Ghor: More Development could Prevent Insurgent Threats

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003845 DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KDEM PGOV PTER AF SUBJECT: Ghor: More Development could Prevent Insurgent Threats ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Located in central RC-West, the province of Ghor is one of the most isolated and underdeveloped in Afghanistan. While not at the center of the insurgency, Ghor suffers from the influence of warlords, transient youth who mingle with the insurgency in bordering provinces, and lack of capacity. If not addressed now these issues could create a void easily filled by the insurgency. Its current stable security situation makes Ghor a good candidate for more innovative assistance programs that will build a sustainable future for the province. END SUMMARY. -------------- Introduction -------------- ¶2. (U) Ghor is an underdeveloped, mountainous, rural province that is relatively stable and secure, boasting a mainly Tajik population estimated between 600,000 and 800,000. Illiteracy runs at roughly 80 percent, with the same percentage of the population engaged in agriculture, farming and animal husbandry. The absence of paved roads increases Ghor's isolation, especially in winter. Electricity in Ghor is limited to four hours a day in the capital of Chaghcharan. Several dozen villages are the beneficiaries of micro-hydro projects constructed by the National Solidarity Program (NSP) along with the Lithuanian and Icelandic governments. -------------- Ghor Stable for Now -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Ghor's current stability should not be taken for granted. Locals attribute the situation and easing of tribal conflicts since 2005 to the establishment of the PRT and its regular patrols. Prior to 2005, however, armed conflicts between Ghor's three main warlords caused the governor's office to change hands four times in two years. In June 2004, local commander Salaam Khan attacked Chaghcharan and removed Governor Ibrahim Malekzada and ANA Commander General Ahmen Khan Morghabi. The fighting left almost 20 residents of Chaghcharan dead. These three warlords, who still hold sway in their respective regions, profess to support the Government of Afghanistan, though it appears this support is contingent on the Government's continued non-interference in their local affairs. -------------- Current U.S. Assistance to Ghor -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Since 2002, USAID has spent USD 27.03 million in Ghor and the U.S. military (mainly building ANP headquarters throughout the province) about USD 10 million. USAID funds have been disbursed mainly in agriculture (USD 2.07 Million),alternative development (USD 2.35 Million),education (USD 1.51 Million),health (USD 6.14 Million),PRT (USD 6.17 Million),democracy and governance (USD 8.06 Million) economic growth (USD 0.24 Million),and program development (USD 0.49 Million). -------------- Innovative Programs Are Needed -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Increased development activities in Ghor will build the government's capacity; help it penetrate the districts and help break the province's isolation. Areas with potential for increased development include the following: -- Alternative Livelihood, Agriculture and Livestock Management: While Ghor is deemed a "poppy-free province", as recently as 2004 it was the fourth largest poppy producer in Afghanistan. Over 85 percent of Ghoris make their living in agriculture and livestock, but the U.S. has no projects operating to support these areas. Ghor's Directorate of Agriculture, Irrigation and Labor (DAIL) has been leaderless for the past year and has no capacity or budget to provide technical assistance to farmers. We request an agriculture program to be expanded to Ghor such as USAID's Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives North, East, West (IDEA NEW) to provide a solid livelihood plan for farmers to avoid poppy cultivation [Comment: Poppy cultivation dropped off due more to market forces than to efforts by the Government of Afghanistan. End Comment] Technical support in farming, alternative livelihood, livestock management training, and establishment of small veterinary clinics at the district level and development of mobile clinics are also needed. -- Local Economic Development: The overstretched Line Directorate of Economy (LDoEc) currently has no local development plan to promote economic growth in Ghor. The Afghan Small and Medium Enterprise Development program (ASMED) traveled to Chaghcharan for discussions with local officials who work closely with the DOE. ASMED can be more effective if properly staged to provide business KABUL 00003845 002 OF 002 development and tools to small enterprises to promote local economic growth. We believe an ASMED program providing technical assistance to help the LDoEc craft a five year economic development plan is an essential initial step. We would also encourage assistance in establishing a processing center to wash, dry, and cut camel wool rugs. There is a tremendous potential to produce camel wool rugs for export to neighboring provinces. -- Youth Development: A prospective concept by USAID to create a youth development program appears to be concentrating on the south and east rather than the north and west. Programs to engage the youth of Ghor are needed because many uneducated and unemployed youth travel to the bordering provinces of Herat, Farah and Helmand for work where they face the prospect of being recruited into the insurgency. It is estimated that 10 percent of the poppy labor force - an estimated 34,000 young men of ages 16 to 25 - comes from Ghor to work on poppy fields in Helmand and Kandahar. This seasonal employment lasts for about two months, during which they could make about USD 10 per day, or USD 420 over the harvest season, according to UN figures. -- Energy: Ghor's electricity is limited to four hours a day in Chaghcharan and in roughly 30 villages that benefit from micro-hydro projects along the Hari Rud river. USAID's Afghan Clean Energy Program (ACEP) will soon begin in all provinces in Afghanistan. While this project will concentrate mainly to South and SE, we urge that proper attention be given to Ghor due to its desperate need for energy. -- Infrastructure: Ghor's highest priority large infrastructure project need is a paved road to Herat. Herat serves as Ghor's lifeline, providing Ghor with access to markets, health care and education. A road would link youth to vocational training schools to learn new trades. While the Lithuanians are paving the city streets of Chaghcharan and the Japanese are building schools, this signature infrastructure project would be a "game changer" in Ghor's development. ¶6. (U) USG civilians working at Ghor's non-US led PRT need a flexible mechanism to take advantage of targets of opportunity. We have little access to US military CERP funds and coalition partners' funding and flexibility to respond on short notice is limited. The PRT has requested quick reaction funds (QRF) controlled by USG civilians allowing a quick response to: 1) urgent needs which do not fit into any USAID or other donor's program, and 2) requests for support for high priority projects in the Provincial Development Plan (PDP) not funded by others. For example, USAID has donated almost one million books for schools in Ghor but due to lack of funds for distribution, it took over four months to deliver the books to the district level. In addition, the Department of Water and Irrigation has been looking for funding for three projects in the PDP that cost only USD 3500 each, yet cannot get donor funding. (Comment: A QRF could quickly and efficiently address some, though not all, of these types of requests, strengthening support for the local government and providing much needed assistance. The Embassy plans to launch its QRF in early 2009. End Comment.) ¶7. (SBU) Comment: The USD 27.03 Million in USAID funding Ghor received between 2002 and April 2009, is small compared to roughly USD 237.3 Million received by neighboring Herat Province in the same period. Ghor would be unable to absorb a huge aid increase. With some additional funding, however, there is an opportunity to build sustainable stability in an area not yet under pressure from the insurgency. Local officials often half-joke that they would attract more assistance if somebody showered Chaghcharan with rockets. Without increased development and good governance this province could fall into the wrong hands and would likely experience many of the same problems it had before we arrived. End comment.