5/22 if he intended to run for re-election
on 8/20. Karzai's consideration of an early election, a
development that would all but end the opposition's hopes for
victory, has softened their stance. Most now welcome U.S.
efforts to lead the Afghan political establishment to a
consensus political agreement, though the thought of Karzai
remaining in office for three-five more months may yet take a
few days to sink in.
Rabbani
--------------
4. (C/NF) Rabbani reaffirmed his support for the 8/20
election date and told Charge he "understood" the U.S.
position, but did not accede to our view. He and the UF
would promote security and stability in the country. Still,
he believed Karzai was looking for any means to stay in power
in order to exploit the advantages of incumbency. He was
skeptical any voluntary limitations on Karzai's executive
authority over the summer would satisfy opposition concerns.
Governors, police chiefs, and district administrators who
might improperly influence the election in Karzai's favor
were already in place, he said. Like other leaders, he
suspected that late-breaking news that Karzai could call an
earlier election was a ploy to create a crisis in order to
remain in office. Rabbani added that the delay in resolving
the post-5/22 presidential continuity question was holding up
an announcement of the UF's candidate. "We want to solve
these other questions first," he said.
Yaseni
--------------
5. (C/NF) Deputy Speaker Yaseni, who affirmed his intention
to run for president (ref B),told Charge he would support
Karzai remaining in office after 5/22 and an August election
date. In return, he requested the international community
undertake certain commitments to ensure a free, fair, open,
and transparent election, and prevent the Palace and other
government agencies from interfering on behalf of Karzai's
campaign. One concrete request was to prevent the security
services from harassing candidates. The Charge said the U.S.
would in any case support such actions, calling them "the
minimum requirements for a free election." Yaseni warned he
may not be able to publicly commit to all aspects of the U.S.
position without upsetting some of his supporters, but would
put the interests of the country and a successful
election ahead of his own.
Mohaqqeq
--------------
6. (C/NF) Head of the Hazara-based Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Mardum
Mohammad Mohaqqeq affirmed his support for the 8/20 election
KABUL 00000421 002 OF 002
date, saying early elections were impossible due to weather
conditions, lack of time for the opposition to organize, and
the need for open and fair elections for all Afghans.
Mohaqqeq supported creation of a caretaker government headed
either by Upper House Speaker Mojaddedi, Lower House Speaker
Qanooni, or Chief Justice Azimi, but expressed willingness to
consider a caretaker government under Karzai, as long as the
president operated under diminished authorities. Mohaqqeq's
ideas on limiting his authority included putting the IDLG
under the Ministry of the Interior, and replacing Interior
Minister Atmar and IEC Chairman Ludin with neutral figures to
ensure fairness in the elections. He could not predict the
UF's response to such a proposal.
Zahir
--------------
7. (C/NF) Mustapha Zahir also supported the 8/20 election
date. He expressed concern that the presidential continuity
question would lead to a crisis that could destabilize the
country after 5/22. The UF and other opposition groups would
oppose any effort by Karzai to move the election forward,
which he expected the president would announce this week.
Zahir appreciated pressure from the international community
to keep Karzai in line and agreed that only a political
consensus could provide an acceptable way forward. "Karzai
is not the same man I knew 10 years ago," he said. "He's
tired and unsure about his team." Palace and MFA protocol
chief Amb. Seddiq had recently called Zahir to request he
lend his support to Karzai's plan to remain in office. Zahir
said he was worried Karzai would use him and his family's
name as a "trophy" and was still considering what role he
might take. He preferred Karzai not stand for reelection and
remain president through the interim period. At the same
time, Zahir was committed to using his family's good name to
promote national unity. He would encourage the Palace,
Parliament, and political leaders to seek a political
agreement that put national interests ahead of their own.
DELL