KARZAI REOPENS ELECTION DATE TIMING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000397 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM AF SUBJECT: KARZAI REOPENS ELECTION DATE TIMING REF: A. KABUL 354 ¶B. KABUL 372 ¶C. KABUL 396 Classified By: CDA Christopher Dell, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On 2/23, President Karzai informed a group of western and developed country embassies that he would announce on 2/27 his decision either to comply with the Constitution (i.e., declare that the election should be advanced to the spring) or seek a political agreement that would result in his staying in office through an 8/20 election and until the inauguration. The charge met separately with Palace Chief of Staff Daudzai and reiterated our position that the election date had to remain 8/20 and Karzai had to lead his opponents in finding a political consensus. The charge identified a number of problems posed by a spring election, ncluding the legitimacy of the result and impications for national stability. Daudzai said Karzai would consult with the United States and the UN before he makes his announcement. -------------- -------------- Karzai to declare intent on election date later this week -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Karzai met today with other major western and developed country embassies to solicit views on the transition authority issue. UK Charge Patrick confirmed all the major European missions, Canada and Japan attended. Karzai stated at the start of the meeting that he had consulted earlier with the United States (reftel a) and wished to speak today to other key diplomatic partners. Karzai declared this meeting was another in a series of consultations he had been conducting with various stakeholders, both domestic and international. ¶3. (C) Karzai told the group he was studying options on how to deal with the transitional authority issue and had concluded on two options: (1) what he termed a &constitutional solution,8 which would mean a spring election; or (2) a &political solution,8 whose exact terms he could not predict, but whose prerequisite would be his remaining in office through an 8/20 election and until the inauguration. He provided no details on how he would pursue a political solution, or the form such an agreement might take. Karzai aded that Chief Justice Azimi and Justice Minister Danesh had advised him that the constitution required him to call for elections in the spring. He informed the group he would announce his decision on 2/27. ¶4. (C) Karzai then asked for feedback. UK Charge Patrick characterized the diplomatic response as tepid. The UK, Japan, Italy and EC all spoke in favor of option two, emphasizing the importance of holding to the 8/20 date. Patrick said the German and EU representatives spoke very subtly; he believed Karzai interpreted their positions as neutral. The Canadian and French representatives, among others, did not speak. The meeting finished in 30 minutes. -------------- Chief of Staff Daudzai -------------- ¶5. (C) Daudzai affirmed to the charge what Patrick had told polcouns earlier. Daudzai added that the United States and the UN would be the last parties Karzai would consult prior to his announcement. (SRSG Eide and DSRSG-Political Alexander are away. DSRSG-Development Asplund is in charge). ¶6. (C) The charge reiterated our position that the election date had to remain 8/20 and Karzai had to lead his opponents in finding a political consensus. He informed Daudzai that the Ambassador had fulfilled his pledge to Karzai and convened key members of the diplomatic community (reftel b) to urge them to support the 8/20 date and to encourage all key domestic political parties to reach a political consensus on the transition authority issue. The Ambassador had also met Rabbani and VP Massoud on 2/21 (reftel c) and made the same points. Daudzai was grateful and urged the Embassy to continue to see the opposition. ¶7. (C) Charge identified a number of problems posed by a spring election. The United States would deploy most of its 17,700 troops to the South in the summer, principally to secure the region for elections. Troops would not arrive in time for a spring election, which would therefore be conducted in an insecure environment. Logistical preparations were nowhere near in place for a spring election. Insecurity in the south would prompt accusations KABUL 00000397 002 OF 002 of Pashtun disenfranchisement while a flawed electoral process overall could each and together threaten the legitimacy of the process and the outcome. This result itself could prompt the instability Karzai wished to avoid. ¶8. (C) Charge also pointed out that there would be an impact on bilateral relations if Karzai walked away from his public commitment to the 8/20 date less than two weeks after making that public pledge as he stood before cameras and next to SRAP Holbrooke. (Charge later ran into Deputy NSA Ibrahim Spinzada and reiterated this last point). ¶9. (C) Charge asked Daudzai if the Palace was studying the constitutional provisions on a state of emergency (SOE). Chief Justice Azimi told Karzai that he could not declare a SOE in this circumstance because no emergency situation existed. Daudzai suggested, however, that if Karzai announced an April election and some kind of problem arose in the interim, there might then be rationale for an SOE. He said nothing further. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) We will continue to call on members of the opposition and urge them to support an 8/20 date and work with Karzai to seek a political consensus. Karzai, however, must certainly be reassessing his ability to reach a consensus agreement with his opponents, who appear to be nearly unanimous in their support of a caretaker government option. A timely call from senior Washington officials could stiffen Karzai,s spine to refocus his attention and energy on option two ) an 8/20 election and a domestic political agreement to get us there. DELL