VICE PRESIDENTS AND PARLIAMENT LEADERS HOLD FIRM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000413

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV AF
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENTS AND PARLIAMENT LEADERS HOLD FIRM
TO CARETAKER GOVERNMENT WITHOUT KARZAI

REF: A. 2/25 HOLBROOKE-DELL PHONE CALL

B. KABUL 396

Classified By: Charge Christopher Dell, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. In 2/25 meetings with the Charge, the
two vice presidents and the speakers of each house of
Parliament welcomed U.S. efforts to assist the country to
reach a consensus on post-5/22 executive authority, but most
held firm to their insistence that President Karzai step down
in favor of a caretaker government. All leaders accept the
8/20 election date and would oppose any effort by Karzai to
move the date forward. However, nearly all expressed
concerns that Karzai would manipulate government resources to
benefit his campaign if he remained in office. They insisted
he had to resign in favor of a caretaker government after
5/22 if he wished to run for re-election. Some of them,
however, would consider an arrangement in which Karzai
remained in office after 5/22 while running for re-election,
but under the condition that he accepted voluntary
limitations on his power.

U.S. Position
--------------


2. (S/NF) In his 2/25 meetings, Charge explained to each
of the four political leaders the U.S. position on elections
and transitional authority (ref A): the Afghan political
establishment must preserve the 8/20 presidential election
date and that while Karzai,s mandate ends on 5/22, we
believe he and the bulk of his government should assume
caretaker status until August elections. In the U.S. view,
it was imperative to maintain a strong central government
during the peak Taliban fighting season over the summer
months. The United States recognized Karzai,s executive
authority expired on 5/22. The most logical option would be
for Karzai to step down on 5/22, and then assume a position
as caretaker president until the inauguration. During that
period, he could exercise some diminished level of authority,
the exact limitations of which the Palace and opposition
groups would have to decide. This diminished authority would
address the suspicions of the opposition that Karzai would
use the power of incumbency to influence the outcome of the
election. The international community could serve as an
oversight body over Karzai,s actions in this capacity. The
U.S. urged all Afghans to negotiate with the best interests
of the country, not themselves, in
mind. The end result should be a free, fair, open, and
transparent election on 8/20.

Vice Presidents
--------------


3. (S/NF) First Vice President Massoud reiterated his
support for the 8/20 election date, but also his opposition
to Karzai staying in office after 5/22 (ref B). He contended
that an interim president, but not Karzai, was the best
solution. Sometimes it was necessary to violate the
Constitution in the interests of the country; a May election
would clearly not be fair, open, or transparent. He called
on the U.S. to lead on determining a way forward.


4. (S/NF) Second Vice President Khalili suggested the
United States, UN and other members of the international
community (unspecified) should bring together leaders from
the executive, legislative and judicial branches to devise a
consensus solution to the presidential continuity dilemma.
On the election date, Khalili agreed an election before 8/20
was not possible for security and logistical reasons, but
remained concerned about violating the constitutional
requirement to hold the election before May.

Parliamentary Leaders
--------------


5. (S/NF) Upper House Speaker Mojaddedi said the Upper
House had long supported the Independent Election
Commission's rationale for an 8/20 election. He pledged that
the Upper House would issue a statement supporting the
election date, to balance efforts by the Lower House to
challenge the IEC's actions. Mojaddedi, who has privately
expressed some interest in revisiting his role as a caretaker
leader, was more ambiguous on the issue of post-5/22
presidential continuity. Various politicians, legal
scholars, and lawyers have suggested he serve as caretaker
president -- an option he told the Charge he has not ruled
out completely, but that "God has taken all love of power
from my heart." Mojaddedi believed his close history with
Karzai colored his chances of being seen as an impartial
moderator in talks with opposition parties to reach a
consensus solution.


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6. (S/NF) Lower House Speaker Qanooni doubted limitations
to Karzai's post-5/22 authority would appease critics,
including him, who thought Karzai would unfairly exploit
government resources during the campaign. Governors,
district administrators, and police chiefs loyal to the
president were already in place and ready to influence voting
in Karzai's favor; limiting future appointments would not
address this concern. Qanooni appreciated the U.S.
commitment to a free, fair, open, and transparent election
and welcomed our participation in discussions on how to
address presidential continuity. Qanooni insisted a
transitional mechanism that replaced Karzai as head of state
was absolutely necessary, but said he would consider the
Charge's suggestion to consider limitations on Karzai's
authority while serving in a caretaker capacity as part of an
overall compromise.
DELL