HELMAND GOVERNOR SEES SOME PROGRESS BUT BLAMES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000416

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CG CJTF-101 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF
SUBJECT: HELMAND GOVERNOR SEES SOME PROGRESS BUT BLAMES
PRESIDENT,S GOVERNING STYLE FOR PROVINCE,S OVERALL WOES

REF: KABUL 383

Classified By: Acting DCM Robert J. Clarke for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------------

1. (C) En route to a visit in the UK, Helmand Governor
Mangal met with the Ambassador on 17 February to provide an
update on developments in his province. He was especially
pleased with progress on the counter narcotics front as well
as with the continuing, positive effects being felt in
Garmsir district as a result of last year's Marine
Expeditionary Force deployment. On security, the Ambassador
sketched out plans for the stationing of additional U.S.
forces in Helmand and asked for the governor's help in
managing future civilian casualties incidents. Mangal
suggested the key to avoiding such mistakes is good
coordination, and he promised to do his part in that regard.
The governor is continuing his efforts to identify
cooperative Alizai leaders with whom he might work, but he
has not managed to sideline local strongman and Karzai
favorite Sher Mohammad Akhundzada (SMA). Mangal's
relationship with the President has not improved; Karzai
recently told a Helmand district governor that Helmand "is
not part of my administration" but is "controlled by
foreigners." For his part, the governor attributes many of
Helmand's problems to the President Karzai's tendency over
the past several years of trying to manage the province via
personal relations instead of through the appointment of
qualified officials.

Progress on Several Fronts
--------------

2. (SBU) The governor pointed to several positive
developments. He indicated the Afghanistan Social Outreach
Program (being financed by the UK in certain districts in
Helmand) is off to a good start in Garmsir, Nad Ali and
Gereshk, with a rollout to a few more districts planned. He
was pleased as well that reconstruction and development work
has made progress in Garmsir following last summer's clearing
operations by the Marine Expeditionary Force there. Even in
Musa Qala, he said, he had been able to meet with large
numbers of ordinary citizens (he claimed 3000) who want peace
and a better future.


3. (SBU) Above all, though, he was pleased with the early
results of this year's counter narcotics campaigning,
including both Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) and Poppy
Eradication Force (PEF) operations. He noted plans to expand
the Food Zone (where only licit crops are permitted) in the
future. Mangal rejected the widespread notion that poppy
cultivation has dropped because of the high price of wheat
(the wheat price was high last year too). He attributed the
change instead to a broader and better public information and
outreach campaign (including the enlistment of more religious
figures in the effort) and the distribution of improved wheat
seeds. Because of this last in particular, it is no longer
farmers themselves but anti-government forces who are
actively resisting poppy eradication efforts. He suggested
it remains important to find additional ways to help farmers
in order to cement this trend. As to whether it is
insurgents or landowners involved in the narcotics trade who
are behind attacks, the governor maintained it is pointless
to draw a distinction since they are so closely linked
financially. Note: As of mid-February, over 1500 hectares
of poppy had been eradicated in Helmand by the PEF, with
another 200-300 hectares by GLE. The total area eradicated
there last year over the entire season by both PEF and GLE
was about 2600 hectares. End Note.


4. (C) For his part, the Ambassador said it remains unclear
exactly how future U.S. counter narcotics efforts will be
structured, but he suggested there might be some new elements
in light of the new U.S. military deployments. Reducing
poppy cultivation in Helmand will, in any event, remain a top
U.S. priority. He applauded the governor's work to date,
particularly his carrying through on eradication in areas
where he had warned farmers last year that poppy cultivation
would no longer be tolerated. This should give the
governor's words added impact in the future.

Security Challenges Ahead
--------------

5. (C) The Ambassador cautioned Governor Mangal that this
is likely to be a particularly "complicated" year, with more
fighting, the elections and the realignment of international

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forces. He briefly described the anticipated U.S. military
deployments, focused particularly on cutting off
reinforcement lines from Pakistan in southern Helmand and
Kandahar provinces. He reminded Mangal that the governor has
allies not only in Lashkar Gah but also at RC-South and ISAF
headquarters. At the same time, he pointed out that despite
best efforts to protect the Afghan people, international
forces will inevitably make some mistakes. The Ambassador
asked for the governor's help in managing the occasions when
mistakes do occur.


6. (C) Mangal responded along two lines. First, he fully
acknowledged that, with the increase in troops in Helmand,
fighting will intensify. Nonetheless he welcomed the
increase in troops because he believes the additional forces
"will destroy terrorists." He noted with apparent
satisfaction that, although "most" insurgents have returned
for the moment to madrassas in Pakistan, when they return in
the spring they will find themselves facing a larger
countervailing troop presence. On the issue of civilian
casualties, he did not really respond to the question of
helping to manage the fallout but addressed instead the need
to prevent them. He acknowledged that mistakes are
♮8 but at the same time suggested "we can prevent
mistakes if we coordinate(I will always try to maintain good
coordination so as to avoid mistakes."

Political Dynamics
--------------

7. (SBU) Asked whether he has made progress in identifying
Alizai tribal leaders with whom he can work, Mangal responded
only indirectly. He remains committed to his strategy of
finding such people while also stressing the importance of
more engagement with Alizais as a whole and bringing tangible
improvements to their lives. He said he is considering what
additional projects might be initiated in Alizai areas.
Security, however, remains a formidable challenge. But as
soon as the government has real control over Musa Qala,
Kajaki and Baghran districts in northern Helmand, then such
projects can go forward and will have a major impact. In
this context, he noted that the military in Kajaki do not
have a particularly good relationship with the local people.
In general, he lamented that many people continue to think
only in terms of three Alizais as real influence-wielders )
former governor Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, Mullah Salam in
Musa Qala and Rais Baghrani in the province's northernmost
district. He conceded that Baghrani has some influence with
the Taliban but dismissed Mullah Salam as having no more than
5 percent support among locals. He has warned President
Karzai that Salam cannot play any constructive role.


8. (SBU) Mangal's relationship with President Karzai does
not appear to have improved. The governor insisted he tries
to carry out the president's wishes in good faith but never
hears from him. He recounted how a Helmand district
administrator encountered Karzai at a recent event in Kabul
and was asked where he came from. Responding that he was
from Helmand, the president shot back that Helmand "is not
part of my administration" but instead is "controlled by
foreigners." Philosophically, Mangal commented that he
tries to maintain a good relationship with President Karzai,
but, he said, "I can't become a Sher Mohammed (Akhundzada)."
The Ambassador suggested he should not try to do so.

Prospects for Elections
--------------

9. (SBU) Finally, Governor Mangal maintained -- though
without citing specific evidence -- that interest in Helmand
in the upcoming elections is well below the 2004 level. He
laid the blame for this squarely at the doorstep of the
central government. By failing to make good on its promises,
he said, the authorities had lost the trust of the people.
"We have been weak compared to the Taliban." He recounted
that he had told the President that "we have destroyed
Helmand as much as the Taliban have." When asked by
President Karzai to identify the "we," Mangal said he pointed
to the people Kabul has appointed as its representatives in
the province ) governors, prosecutors, chiefs of police,
etc. We relied on relationships, he told the Ambassador,
instead of on professionalism.

Comment
--------------

10. (C) The meeting provided a bit of balance to the often
gloomy reports about Helmand, with the governor able to cite
a number of notable, positive developments. His personal

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activism on counter narcotics has brought concrete results
and makes him a model among Southern governors. His comments
on preventing civilian casualties, the important role of
coordination in this regard and the need for greater direct
engagement with residents closely paralleled the comments of
Helmand's MPs at a recent meeting with the British Embassy
here (reftel). We will be surprised if Mangal's suggestion
of low citizen interest in the upcoming elections holds, at
least once candidates have been named. Worth noting, the
recent, plus-up voter registration in Helmand equaled about
29 percent of the first voter registration five years ago;
the average for all provinces is about 35 percent. Finally,
it is clear from the governor's comments that he remains in
office despite, rather than with the support of, President
Karzai. Against that background, we find the competent
Mangal's repudiation of the modus operandi frequently favored
by the president in dealing with the provinces, namely
working through personal relations rather than giving top
priority to qualifications, especially telling ) and on the
mark.
DELL