KARZAI INSISTS ON 2010 ELECTIONS: AFGHANS'

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004188

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI INSISTS ON 2010 ELECTIONS: AFGHANS'
"SUSPICIONS" WON'T PERMIT DELAY

REF: KABUL 4147

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Ricciardone, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: In a contentious yet polite meeting with CDA
Ricciardone, President Karzai insisted December 28, that he
feels compelled to order the holding of elections "on
schedule" (reftel) because the delays and deficiencies of the
2009 Presidential contest have left Afghan people suspicious
that any significant deviation from the constitution was an
international conspiracy to weaken the state. When pressed,
he said that he planned to enact some "reforms" to the
Independent Electoral Commission and that we "must help him"
hold the elections; he also indicated, several times, that he
would be open to our "arguments" in favor of a slight delay,
from spring to fall of 2010 - asking us to "Bring me your
proposals." CDA Ricciardone made it clear that the U.S.
needed to see reform to key electoral institutions and the
voter lists before the US could commit resources in support.
In a separate meeting the same day with CODEL Israel, Karzai
waved off Congressional concerns about a repeat of fraud in
the prospective elections. End Summary.

--------------
The Trauma of the 2009 Elections
--------------


2. (S) Although the expected IEC announcement did not surface
on December 28 President Karzai told CDA Ricciardone and
PolCounselor Pforzheimer that he and the senior political
leaders of the country - from Parliament, the Supreme Court,
and the IEC - were all agreed that the government must have
the 2010 Parliamentary elections on time, as required by the
Constitution. Karzai said that he had consulted with 140 MPs
and that Lower House Speaker Qanooni assured him there was
"unanimous" support for this; Embassy reporting shows much
more nuance but it is likely that Qanooni, a political
survivor, has assured a sizable Parliamentary majority in
favor.


3. (S) When asked how he would reconcile his dilemma of the
need to hold elections this spring versus the need for
elections process reform made painfully evident by this past
year's long and distracting Presidential contest, Karzai
returned repeatedly to the "trauma" of the 2009 results
process. He maintained his narrative that the Afghan people
lost faith in the process through the machinations of the
Electoral Complaints Commission and the international
community, and that they no longer believe any foreign
promises of reform. In particular, he pointed to the U.S.'
alleged "promise" of a second round in the Presidential race
which would have solidified the legitimacy of his second
term, and exclaimed "I would hold another election tomorrow
if I could" to erase this stain.


4. (S) Karzai revealed his state of mind by his persistent
references to Afghans' "fear of the unknown" and need to
"know what our allies are up to". He again referred to
recent allegations against former UNAMA D/SRSG Peter
Galbraith that he had tried to depose Karzai following the
election, then asked if international support for a delay of
the elections is "a continuation" of Galbraith's alleged
acts. "Tell Washington," he said, "there is a lot of
suspicion in Afghanistan about the intentions of the
international community... you are not dealing any more with
a secure psyche" but instead a country that has gone through
a "nightmare" they fear will recur.

--------------
A Flawed Election is Better Than a Delay ...
--------------


5. (S) In view of this national fear, Karzai said, the best
option is to press forward with elections that will "not be
perfect" but at least will be on time. The credibility is
secondary, he said; "even flawed elections are better than a
delay." He noted the need to keep the Constitution intact at
a point when it has been undermined and might be in jeopardy.
"We cannot keep playing with the Constitution." He agreed
that he saw the need to "correct" the elections law and to
make the IEC stronger and more competent. He also wants to
reform the ECC, which he repeatedly complained had
"disappeared after dealing with the Presidential elections,
and failed to discharge its duty to examine complaints about
provincial council elections." (Note: Part of his concept of
reform is no doubt to eliminate international positions. End
note). He asked us to "help them" with resources and
security.


6. (S) Repeatedly, Karzai and his advisors said that the
country could go through "hell" and the disorder of a rising

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crime wave if the Constitutional order is again weakened by
another delay of elections. There is time to enact some
reforms before May, Karzai said; anyway, the United States
had raised both reasons of reform and security to justify
delay in the 2009 Constitutional elections dates, yet in the
end, neither was in evidence. There is time to register new
candidates and new voters, he said, dismissing our point that
the 2009 elections had demonstrated that the voter registry
is fatally flawed.


7. (S) Karzai acknowledged that the changes to the IEC and
ECC must occur through amendments to the Electoral Law.
Ricciardone pointed out that, per the Constitution, the
Electoral Law cannot be changed within twelve months of a
Parliamentary election. Karzai agreed that "Parliament
cannot change it" but affirmed that he can, and plans to
amend the elections law through a Presidential decree "with
full force of law". (Note: Karzai is correct, he can issue a
decree when Parliament is out session. End note.)

--------------
... OK, A Small Delay Could be Arranged
--------------


8. (S) Despite his inital firm position on the timing as
decreed by the Constitution ("please report this clearly to
Washington"),several times during the second half of the
meeting Karzai appeared to invite the U.S. to make a
counter-argument for a specific delay until the fall. He at
first stated "don't even try" (pushing a delay) but later
said "we must hold them on time -- or, near to it" and "two
or three months' difference is OK." He hedged that he wanted
to hold the elections "in accordance with the Constitution --
to the best of our efforts." Karzai also acknowledged that
some districts would be impossible to secure and that in
those cases, later by-elections per province might be held.
(Note: IEC Secretary Najifi reportedly responded to a
journalist's question on December 28 that "the IEC will be
ready to conduct the elections on time, but we cannot speak
to the necessary financing or security measures." End Note.)


9. (S) Karzai assented that "we want to do it ourselves" and
"it's impossible for Washington or London to say they have
good intentions" about the electoral reform agenda.
Nonetheless, Karzai also asked Ricciardone to "come back to
us soon with your suggestions for alternatives" to the May
2010 date and to "come back with your ideas (of reform) and
convince us" to delay until the fall. (Comment: His
entreaties had a quality trying to learn the U.S. bottom line
for acceptable reforms which might unlock funding for the
elections. Evidently he also was trying to shift the onus
for resolving his dilemma on the U.S. and "the foreigners."
End comment.)

-------------- --
US Response: Reforms Are Vital; So Is Security
-------------- --


10. (S) Ricciardone told Karzai that it could not be the role
of the international community to initiate a reform effort of
Afghan electoral institutions -- this is where he must show
leadership, which we could support. Ricciardone said that
Americans now are "equally skeptical" as Afghans are of the
other's intentions and also need to be convinced that the
Afghan government is determined to improve its democracy. So
much reform work needs to be done, he said, that to hold
truly transparent and credible elections in the next five
months appeared to us both impossible and an unnecessary risk
of further "trauma" on the country. It was hard to conceive
that the needed reforms and procedures could be accomplished
in less than a year.


11. (S) Ricciardone noted that while the United States does
not want to weaken the constitutional order in Afghanistan,
holding elections which would not reflect any improvements on
the flawed 2009 ballot would in its own way significantly
weaken Afghan democracy -- as well as weakening U.S. and
other international domestic political support for
Afghanistan. Our objective was not to delay the elections,
Ricciardone stressed, but to support what we understood was
Karzai's own purpose: to strengthen Afghan democracy by
reforming the elections process, whose flaws were clear in
the 2009 experience. A delay probably would be necessary to
accomplish this purpose, but should not be confused with the
purpose itself. Karzai rejoined that the question of an
unconstitutional delay was the issue, and he could not accept
this.


12. (S) On security, Ricciardone pointed out that both
training of Afghan National Security Forces and
counter-insurgency operations could be delayed or derailed by

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another nation-wide election, setting back progress and
making President Obama's politically bold strategy of
increasing our support more vulnerable to domestic political
attack. He noted that we shared the same purpose -
strengthening democracy and Afghan institutions - but the
U.S. saw different ways to achieve it, for example giving
priority to an election that might not be on time but is
"transparent, fair, secure and orderly." "As you lay out
your determination to hold these elections, we urge you also
to emphasize your plans for thorough reform of the electoral
process," Ricciardone repeated, warning that elections that
involve our funding and our troops must be based on
confidence on both sides. An announcement focusing on the
date of the 2010 parliamentary elections, while ignoring the
need for reform, inevitably would expose Karzai to new and
serious differences with the U.S. and international community
at the outset of his new term. On the other hand, an
announcement emphasizing a commitment to strengthening Afghan
democracy through meaningful reform of the electoral process
would offer us an opportunity to state our support,
relegating the question of timing to secondary importance.

--------------
CODEL Israel: Repeats the Message
--------------


13. (S) In a meeting later that same day, Karzai heard from
visiting eight-member CODEL Israel that they want to see
Afghanistan's government prioritize reforms over timeliness
in the elections. They noted that it was difficult for
American taxpayers to continue to accept the burden of
supporting troops and development assistance without seeing
"strong" reforms after last year's problem of fraud. Karzai
responded that he planned to enact some reforms but needed
"their ideas" about what they wanted to see. He rehearsed
his narrative about the national "trauma" of the 2009
elections, and the unanimity of parliamentary support for
elections in 2010. (Note: Delegation members who had met
Karzai in the past informed us later that this was the "worst
performance" they had seen from Karzai. End Note.) Karzai
evidently was unaware that the CODEL was fresh from a meeting
with speaker Qanooni, who told them that that the
presidential elections had been problematic, people want
transparency, and that it was important to change the IEC so
it has real independence, change the elections law, and
prevent executive interference.

--------------
Comment
--------------


14. (S) While Karzai misstates both the national assignment
of blame for the 2009 elections (most Afghans seem well aware
of who had the vast majority of the disqualified votes) and
the degree of his "total" support in Parliament, he is
probably right that most Afghans would oppose a long election
delay and would view it with deep suspicion. His
unwillingness to admit that the IEC's bias is at the heart of
the problem means that we and our international partners will
have to keep pressing him and his Government to put in place
the key reforms the international community has identified,
and which would necessitate a delay. We have backgrounded
local journalists on our views on the need for reform. By
focusing on the need for reform and declining to take
Karzai's bait on the timing issue, we expect to be able to
contribute to and influence public debate and to support
Afghan voices for reform.


15. (S) Nonetheless, we doubt that under any amount of
pressure -- including an international community financial
boycott or any threat to minimize security support -- Karzai
would defer the election to 2011, as we judge would be
necessary to begin to overhaul the elections process. Under
these circumstances, Embassy Kabul will develop a policy
option for discussion to divert funds now designated to
support the Parliamentary elections into long-term
institutional reforms that will improve the conduct of
elections long after 2010, including the creation of a viable
voter registry and a solid candidate vetting system.
RICCIARDONE