2010 ELECTIONS: SETTING THE DATE BY ESTABLISHING

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 004062 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF SUBJECT: 2010 ELECTIONS: SETTING THE DATE BY ESTABLISHING MINIMAL CONDITIONS FOR OUR SUPPORT REF: KABUL 3980 Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The United States cannot afford to expend additional vital resources and risk losing political and security space to support future Afghan elections unless fundamental reforms are enacted in advance of the Parliamentary and District Council elections, at present scheduled to be held between April and May 2010. The U.S. government, in cooperation with the international community, should set minimal conditions for our future support. Such conditions, as Embassy Kabul envisions them, are unlikely to be met by the spring 2010 date, or even by fall 2010, and we therefore consider a 2011 timeframe to be overall the most feasible option. Ultimately, it is up to the Afghans to decide on an election date, but too much is at stake to support unconditionally another flawed Afghan election. End Summary. -------------- Learning Our Lessons -------------- ¶2. (C) While there were many positive aspects of the 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council elections, including active campaigning and a maturing media debate, significant problems of fraud arose due in large part to inherent weaknesses in the two electoral management and oversight bodies, the lack of a reliable voter registry, and the absence of strong political parties. We supported the elections while trying to address the shortcomings, including fraud and Independent Elections Commission (IEC) partiality and recruitment problems. After spending nearly $300 million on the 2009 elections we are in a much more vulnerable position facing 2010: can we, and should we, expend additional resources if improvements are not made? Will we also lose valuable political and security attention to months of election campaigning, balloting and counting processes? -------------- -------------- UNAMA's Leading Role: Raising with Karzai and the IC -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) SRSG Kai Eide and Ambassador Eikenberry have raised the idea of postponing the elections with President Karzai in early December (reftel). While President Karzai is inclined to postpone the District Council elections, he expressed his intention to either hold the Parliamentary elections on schedule or delay them until early fall 2010, a date we understand the IEC Secretariat prefers. (Note: One interpretation of his position is that he would prefer the international community to impose a later date on him, so he will not bear full responsibility. End note.) ¶4. (C) The international community, for its part, is close to consensus but has not reached it yet regarding the minimal threshold of reforms required to support the next elections. Establishing a minimal threshold is vital as it would indicate the most appropriate timeline to follow. In the December 8 UN Stakeholder's meeting, opinion ranged from holding the elections on time, delaying by one year, or postponing for two years. The UK favored a two-year window, and Germany opined that holding elections in 2010 are not feasible and listed four major conditions: a census and combined civil/voter registry; reform of the electoral structure; IEC reform, including the nomination process; and, a review of UNDP ELECT. The Netherlands was not yet clear on its conditions, but believed that there should be "enough time" to correct the wrongs before holding another election although it favored sticking to the Constitution. Italy stipulated the need to reform the IEC and voter registration, preferring quality elections over rushed ones. The Canadians had not yet reached a formal position. Sweden urged donors to weigh the long-term perspective versus a short-term option with minimal conditions. On the other hand, the European Community and Turkey at the meeting said they believed that to maintain Constitutional order and legitimacy, the elections should be held in 2010. All donors agreed that we need a clarified position to gain traction on the timing of Afghanistan's next elections. Separately, the EU Observer mission told us December 17 that they favor a delay in order to enact crucial reforms. ¶5. (C) A December 15 donors workshop on civil and voter registry agreed on the following minimal conditions for supporting Parliamentary elections, in 2010 or afterwards. These conditions include: a change in IEC leadership; a change in UNDP ELECT's Project Document, including modification of its management structure and Elections Complaint Commission (ECC) financing; a bare minimum voter registry update matched to the voter registry dataset of 2009 and preceded by an audit; candidate vetting reform; and, the re-constitution of the ECC backed by adequate resources. This list is not binding or completely comprehensive (there are discussions of a need to change the SNTV voting methodology as well to encourage political parties) but represents a solid international consensus at the expert level. ¶6. (C) In a meeting December 16, UNAMA political section officials shared with us their concerns about security, logistics and high-level misuse of the IEC and agreed that 2010 elections were "inadvisable". They reported that contrary to his stated position last week with SRSG Eide, President Karzai may be planning to announce, by the end of December, an unspecified delay to the officially-mandated Spring 2010 election date. This could open the door to a longer timeline to discuss basic reforms and a delay past ¶2010. UNAMA leadership is thin through the New Year but they will continue to work for a consolidated international position, ideally by the end of the year but necessarily before the January 28 London Conference when this discussion will become much more public. -------------- -------------- The Way Forward - Set Conditions and The Date Will Follow -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) We need to establish minimum acceptable threshold/conditions under which the USG will agree to further assist and fund Afghan election. The most important argument against this approach is respect for the constitution; however, there is likely to be Afghan acceptance of the fact that in its current environment security, logistics and rule of law arguments against 2010 elections have nearly equal weight. (The Electoral Law allows postponement of elections for technical, logistical and security reasons.) The following are reforms we can expect Afghans to achieve according to three timelines: 2010 (realistically Fall rather than Spring); 2011; and, 2012. We believe that at minimum the Parliamentary and District Council elections should be postponed to 2011 but that the Afghan government is likely to reject outright a 2012 timeline. ¶8. (SBU) Spring-Fall 2010: We possibly could expect: -- better IEC leadership by the fall but only if there is political will on the part of the Karzai Administration to change the leadership via decree; -- slightly improved vetting; -- possibly improved security; -- better risk mitigation (from lessons learned); -- more adequate UNDP-ELECT project management (also from lessons learned). However, we can also expect: -- an inadequate and incomplete voter registration, which we would be negligent to fund further; -- few, if any, electoral reforms; and -- no census (necessary for District Council Elections in the current format). ¶9. (SBU) Spring or Fall 2011: In this timeframe, we could expect: -- new IEC leadership and broader IEC staff changes; -- modest electoral reforms, including at the passage of the IEC Structure Law and possibly the approval of a new voting system; -- much improved candidate vetting; -- an incomplete, but improved, voter registry; -- more time to improve civic education; -- demarcations of districts; and, -- possible prosecutions of IEC officials allegedly involved in favoritism in the 2009 elections towards a particular political stream. We can also expect that security in Pashtun areas, which were disadvantaged in the Presidential elections, could be much improved, leading to a more equal political playing field. However, there would be inadequate time to conduct a complete census and we might end up investing in an improved, but incomplete, combined voter and civil registry. ¶10. (SBU) Spring or Fall 2012: In this time frame, we could expect: -- needed reforms to be in place, including a comprehensive electoral reform; -- reliable voter registry/National ID; -- sound candidate vetting procedures; -- a change in the political party system that would encourage the development of political parties; -- increased voter awareness; -- better security; and -- a possible reform in the elections calendar through Constitutional reform. However, by opening up the possibility for Constitutional reforms, certain political spheres could advocate for and possibly pass undesirable changes, for example reducing or eliminating the quota for female Parliamentarians and District Council members. Further, a two-year delay could seriously call into question the continuation of Afghanistan's Constitutional order and could play into Taliban assertions that the Afghan government is illegitimate. -------------- -------------- Parliamentary Winners and Losers in a Postponement -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) In our preliminary discussions with Parliamentarians and other politicians,those who stand to gain from a Parliamentary elections postponement are the old Northern Alliance (NA) - Junbesh, Jamiat, and to some extent the Wahdat parties, as well as most of the democratic parties and the Gailanis, and possibly Mojadedi -- i.e., primarily the non-Pashtuns and the moderates. The former NA seeks the decentralization of power, which would require a revamp of the Constitution, and they might use the delay to provoke a Constitutional crisis. Further, if there was less fraud and misuse of government resources for pro-Karzai candidates, their parties would possibly fare better. If a census were conducted, these politicians would likely receive more government resources, and perhaps eliminate myths about Pashtun numbers. Other supporters of a delay include self-interested MPs who know they will not likely be re-elected next time and want to keep their jobs for two years. ¶12. (C) Opponents to the delay include all Hezb-e-Islami branches, Afghan Millat, and the Fundamentalists (led by Sayyaf) - i.e., primarily the Pashtuns. Hezb-e-Islami Chairman Arghandewal has confirmed that his party's position is to hold the elections on time, noting the importance of respecting the constitution. If the constitution were damaged again he claimed, "this could be exploited by the enemies of the government." He added that he would support electoral reforms immediately following the Parliamentary elections. Many pro-Karzai supporters have been promised more seats in the Parliament, and if the elections are held quickly and without more anti-fraud measures, it will be easier to use fraud, government resources, and IEC "helpers" to obtain more power. Karzai could then have a "rubber stamp" Parliament and further consolidate power. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) While it is up to the Afghans to decide on an election date, too much is at stake to support unconditionally another flawed Afghan election -- which is what Karzai's circle may advocate. It is vitally important to reach consensus with as many of our allies as feasible, with UNAMA leading the international effort, and create and maintain a joint posture. Within the wider international community, we will work most closely with other donors, since we have the obligation and right to determine the conditions for their support. In mid-November, we started flagging our concerns with Karzai, other influential Afghans, and the international community (especially UNDP) that adequate electoral reforms and security were essential to our support. As the leading donor for Afghanistan's elections we must apply our leverage to this end. We consider the 2011 timeframe to be the most realistic option; while not all reforms could possibly be in place by then, the most important ones could be and pushing the date any further will meet Karzai's outright rejection and would inflict too much damage to the constitutional process. ¶14. (C) We believe the Afghan political elite, with international community facilitation, can reach a consensus on Parliamentary election delays at least until the Fall of 2010 and possibly the Spring of 2011. Indeed, Speaker Qanooni recently suggested the Afghan government first announce a postponement of Spring 2010 Parliamentary elections in the weeks ahead, with a commitment to announce a specific date within the next few months. With this in mind it is important for us to avoid bilateral actions which might make the U.S., once again, the lightning rod for conspiracy theorists and distract attention from the need to enact urgent reforms. EIKENBERRY